Georg Brun

Ranking policy options for sustainable development

Sustainable development calls for choices among alternative policy options. It is a common view that such choices can be justified by appealing to an evaluative ranking of the options with respect to how their consequences affect a broad range of prudential and moral values. Three philosophically motivated proposals for analysing evaluative rankings are discussed: the measured merits model (e.g. Chang), the ordered values model (e.g. Griffin), and the permissible preference orderings model (Rabinowicz). The analysis focuses on the models’ potential for making transparent how an evaluative ranking can contribute to a justified choice among options, particularly in situations that involve diverse values as typically found in debates on sustainable development. Such transparency plays a crucial role when policy rankings are going to be used as arguments in political decision processes. The measured merits model is found to have questionable consequences for the concept of sustainability, while the ordered values model calls for an axiological framework that cannot plausibly be spelled out for sustainability. The permissible preference orderings model is more promising. Its formal structure and its ability to deal with value-pluralism provide an interesting re-structuring of the problem of justifying choices in sustainability issues.ZusammenfassungNachhaltige Entwicklung verlangt, zwischen alternativen Strategien bzw. Verfahrensweisen zu wählen. Es ist üblich, eine solche Wahl mit Verweis auf eine evaluative Rangordnung der Optionen zu rechtfertigen. Dabei muss berücksichtigt werden, wie die Konsequenzen der Optionen unterschiedlichste Werte betreffen. Werden Rangordnungen von Strategien als Argumente im politischen Entscheidungsprozess verwendet, spielt Transparenz eine zentrale Rolle. Wir diskutieren drei philosophisch motivierte Modelle evaluativer Rangordnungen: das Messwertmodell (z.B. Chang), das Wertordnungsmodell (z.B. Griffin) und das Modell der zulässigen Präferenzordnungen (Rabinowicz). Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf den Beitrag der verschiedenen Modelle, die Rechtfertigung einer Wahl zwischen Optionen transparent zu machen. Während das Messwertmodell fragwürdige Konsequenzen für das Konzept der nachhaltigen Entwicklung hat, verlangt das Wertordnungsmodell eine axiologische Struktur, die für Nachhaltigkeit nicht plausibel ausgearbeitet werden kann. Das Modell der zulässigen Präferenzordnungen scheint vielversprechender zu sein. Seine formale Struktur und die Möglichkeit, Werte-Pluralismus zu modellieren, erlauben es, das Problem, wie Nachhaltigkeits-entscheidungen gerechtfertigt werden können, neu zu strukturieren.RésuméLe développement durable exige de choisir entre différentes stratégies ou politiques. Il est courant de justifier un tel choix par un classement évaluatif des options. Il faut à cet égard tenir compte du fait que les conséquences de ces options touchent différentes valeurs. Lorsque le classement de stratégies est utilisé comme argument dans le processus de décision politique, la transparence joue un rôle central. Nous amenons la discussion sur trois modèles de classement évaluatif motivés par une pensée philosophique: le modèle des valeurs mesurées (p. ex. Chang), le modèle des valeurs classées (p. ex. Griffin) et le modèle des classements préférentiels admissibles (Rabinowicz). L’analyse se concentre sur la contribution des différents modèles à rendre transparente la justification d’un choix entre les options. Tandis que le modèle des valeurs mesurées a des conséquences discutables pour le concept du développement durable, le modèle des valeurs classées exige une structure axiologique qui ne peut être élaborée de manière plausible pour la durabilité. Le modèle des classements préférentiels admissibles semble beaucoup plus prometteur. Sa structure formelle et la possibilité de traiter le pluralisme de valeurs permettent de structurer de manière nouvelle le problème de la justification des choix dans le domaine de la durabilité.

Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision

This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument has to be evaluated. The suggested procedure includes rules for recording whether the author in fact accepts or denies the premises and the conclusion, as well as tests for enthymematic validity and strategies for revising belief state ascriptions. Different degrees of interpretive charity can be exercised. This is one reason why the interpretation or reconstruction of an enthymematic argument typically does not result in a unique outcome.

Acting now or later? Determining an adequate decision strategy for mitigation measures addressing methane emissions from ruminants

Nutritive options for ruminants, which have been proposed to mitigate methane (CH4) emissions, are used to showcase how decision strategies enable reasonable decision-making in case of various types of uncertainty of information regarding the policy decision problem. Decision strategies concerning the scope of the decision problem and the timing of decision-making provide a systematic structure for deliberation and learning about these types of uncertainty. Regarding nutritive options for ruminants, incompleteness, inherent variability, and unreliability of information about the options, outcomes and stakes involved speak against accepting the proposed list of options and closure of the decision problem. However, the role of CH4 emissions from ruminants in abating global warming speaks against passive postponement of decision-making. Thus, decision strategies to be considered are adapting the list of options and active postponement, or possibly semi-closure, of decision-making.

ADEQUATE FORMALIZATION AND DE MORGAN’S ARGUMENT

Lampert and Baumgartner (2010) critically discuss accounts of adequate formalization focusing on my analysis in (Brun 2004). There, I investigated three types of criteria of adequacy (matching truth conditions, corresponding syntactical surface and systematicity) and argued that they ultimately call for a procedure of formalization. Although Lampert and Baumgartner have a point about matching truth conditions, their arguments target a truncated version of my account. They ignore all aspects of systematicity which make their counter-example unconvincing.