Gary S. Rosenkrantz

On the Unity of Compound Things: Living and Non-Living

There appear to be at least two kinds of compound physical substances: compound pieces of matter, which have their parts essentially, and living organisms, which do not. Examples of the former are carbon atoms, salt molecules, and pieces of gold; and examples of the latter are protozoa, trees, and cats. Given that there are compound entities of these two kinds, and given that they can be created or destroyed by assembly or disassembly, questions naturally arise about the nature of the causal relations which unite their parts. In answer to these questions, we first argue that the parts of a compound piece of matter are connected via a relation of dynamic equilibrium of attractive and repulsive forces. We then argue that the parts of an organic living thing are united in a different way: they are functionally connected in a broadly Aristotelian sense which is compatible with an ultimately non-teleological, naturalistic biology.

The Metaphysics of Persons

Sosa has viewed personal identity as a function of the causal continuity and connectedness of person-stages. I question whether this sort of approach provides a logically sufficient condition of personal identity. Yet, I find much to recommend in Sosa’s broadly Aristotelian account of persons, an account which implies that a person is not a Cartesian soul, or a Hobbesian body, but rather is “the embodiment by a body of a personal profile.” In defense of this account, Sosa ingeniously argues against the possibility of Cartesian souls on the ground that Diversity Cannot Stand Alone and against the possibility of dualistic interaction on the ground that causal relations supervene on qualitative noncausal factors. Both of these arguments are critically assessed. Finally, Sosa puts forward an apparent dilemma for his broadly Aristotelian ontology of physical substances, including people, namely, either (i) there is an “explosion of reality” (e.g., a spherical piece of snow constitutes infinitely many colocated physical objects), (ii) only noncompound physical objects exist, or (iii) the existence of a physical object is relative to a conceptual scheme. After discussing Sosa’s response to this apparent dilemma, I discuss a fourth alternative which incorporates a form of naturalism and which has some advantages.

A Realistic Theory of Categories: An Essay on Ontology.

Part I. the Realistic Background: 1. Introduciton 2. The nature of attributes 3. The existence of attributes 4. Propositions as reducible to attributes 5. The intentional structure of attributes 6. The primacy of the intentional Part II. The Basic Categories: 7. The ontology of the theory of classes 8. The nature of relations 9. Times and the temporal 10. States and events 11. Spatial entities and material substances 12. Persons and their bodies Part III. Homeless Objects: 13. Appearances 14. Intentionalia 15. Fictitious objects Part IV. Application to Philosophical Theology: 16. Necessary substance.

Substance among Other Categories.

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Substance and other categories 2. Historically prominent accounts of substance 3. Collectionist theories of substance 4. The independence criterion of substance 5. Souls and bodies Appendix 1: the concrete-abstract distinction Appendix 2: Continuous space and time and their parts: a defense of an Aristotelian account Index.

Singular Reference and Unexemplified Haecceities

In the preceding chapter, I argued that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, including both nonexistent possible concreta which are mereologically and causally disjoint, and nonexistent possible concreta which are mereological or causal products.1 As noted earlier, this line of reasoning implies that Strong Extreme Realism is true. Since bifurcated and moderate realist objections to my argument were also answered in that chapter,2 there seems to be no barrier remaining to the acceptance of Strong Extreme Realism. Accordingly, in the arguments to follow I assume that Strong Extreme Realism is true, and hence that no form of Moderate Realism is correct.

Haecceities and Nonexistent Possible Individuals

I have argued that there are nonqualitative haecceities,1 and that if this is the case, then there is a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions.2 I conclude that there exists a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. It seems that if there are abstracta of these kinds, then metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of them. Therefore, it appears that metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. In particular, it is highly plausible that a possibility or possible world is identifiable with an abstractum,that is, a proposition or property, or conjunction of them.3 Using a term coined by Alvin Plantinga, the view which endorses such an identification will be called Modal Realism.4 I shall argue that the postulation of unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities is justified because Modal Realism requires the existence of such properties.

The Problem of Individuation

A standard argument in favor of Realism about abstracta posits the existence of a property in order to explain why several particulars are of the same kind.