Geoff G. Cole

You look where I look! Effect of gaze cues on overt and covert attention in misdirection

We designed a magic trick in which misdirection was used to orchestrate observers’ attention in order to prevent them from detecting the to-be-concealed event. By experimentally manipulating the magicians gaze direction we investigated the role that gaze cues have in attentional orienting, independently of any low level features. Participants were significantly less likely to detect the to-be-concealed event if the misdirection was supported by the magicians gaze, thus demonstrating that the gaze plays an important role in orienting peoples attention. Moreover, participants spent less time looking at the critical hand when the magicians gaze was used to misdirect their attention away from the hand. Overall, the magicians face, and in particular the eyes, accounted for a large proportion of the fixations. The eyes were popular when the magician was looking towards the observer; once he looked towards the actions and objects being manipulated, participants typically fixated the gazed-at areas. Using a highly naturalistic paradigm using a dynamic display we demonstrate gaze following that is independent of the low level features of the scene.

Misdirection in magic: Implications for the relationship between eye gaze and attention

Magicians use misdirection to manipulate peoples attention in order to prevent their audiences from uncovering their methods. Here we used a prerecorded version of a magic trick to investigate some of the factors that accompany successful misdirection. Prior information about the nature of the trick significantly improved participants’ detection of the method. The informed participants fixated closer to the event in question, suggesting that they were monitoring it more closely once they knew about the trick. The probability of detection was independent of how far the participant was looking from the “secret” event as it happened, but participants who detected the event moved their eyes towards where it took place much earlier than participants who missed it. This result is consistent with the notion that attention is allocated ahead of the current locus of fixation, and we present evidence that attention may be allocated two or more saccade targets ahead of where the participant is fixating.

Do equiluminant object onsets capture visual attention

S. Yantis and A. P. Hillstrom (1994) have claimed that abrupt onset of a new visual object captures attention even when the new object is equiluminant with its background, implying that attention is captured at the level of object descriptions rather than at the level of luminance change detection. S. Yantis and A. P. Hillstroms experiments contained potential flaws that call their conclusion into question. The present article reports 5 experiments investigating these and related issues. The results suggest that for abruptly onsetting visual objects to capture attention, detection of change in a dimension of sensory stimulation is a necessary, but perhaps not a sufficient, requirement. Evidence is also presented against the view that attentional priority for new objects arises as a result of visual masking of old objects in the same displays.

Visual Salience in the Change Detection Paradigm: The Special Role of Object Onset.

The relative efficacy with which appearance of a new object orients visual attention was investigated. At issue is whether the visual system treats onset as being of particular importance or only 1 of a number of stimulus events equally likely to summon attention. Using the 1-shot change detection paradigm, the authors compared detectability of new objects with changes occurring at already present objects--luminance change, color change, and object offset. Results showed that appearance of a new object was less susceptible to change blindness than changes that old objects could undergo. The authors also investigated whether it is onset per se that leads to enhanced detectability or onset of an object representation. Results showed that the onset advantage was eliminated for onsets that did not correspond with the appearance of a new object. These findings suggest that the visual system is particularly sensitive to the onset of a new object.

Detectability of onsets versus offsets in the change detection paradigm.

The human visual system is particularly sensitive to abrupt onset of new objects that appear in the visual field. Onsets have been shown to capture attention even when other transients simultaneously occur. This has led some authors to argue for the special role that object onset plays in attentional capture. However, evidence from the change detection paradigm appears contradictory to such findings. Studies of change blindness demonstrate that the onset of new objects can often go unnoticed. Assessing the relative detectability of onsets compared with other visual transients in a change detection procedure may help resolve this contradiction. We report the results of four experiments investigating the efficacy with which onsets capture attention compared with offsets. In Experiment 1, we employed a standard flicker procedure and assessed whether participants were more likely to detect the change following a frame containing an onset or following a frame containing an offset. In Experiment 2, we employed the one-shot method and investigated whether participants detected more onsets or offsets. Experiment 3 used the same method but assessed whether onsets would be detected more rapidly than offsets. In Experiment 4, we investigated whether the effect obtained in Experiments 1-3 using simple shapes would replicate when images of real-world objects were used. Results showed that onsets were less susceptible to change blindness than were offsets. We argue that the preservation of information is greater in onsets than in offsets.

