Geoffrey Roberts

History, theory and the narrative turn in IR

My lecture has three main themes: First, the nature and extent of the turn to history and narrative in the study of international relations. Second, the contribution of narrative history to IR theory, not as an adjunct or empirical resource, but as a theoretical perspective in its own right. Narrative historians of international relations may not adhere to an explicit theory of international relations but they do practice an implicit philosophy of history, a philosophy as sophisticated and theoretically fertile as any other IR theoretical approach.

The Soviet decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany

(1) When did the USSR decide to embark on political negotiations with Nazi Germany with a view to securing a German-Soviet detente? (2) How, from Moscows point of view, did these negotiations progress from their general inception to the actual non-aggression treaty and spheres of influence agreement embodied in the Nazi-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939? (3) What was the nature of the Soviet foreign policy decision represented by the pact with Nazi Germany?

Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947

(1994). Moscow and the Marshall plan: Politics, ideology and the onset of the cold war, 1947. Europe-Asia Studies: Vol. 46, No. 8, pp. 1371-1386.

Ideology, calculation, and improvisation: spheres of influence and Soviet foreign policy 1939–1945

This article examines Soviet foreign policy during the Second World War in the light of new evidence from the Russian archives. It highlights the theme of spheres of influence and the relationship between the pursuit of this goal by the USSR and the outbreak of the Cold War. It argues that the Cold War was the result of an attempt by Moscow to harmonise spheres of influence and postwar cooperation with Britain and the United States with the ideological project of a people’s democratic Europe.

Infamous encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsäcker meeting of 17 April 1939

This article uses recently released documents from the Soviet diplomatic archives to examine the Merekalov–Weizsacker meeting of April 1939. It argues that these documents show that western historians have been mistaken in assuming that this meeting was the occasion for Soviet signals of a desire for detente with Nazi Germany. The significance attached to the meeting in this respect is part of the cold war myth that the USSRs negotiations for a triple alliance with Great Britain and France in the spring and summer of 1939 were paralleled by secret Soviet–German discussions which eventually lead to the Nazi–Soviet pact of August 1939. The article seeks to demolish those elements of the myth that concern the Merekalov–Weizsacker encounter and to present an alternative interpretation of the provenance and meaning of the so-called political overture by the Soviet ambassador at the meeting.

Sexing up the Cold War: New Evidence on the Molotov–Truman Talks of April 1945

This article presents and examines new evidence from the Russian archives on the Truman–Molotov talks of April 1945. This new evidence undercuts the conventional story that this was a rough and tough meeting that led to a significant deterioration of Soviet–American relations. The turn to Cold War came much later, and it was only in that context that the Molotov–Truman encounter came to be looked upon as a particularly negative event. That retrospective view fed into postwar memoirs and then into the historiography, thereby creating one of the mythical, emblematic events of the early Cold War.

Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography

Recently released files from the collection (fond) of Josif Stalins papers in the former Central Party Archive in Moscow have shed new light on the development of postwar S viet diplomatic historiography, particularly in relation to Stalins personal role in framing the official rationale and justification for the Nazis viet pact of 19391941. This episode gave rise to a policy of archivebased publications in the mid 1950s and pr vided the foundation for later Soviet (and posts viet) treatments of the diplomatic history of the Second World War and other topics.

Soviet policy and the Baltic States, 1939–1940 a reappraisal

(1995). Soviet policy and the Baltic States, 1939–1940 a reappraisal. Diplomacy & Statecraft: Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 672-700.

A Soviet Bid for Coexistence with Nazi Germany, 1935–1937: The Kandelaki Affair

of the most intriguing mysteries in the history of Soviet foreign policy is the story of David Kandelaki, the Soviet trade representative at Berlin between 1934 and 1937, who negotiated two important trade and credit agreements with the Germans. In the early spring of 1937, Kandelaki returned to Moscow to become deputy peoples commissar for foreign trade; shortly afterwards, he was purged and, in 1938, he died. His fate was typical of many Soviet embassy officials of the 1930s: a period of service abroad, recall to Moscow, a posting in the central apparatus, dismissal and imprisonment, and death. Notwithstanding his brief period as a deputy commissar, Kandelaki was only a middle-ranking official and probably his name would have faded into obscurity but for his involvement in a famous episode in pre-war Soviet diplomacy. Kandelaki was posted to Berlin shortly after Hitlers accession to power in 1933 had brought to an end the co-operative relationship established at Rapallo between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia. In 1933 and 1934, the Soviets, in the hope of normal relations with the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Nazi regime, made proposals for German participation in collective-security arrangements covering Eastern Europe, and for a joint Soviet-German guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic states. When all such attempts at conciliation failed, the Soviets took up the idea of collective security against aggression and of a grand alliance against Fascism and Nazism. The outcome, in May 1935, was treaties of mutual assistance against Germany with both France and Czechoslovakia, which further soured Soviet-German relations.1 Kandelakis posting at Berlin was marked by public political polemics, by diplomatic conflicts, and, even, when the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, by a sort of Nazi-Communist war by

Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War

how Kotkin will present the loaded history of Soviet-German relations in the 1930s in his next volume. Some passages from the book read topically, and not only for Cold War history. Turning against the West and doing things ‘in my own way’, fateful errors that the authoritarian Soviet leadership could not admit or recall, do not appear to be things of the past. Stalin inherited from Lenin the double problem of ‘an ideologically blinkered dictatorship’ and ‘a costly global antagonism’ (p. 419). Moscow’s leaders never seem to inherit much good from each other. Managing Russian power in the world has been progressively difficult, as the world developed with increasing speed. Stalin reminds us that autocratic rulers can be incredibly lucky and benefit from fortuitous turns of events. But in the end, authoritarian solutions can turn into tragedies, particularly when the autocrat is not held accountable. Russian people became first victims of Stalin’s dictatorship, then the others.