Geoffrey Wiseman

Diplomatic practices at the United Nations

This article considers the importance of informal, practice-based change as opposed to formal change at the UN. I first evaluate UN reform, showing that diplomacy and institutional change within the UN system are better understood as having evolved less from major, formal reform of the UN Charter (‘the Charter’) than from minor changes in routine practices. I then examine what practice theory and diplomatic studies can learn from each other in terms of how each views the role of leading individuals, illustrating specific practice-based change in relation to the Secretary-General’s role. Next, I show how the appointment process for a new Secretary-General has evolved through informal practice, after which I advance an argument that UN diplomatic practices should be considered not only within the narrow context of a formal diplomatic corps of member state diplomats but also as part of an informal, wider diplomatic community of diplomats and non-state actors. Practice theory helps students of diplomacy think more abstractly and systematically about mundane diplomatic practices. Students of diplomacy can help guide practice theory toward empirical diplomatic activities that are often internalized and taken for granted. I conclude that a dialog between the two fields will promote a better understanding of diplomacy as undervalued practices.

Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy

My central claim is that the United States has conducted a distinctive form of ‘anti-diplomacy’, accepting in practice many diplomatic norms and practices while remaining reluctant to acknowledge the fact. To support this claim, this article argues that since its rise as a world power, the United States has participated in international society’s diplomatic culture in a distinctive way and that this distinctiveness stems from seven interconnected characteristics of American diplomacy: (1) America’s long-held distrust and negative view of diplomats and diplomacy, which has contributed to the historical neglect and sidelining of the US Department of State in the United States’ policy-making process; (2) a high degree of domestic influence over foreign policy and diplomacy; (3) a tendency to privilege hard power over soft power in foreign policy; (4) a preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy; (5) an ideological tradition of diplomatically isolating states that are considered adversarial and of refusing to engage them until they meet preconditions; (6) a tradition of appointing a relatively high proportion of political rather than career ambassadors; and (7) a demonstrably strong cultural disposition towards a direct, low-context negotiating style. A consequence of these distinguishing characteristics is that American diplomacy tends to be less effective than it might otherwise be, not only in advancing the United States’ own interests, but also in advancing wider international cooperation. A goal here is to provide a working framework with which to evaluate any US administration’s relationship to diplomacy as the country’s interests and identity evolve.

Engaging the Enemy: An Essential Norm for Sustainable US Diplomacy

This chapter examines the role that diplomatic engagement of an enemy – that is, an adversarial state – plays in sustainable diplomacy.1 My key claim is twofold: that the idea of talking with – or, more accurately, engaging – hostile regimes is inherent in and essential to diplomatic culture’s norm of continuous dialogue, and that the US must embrace this norm by engaging, rather than isolating and imposing preconditions on, adversarial states if it is to reap the full benefits of, and at the same time contribute to, the conflict-resolving potential of sustainable diplomacy.

What is Non-Provocative Defence?

The idea that the risk of war increases when defence policies are based on offensive military thinking and decreases when defence policies are based on defensive, or non-provocative, thinking is not a new one. Nor is the idea that international security in general will be improved if defensive elements are integrated into the defence policies of states and alliances. Thus, ideas promoting non-provocative defence were not novel when they began receiving attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period marked by deteriorating East-West relations caused by such problems as regional conflicts in Africa, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the build-up of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, and plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to modernise its Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). Actions by both the East and the West at this time appeared to reflect a reversion to what has been widely regarded as a central problem in international relations: the so-called security dilemma, defined as ‘the dynamic in which one state’s efforts to increase its security are perceived as being achieved at the expense of another state’s security, promoting a spiral of competition that usually manifests itself in an arms race that, ultimately, leads to war’.