Object Onset and Parvocellular Guidance of Attentional Allocation

The parvocellular visual pathway in the primate brain is known to be involved with the processing of color. However, a subject of debate is whether an abrupt change in color, conveyed via this pathway, is capable of automatically attracting attention. It has been shown that the appearance of new objects defined solely by color is indeed capable of modulating attention. However, given evidence suggesting that the visual system is particularly sensitive to new onsets, it is unclear to what extent such results reflect effects of color change per se, rather than effects of object onset. We assessed attentional capture by color change that occurred as a result of either new objects appearing or already-present “old” objects changing color. Results showed that although new object onsets accrued attention, changing the color of old objects did not. We conclude that abrupt color change per se is not sufficient to capture attention.

Fear of Holes

Phobias are usually described as irrational and persistent fears of certain objects or situations, and causes of such fears are difficult to identify. We describe an unusual but common phobia (trypophobia), hitherto unreported in the scientific literature, in which sufferers are averse to images of holes. We performed a spectral analysis on a variety of images that induce trypophobia and found that the stimuli had a spectral composition typically associated with uncomfortable visual images, namely, high-contrast energy at midrange spatial frequencies. Critically, we found that a range of potentially dangerous animals also possess this spectral characteristic. We argue that although sufferers are not conscious of the association, the phobia arises in part because the inducing stimuli share basic visual characteristics with dangerous organisms, characteristics that are low level and easily computed, and therefore facilitate a rapid nonconscious response.

Attentional capture by object appearance and disappearance.

In two experiments we examined whether the appearance of a new object has attentional priority over disappearance. Previous failures to show differences are possibly due to onsets and offsets always being presented as a sole visual transient. Rather than presenting each alone, we presented onset and offset singletons simultaneously with a display-wide luminance transient in order to force each to compete with other visual events. Results from Experiment 1 showed that targets associated with onsets accrued a reaction time benefit whilst targets associated with offsets did not. Experiment 2 showed that onsets attracted attention even when observers were attentionally set to look for offset. By contrast, offsets needed a relevant attentional set in order to attract attention. We argue that the appearance of an object has attentional priority over disappearance.

Change blindness and the primacy of object appearance.

A large body of work suggests that the visual system is particularly sensitive to the appearance of new objects. This is based partly on evidence from visual search studies showing that onsets capture attention whereas many other types of visual event do not. Recently, however, the notion that object onset has a special status in visual attention has been challenged. For instance, an object that looms toward an observer has also been shown to capture attention. In two experiments, we investigated whether onset receives processing priority over looming. Observers performed a change detection task in which one of the display objects either loomed or receded, or a new object appeared. Results showed that looming objects were more resistant to change blindness than receding objects. Crucially, however, the appearance of a new object was less susceptible to change blindness than both looming and receding. We argue that the visual system is particularly sensitive to object onsets.

Mental state attribution and the gaze cueing effect

Theory of mind is said to be possessed by an individual if he or she is able to impute mental states to others. Recently, some authors have demonstrated that such mental state attributions can mediate the “gaze cueing” effect, in which observation of another individual shifts an observer’s attention. One question that follows from this work is whether such mental state attributions produce mandatory modulations of gaze cueing. Employing the basic gaze cueing paradigm, together with a technique commonly used to assess mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals, we manipulated whether the gazing agent could see the same thing as the participant (i.e., the target) or had this view obstructed by a physical barrier. We found robust gaze cueing effects, even when the observed agent in the display could not see the same thing as the participant. These results suggest that the attribution of “seeing” does not necessarily modulate the gaze cueing effect.