Mark A. Atkinson

Mental state attribution and the gaze cueing effect

Theory of mind is said to be possessed by an individual if he or she is able to impute mental states to others. Recently, some authors have demonstrated that such mental state attributions can mediate the “gaze cueing” effect, in which observation of another individual shifts an observer’s attention. One question that follows from this work is whether such mental state attributions produce mandatory modulations of gaze cueing. Employing the basic gaze cueing paradigm, together with a technique commonly used to assess mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals, we manipulated whether the gazing agent could see the same thing as the participant (i.e., the target) or had this view obstructed by a physical barrier. We found robust gaze cueing effects, even when the observed agent in the display could not see the same thing as the participant. These results suggest that the attribution of “seeing” does not necessarily modulate the gaze cueing effect.

Is social inhibition of return due to action co-representation?

When two individuals alternate reaching responses to visual targets presented on a shared workspace, one individual is slower to respond to targets occupying the same position as their partners previous response. This phenomenon is thought to be due to processes that inhibit the initiation of a movement to a location recently acted upon. However, two distinct forms of the inhibition account have been posited, one based on inhibition of an action, the other based on inhibition of an action and location. Furthermore, an additional recent explanation suggests the phenomenon is due to mechanisms that give rise to action congruency effects. Thus the three different theories differ in the degree to which action co-representation plays a role in the effect. The aim of the present work was to examine these competing accounts. Three experiments demonstrated that when identical actions are made, the effect is modulated by the configuration of the visual stimuli acted upon and the perceptual demands of the task. In addition, when the co-actors perform different actions to the same target, the effect is still observed. These findings support the hypothesis that this particular joint action phenomenon is generated via social cues that induce location-based inhibition of return rather than being due to shared motor co-representations.

Spontaneous Perspective Taking in Humans

A number of social cognition studies posit that humans spontaneously compute the viewpoint of other individuals. This is based on experiments showing that responses are shorter when a human agent, located in a visual display, can see the stimuli relevant to the observer’s task. Similarly, responses are slower when the agent cannot see the task-relevant stimuli. We tested the spontaneous perspective taking theory by incorporating it within two classic visual cognition paradigms (i.e., the flanker effect and the Simon effect), as well as reassessing its role in the gaze cueing effect. Results showed that these phenomena (e.g., the Simon effect) are not modulated according to whether a gazing agent can see the critical stimuli or not. We also examined the claim that previous results attributed to spontaneous perspective taking are due to the gazing agent’s ability to shift attention laterally. Results found no evidence of this. Overall, these data challenge both the spontaneous perspective taking theory, as well as the attentional shift hypothesis.

Connecting Those That Care: Designing for Transitioning, Talking, Belonging and Escaping

Care provision in many nations increasingly relies on the work of informal, or non-professional, carers. Often these carers experience substantial disruptions and reductions to their own sociality, weakened social support networks and, ultimately, a heightened risk of social isolation. We describe a qualitative study, comprised of interviews, design workshops and probes, that investigated the social and community support practices of carers. Our findings highlight issues related to becoming and recognising being a carer, and feelings of being ignored by, and isolated from, others. We also note the benefits that sharing between carers can bring, and routes to coping and relaxing from the burdens of care. We conclude with design considerations for facilitating new forms of digitally mediated support that connect those that care, emphasising design qualities related to transitioning, talking, belonging and escaping.

Action or attention in social inhibition of return

When two individuals alternate reaching responses to targets located in a visual display, reaction times are longer when responses are directed to where the co-actor just responded. Although an abundance of work has examined the many characteristics of this phenomenon it is not yet known why the effect occurs. In particular, some authors have argued that action representation mechanisms are central to the effect. However, here we present evidence in support of an account in which the representation of action is not necessary. First, the basic effect occurs even when participants cannot see their co-actor’s movement but, importantly, have their attention shifted to a target side via an attentional cue. Second, its time course is too short-lasting to function effectively as a component of action planning. Finally, unlike other joint action phenomena, the effect is not modulated by higher order mechanisms concerned with the personal attributes of a co-actor. Taken together, these results suggest that this particular joint action phenomenon is due to attentional rather than action mechanisms.

Visual attention and action: How cueing, direct mapping, and social interactions drive orienting

Despite considerable interest in both action perception and social attention over the last 2 decades, there has been surprisingly little investigation concerning how the manual actions of other humans orient visual attention. The present review draws together studies that have measured the orienting of attention, following observation of another’s goal-directed action. Our review proposes that, in line with the literature on eye gaze, action is a particularly strong orienting cue for the visual system. However, we additionally suggest that action may orient visual attention using mechanisms, which gaze direction does not (i.e., neural direct mapping and corepresentation). Finally, we review the implications of these gaze-independent mechanisms for the study of attention to action. We suggest that our understanding of attention to action may benefit from being studied in the context of joint action paradigms, where the role of higher level action goals and social factors can be investigated.

Are goal states represented during kinematic imitation

A number of studies have shown that observation of another person’s actions can modulate one’s own actions, such as when 2 individuals cooperate in order to complete a joint task. However, little is known about whether or not direct matching of specific movements is modulated by the goals of the actions observed. In a series of 7 experiments, we employed an action observation paradigm in which 2 coactors sat opposite each other and took turns to reach out to targets presented on a shared workspace. Importantly, coactors performed either the same goal at the reached-to location or a different goal. Although results consistently showed that the reaching action of 1 individual slows the observer’s reaching action to the same spatial location, the effect was not modulated according to the adopted goals of coactors. These findings challenge the notion that the processes involved in the imitation of specific movements code for the action goals of those movements.

How social is social inhibition of return

A number of studies have shown that the motor actions of one individual can affect the attention of an observer. In one notable example, “social inhibition of return,” observers are relatively slow to initiate a response to a location where another individual has just responded. In the present article we examine the degree to which this phenomenon can be considered a social effect. We find that unlike the related social, or “joint,” Simon effect, social inhibition of return is not influenced by competitive versus cooperative interaction, nor by live versus recorded interaction. We do find however that co-actors need to turn-take in order for the effect to occur. Thus, so-called “social” inhibition of return only reaches a minimal threshold to be considered a social phenomenon.