Geoff Stewart

Management objectives and strategic interactions among capitalist and labour-managed firms

Abstract It has recently been shown that the separation of ownership and control in a capitalist firm may not lead to a conflict of interests between managers and owners when there are oligopolistic interactions between firms. This paper introduces labour-managed firms into the picture. We show that when the labour-managed firm is involved the prospect of gains from managerial discretion under Cournot oligopoly may be replaced by an inevitable loss. In an entry deterrence framework on the other hand there is, once more, the possibility of mutual gains. The effect of strategic behaviour more generally may therefore depend upon firm organisation.

Profit-sharing in cournot oligopoly

It has been argued that, even if there are macroeconomic benefits, individual firms will not switch from a conventional wage system to profit-sharing. We show that while true for a monopolist, it does not generally hold under Cournot oligopoly.

Capitalists and workers: knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm

Does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm? The formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge, and we demonstrate that, in this context, there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm - that is, to be the ‘capitalist’. Results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate. The key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm. This contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature.

On the choice between capitalist and labour-managed production: evidence from a panel of entrants into UK manufacturing industries

Empirical evidence suggests that labour-managed firms (LMFs) are relatively rare in market economies not because they are unable to survive as long as their capitalist firm (CF) counterparts, but rather because they are created much less frequently. In this chapter we use event count models applied to panel data on UK manufacturing to provide a direct comparison of the entry process of CFs and LMFs. Our main finding is that risk and capital requirements constitute greater entry barriers for LMFs than for CFs.

Implicit amenity prices and the location of retirees in England and Wales

General equilibrium models in which compensation for local amenities occurs in both housing and labour markets have been widely used to generate implicit amenity prices and regional quality of life indices. An implication and prospective test of such models is that individuals who are outside the labour market have an incentive to locate in regions where amenities are capitalized into wages. In this article we construct a measure of the extent of amenity capitalization into wages for each county in England and Wales. We then test the multimarket amenity model by applying this measure to county-level data on the location of retirees. Our results provide strong support for the model.

MODELING PROPORTIONS: RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS OF UK FIRM ENTRY

A long-standing issue in industrial economics is the understanding of the relative prevalence of labor-managed firms (LMFs) and capitalist firms across industries. In proportionate terms, LMF entry tends to be highly concentrated in particular industries. We provide empirical evidence on this by modeling the proportions of industry entrants that are LMFs, using a panel of UK manufacturing industries. Random effects proportions models indicate the role and importance of risk and capital requirements as potential deterrents to LMF entry.

Trade Liberalisation, Market Structure and the Incentive to Merge

In this article, we consider whether a movement towards freer international trade generates incentives for firms to merge and if so what forms of merger are most profitable. In a linear Cournot framework, we show that a reduction in trade costs may, but will not necessarily, encourage mergers. Both market structure and the level to which trade costs fall are shown to play a decisive role. Domestic mergers will be encouraged only if the product market is not highly concentrated and trade costs fall below a threshold level. International mergers can be encouraged in any market structure, and are generally more profitable than domestic mergers.

International Trade and the Incentive for Merger

This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.