The Development of Non-Provocative Defence Concepts in Western Europe in the 1980s

In the 1980s, proposals for improving the stability of East-West security relations began to focus on non-provocative defence concepts. These defensive proposals arose in essentially two contexts: the sustained Western critique of NATO deterrence strategy in the early to mid 1980s, and Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence pronouncements under the rubric of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ beginning in 1986. This chapter has three major parts. The first looks at why non-provocative defence concepts arose in Western Europe in the 1980s, highlighting salient features of the debates in several countries. The second surveys state policies in Switzerland and Sweden, two European neutral states that voluntarily practice versions of non-provocative defence. The third assesses the non-provocative defence critique of NATO policy that followed NATO’s 1979 ‘dual-track’ decision and its move to include more offensive elements in its conventional war plans. The assessment is made in terms of defensive writers’ main claims, assumptions, and modes of discourse.

New Defensive Thinking in the Soviet Union, 1986–89

This chapter examines the rise of defensive thinking in the USSR under Gorbachev during 1986–89. In doing so, it considers three main propositions: that Western-originated thinking on non-provocative defence influenced NATO only through its influence on the Soviet Union; that new thinking in the Soviet Union owed much to non-official Western influences but largely legitimised itself by drawing on the Soviet past; and that Western offensive policies may have facilitated the emergence of Soviet defensive policies. After briefly reviewing earlier Soviet defensive thinking, I discuss the main claims of the new Soviet thinking under Gorbachev, examining evidence of a shift towards defensive doctrine after 1986. I then consider Soviet defensive advocates’ main assumptions and modes of discourse, concluding by considering how the Soviet defensive debate may have contributed to ending the Cold War.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Non-Provocative Defence: Lessons for the Future

This book’s central concern is to examine the viability of non-provocative defence concepts. In different ways, chapters two through eight have helped to answer the main questions identified in chapter one: Do non-provocative defence concepts constitute a coherent military-security strategy for deterring potential attackers, fighting wars, and even settling wars? Do such concepts actually help convey defensive intent, thereby helping to resolve the security dilemma? Under what conditions do these concepts provide a viable basis for the defence policies of states? Was the rise of non-provocative defence concepts tied necessarily to the late Cold War era? Are defensive concepts relevant under post-Cold War conditions?

Antecedents of Non-Provocative Defence

The 1980s debate about defensive concepts can be traced to several historical sources. One is early public debates and diplomatic negotiations on arms control related to, for example, the inter-war Washington naval treaties and Geneva Disarmament Conference. A second is the post-war settlements of 1918–19 and 1945; a third is the post-Second World War ‘German problem7. A fourth is the practice of certain neutral states. In examining these sources, one finds several recurring ideas: a conviction that arms races cause war; a sense that offensive and defensive armaments can be distinguished; a belief in the political, military, and moral power of defensive weapons and buffer zones; a preference for conscript, reservist, or militia forms of military organisation over professional standing armies; a desire for public awareness to replace secrecy in military matters; and a willingness to consider the role of one’s own country in threat creation. The brief survey presented here identifies defensive antecedents in three periods: the inter-war years, the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, and the 1950s through the 1970s. These ‘eras’ were chosen both to organise ideas that emerged from disparate sources and to highlight certain turning points in the development of those ideas.

Defensive Approaches in the Asia-Pacific

Since the Cold War’s end, the Asia-Pacific has become an increasingly significant area in terms of politics, strategy, and economics.1 This chapter examines the viability of defensive concepts in the Asia-Pacific region since 1989, focusing on the security debate and highlighting the extent to which several of the region’s countries have pursued policies manifesting strong defensive elements. The security debate concerning this region has included some defensive advocacy and . as with previous cases . the unacknowledged application of defensive norms and assumptions. However, the attention that defensive advocates have paid to the possibility of applying their ideas to the Asia-Pacific has been comparatively minor, and the number of regionally based advocates has been small.2

Collective Security and Defensive Concepts: the 1990–91 Gulf War

Iraq’s 1990 invasion and annexation of Kuwait caught the European non-provocative defence community off guard. Defensive theorists had not given much thought to how their concepts would apply beyond Europe and to how to handle a flagrant and unambiguous act of aggression. In particular, no serious or sustained effort had been made to understand how defensive concepts might be reconciled with collective security requiring offensive military power. And while defensive theorists had closely examined ‘war prevention’ and ‘war fighting’, at least in Europe, they (like most others) had neglected the problem of how to settle a war defensively.1