Eric Heginbotham

Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy

International relations scholars have largely overlooked Japan in their surveys of great power politics. At the same time, students of Japan frequently focus on a single policy area or on Japan’s bilateral relations with specific states and have generally failed to test Japan’s larger strategic calculus against international relations theory.’ Those who have examined Japanese grand strategy typically adopt a structural realist model, under which states are motivated primarily by the fundamental imperative of military security and frequently subordinate other goals to that end. Some scholars, observing divergence from behavior predicted by this theory, have concluded that Japan’s foreign policy is nonrealist or otherwise exceptional.2 In this article, we examine Japan’s postwar foreign policy both against structural realism and against what we call ”mercantile realism,” which recognizes technoeconomic security interests-including, but not limited to, those associated with military security-as central considerations of state policy. We conclude that although Japan clearly does not ignore military security,

China's Coming Transformation

Social forces unleashed by Chinas economic reform over the last 20 years are now driving inexorably toward a fundamental trans formation of Chinese politics. Since the suppression of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square, Chinas leaders have struggled to maintain the political status quo, even while pursuing rapid economic reform. The result today is a nonadaptive, brittle state that is unable to cope with an increasingly organized, complex, and robust society. Further efforts to resist political change will only squander the benefits of social and economic dynamism, perpetuate the governments costly battle to contain the populace, drive politics toward increasingly tense domestic confrontation, and ultimately threaten the system with collapse. Many of todays senior Chinese officials recognize this dilemma but have powerful personal motivations to resist change. The next gener ation of Chinese leaders, however?set to take office in 2002-3?is both more supportive of reform and less constrained by Tiananmen-era political baggage. These new leaders will likely respond to the dilemma, therefore, by accelerating political liberalization. This does not imply that China will soon become a Western-style democracy. Rather, the coming steps in reform will likely include

Double Trouble: A Realist View of Chinese and Indian Power

Washington sees Indian power as part of the solution to the challenges posed by the rise of China. But an objective assessment of Chinese and Indian national interests and international actions suggests it is far more likely that each will pose significant challenges to U.S. interests, albeit of different kinds. India will be no less likely than China to pursue vigorously its own interests, many of which run counter to those of the United States, simply because it is a democracy. Over the last decade, Washington has sharpened its hedging strategy toward China, now reinforced by the Obama administration’s ‘‘rebalancing’’ toward Asia. On one hand, Washington works with Beijing on common problems such as counterterrorism, some economic issues, and the challenge of North Korean nuclear weapons. On the other hand, U.S. policy works to balance Beijing’s power in Asia, especially when Chinese activities might destabilize or otherwise directly challenge the interests of the United States or its Asian partners. Meanwhile, the United States is seeking to increase Indian power and enlist New Delhi as a partner in its hedging strategy against China. In the past decade, Washington has sold nearly

Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity

10 billion of advanced military systems and weapons to India, has negotiated arms and technology transfer agreements with New Delhi, and has initiated an expanding program of joint military exercises. The 2008 U.S.—India civilian nuclear deal reversed long-standing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies and provided India with greater international access to nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's Response to China's Military Challenge

Even as events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine have captured the attention of U.S. foreign policy elites, the United States faces key questions about its military position in Asia. In the face of growing Chinese power, can the United States continue to provide a credible deterrent in Asia without either bankrupting itself or pursuing risky strategies that raise new questions about crisis stability? While other security issues remain important, none will have a more fundamental effect on the U.S. military budget or the way the United States does business overseas. Basic precepts of U.S. foreign and security policy are under debate. Notable commentators have recently argued that U.S. forward defenses in Asia are no longer viable and that the United States should transition to a less engaged strategy of “offshore balancing.” Others have countered that the right combination of new technologies and offensive systems might yet restore U.S. dominance. While we welcome the new debate, neither of the most prominent alternative approaches is advisable. The United States requires a new strategy, one that does more to assure U.S. partners than offshore balancing but that is also affordable and does not rely on a vulnerable hair-trigger offensive posture. Fortunately, the United States could realize such a strategy, though it would require significant diplomatic efforts as well as a variety of military adjustments.

Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Foreign Policy, Use of Force, and Border Settlements

The growth of Chinese military power poses significant challenges to Japan. Chinas military spending, which was half that of Japans in 1996, is now three and a half times as large. Japan has taken a range of measures to buttress its military forces and loosen the restrictions on their operations, but much remains to be done. Most important, Tokyo needs to reexamine its strategy to maximize Japans deterrent leverage. Of the three general approaches to conventional deterrence—punishment, forward defense, and denial—Japans best option is to shift to a denial strategy. Such a strategy, built around a resilient force that can survive attack and attrite an encroaching adversary, can make the risks to a potential attacker unacceptably high. In Japans case, such a strategy would leverage the inherent dangers that Beijing would face in contemplating a prolonged war against Japan and its U.S. ally. The strategy, updated to reflect the imperatives of air and maritime warfare in the precision strike era, would require a high level of dispersion and mobility and might therefore be labeled “active denial.” Adopting an active denial strategy would buttress Japans defense and deterrent capability while reducing first-strike incentives and improving crisis stability.

Japan's Dual Hedge

Some assessments of Chinese foreign policy argue that China’s strategic culture inculcates aggression, leading China toward assertive foreign policies, including the use of force. As the preceding chapter indicates, however, when compared to core texts that may shape Indian strategic thought, the Chinese classics on strategic thinking appear less unique. In this chapter, we examine the two countries’ foreign policy trajectories, their use of force, and their record of border conflict and settlements. This will provide further comparative context for making judgments about Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior. In many influential studies of Chinese foreign policy, judgments have already been made. Some scholars believe the People’s Republic of China (PRC), like its imperial predecessor, uses force “frequently,” with the implication that this means China uses force more frequently than other states. In this view, using force is a primary – perhaps preferred – Chinese method for conducting international politics. Another view argues that Chinese security policy is characterized by a “cult of defense,” which causes Chinese leaders to rationalize the use of offensive force as being purely defensive and increases the chances that China will be involved in future war.