George J. Gilboy

China's Coming Transformation

Social forces unleashed by Chinas economic reform over the last 20 years are now driving inexorably toward a fundamental trans formation of Chinese politics. Since the suppression of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square, Chinas leaders have struggled to maintain the political status quo, even while pursuing rapid economic reform. The result today is a nonadaptive, brittle state that is unable to cope with an increasingly organized, complex, and robust society. Further efforts to resist political change will only squander the benefits of social and economic dynamism, perpetuate the governments costly battle to contain the populace, drive politics toward increasingly tense domestic confrontation, and ultimately threaten the system with collapse. Many of todays senior Chinese officials recognize this dilemma but have powerful personal motivations to resist change. The next gener ation of Chinese leaders, however?set to take office in 2002-3?is both more supportive of reform and less constrained by Tiananmen-era political baggage. These new leaders will likely respond to the dilemma, therefore, by accelerating political liberalization. This does not imply that China will soon become a Western-style democracy. Rather, the coming steps in reform will likely include

Political and Social Reform in China: Alive and Walking

The twin drivers of long-term Chinese social and political conflict and change—an increasingly robust society and a more adaptive party-state—have continued to gather strength, leading not toward Western democracy but uneven and fragile reform and liberalization.

Double Trouble: A Realist View of Chinese and Indian Power

Washington sees Indian power as part of the solution to the challenges posed by the rise of China. But an objective assessment of Chinese and Indian national interests and international actions suggests it is far more likely that each will pose significant challenges to U.S. interests, albeit of different kinds. India will be no less likely than China to pursue vigorously its own interests, many of which run counter to those of the United States, simply because it is a democracy. Over the last decade, Washington has sharpened its hedging strategy toward China, now reinforced by the Obama administration’s ‘‘rebalancing’’ toward Asia. On one hand, Washington works with Beijing on common problems such as counterterrorism, some economic issues, and the challenge of North Korean nuclear weapons. On the other hand, U.S. policy works to balance Beijing’s power in Asia, especially when Chinese activities might destabilize or otherwise directly challenge the interests of the United States or its Asian partners. Meanwhile, the United States is seeking to increase Indian power and enlist New Delhi as a partner in its hedging strategy against China. In the past decade, Washington has sold nearly

Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Foreign Policy, Use of Force, and Border Settlements

10 billion of advanced military systems and weapons to India, has negotiated arms and technology transfer agreements with New Delhi, and has initiated an expanding program of joint military exercises. The 2008 U.S.—India civilian nuclear deal reversed long-standing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies and provided India with greater international access to nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

The Myth Behind China's Miracle

Some assessments of Chinese foreign policy argue that China’s strategic culture inculcates aggression, leading China toward assertive foreign policies, including the use of force. As the preceding chapter indicates, however, when compared to core texts that may shape Indian strategic thought, the Chinese classics on strategic thinking appear less unique. In this chapter, we examine the two countries’ foreign policy trajectories, their use of force, and their record of border conflict and settlements. This will provide further comparative context for making judgments about Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior. In many influential studies of Chinese foreign policy, judgments have already been made. Some scholars believe the People’s Republic of China (PRC), like its imperial predecessor, uses force “frequently,” with the implication that this means China uses force more frequently than other states. In this view, using force is a primary – perhaps preferred – Chinese method for conducting international politics. Another view argues that Chinese security policy is characterized by a “cult of defense,” which causes Chinese leaders to rationalize the use of offensive force as being purely defensive and increases the chances that China will be involved in future war.