Roderick M. Chisholm

Brentano and Intrinsic Value

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Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions

In an article on Hintikkas Knowledge and Belief, I suggested that certain difficult questions come to mind when we consider the thought that an individual in one possible world might be identical with an individual in another possible world.2 The present paper is written in response to the editors invitation to be more explicit about these questions. Let us suppose, then, that the figure of an infinity of possible worlds makes good sense and let us also suppose, for simplicity of presentation, that we have a complete description of this one. We may consider some one of the entities of this world, alter its description slightly. adjust the descriptions of the other entities in the world to fit this alteration, and then ask ourselves whether the entity in the possible world that we thus arrive at is identical with the entity we started with in this world. We start with Adam, say; we alter his description slightly and allow him to live for 931 years instead of for only 930; we then accomodate our

The Agent as Cause

I assume that a theory of agency should be adequate to the following: (1) such statements as ‘Jones killed his uncle’ and ‘Jones raised his arm’ are sometimes true; (2) they imply that there is a certain event or state of affairs that an agent caused or brought about (‘Jones killed his uncle’ implies that the death of Jones’ uncle was caused or brought about by Jones, and ‘Smith raised his arm’ implies that the raising of Smith’s arm was something that was caused or brought about by Smith); and (3) such statements may, on occasion be supplemented, by the true statement “But at the time there was something else he could have done instead.”

REFERRING TO THINGS THAT NO LONGER EXIST

If we take tense seriously and have no illusions with respect to everlasting existence, we should be puzzled about how it is that we are able to refer to those things that once existed but no longer exist. It is reasonable to suppose (1) that Socrates no longer exists and (2) that we may refer to him. We may judge, say, that he was the first great philosopher to die by drinking hemlock. To make a judgment about someone, it might be supposed, is to put oneself into a certain relation with that person. But if Socrates no longer exists, how are we able to put ourselves into any relation with him? Of course, there are ever so many ways in which we may be related to Socrates and to any other thing that no longer exists. One may resemble Socrates by walking in just the same way that he did. The American voters will cause George Washington to have a successor he otherwise would not have had. We may thus seem to reach back into the past and cause things that no longer exist to change in various ways. Relating ourselves to things that no longer exist and even acting upon such things would seem, then, to be familiar phenomena. And our question is, not whether such things occur, but just how it is that they occur. A consideration of how it is that we refer to what no longer exists will show us how to deal with the other types of relation that we seem to bear to such entities. What I will say is intended to throw

The Primacy of the Intentional

According to the thesis of the primacy of the intentional, the reference of language is to be explicated in terms of the intentionality of thought. The word “Pferd,” for example, refers to horses in so far as it is used to express thoughts that are directed upon horses. But most contemporary philosophers of language, until recently at least, have held that the intentionality of thought is to be explicated in terms of the reference of language. But no such explication is at hand.

Beginnings and Endings

In this paper, I will illustrate the way in which Franz Brentano applied the techniques of philosophical analysis to one of the most perplexing areas of metaphysics — a set of aporiae about motion and rest and about coming into being and passing away. These questions, which were suggested by Aristotle, were discussed at length by philosophers in the scholastic tradition. And they led Mendelssohn — at least, according to the way in which Kant interprets him — to conclude that the soul is immortal. I believe that anyone who is concerned about these questions could profit by considering what Brentano has said about them.

The philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm

This text mixes Chisholm as a disseminator of others ideas, with his own theories of knowledge and perception, his defence of Cartesian dualism, foundationalism, his adverbial theory of sensory experience, and his immanent agent causation as a solution to the problem of personal freedom.

Ontologically Dependent Entities

A discussion of the distinction between ontologically dependent and ontologically non-dependent entities presupposes a general theory of categories. I assume that there are four basic types of entity: states; contingent individuals; abstract; and necessary substance. The general theory would involve five dichotomies-five ways of dividing things into exclusive and exhaustive subsets. The dichotomies are these: (1) Things which are contingent and things which are noncontingent or necessary; (2) contingent things which are states and contingent things which are non-states or contingent individuals; (3) contingent individuals which are boundaries and contingent individuals which are non-boundaries or contingent substances; (4) necessary things which are states and necessary things which are not states but are, nevertheless, entia per se; and (5) those entia per se which are abstract and that ens per se which is necessary substance. A theory of categories may be formulated by making use of the following undefined philosophical locutions: (1) x exemplifies y; (2) x is necessarily such that it is F; (3) x is a constituent of y; (4) x is a state of y; and (5) the intentional concept of believing. The result is depicted in the accompanying diagram.

The Directly Evident

In the present paper, I shall correct and refine a theory of the directly evident which I have defended in a number of recent publications. The theory, I now believe, rests upon a mistaken general presupposition.

LEIBNIZ'S LAW IN BELIEF CONTEXTS

Publisher Summary Leibnizs law states that if a certain thing A is identical with a certain thing B, then whatever is true of A is also true of B. However, the problem arises if this law is considered along with three other statements that also seem to be true. These statements comprise: (1) a statement of identity, (2) a belief-statement, and (3) a general statement about the relevance of belief to reality. These statements together can to commit to a contradictory conclusion. To solve the problem, it must be either shown that one of the first four statements is false or that there is no justification for believing that the premises commit to the conclusion. This chapter presents a solution for this particular example. If the solution is adequate, it may be generalized to take care of other cases where Leibnizs law, in application to psychological contexts, seems to lead to similar difficulties.