George Klosko

Democratic procedures and liberal consensus

1. Liberal Commitments 2. Theoretical Foundations 3. Democratic Values 4. Religion and Democratic Values 5. Support for Democratic Procedures 6. Distributive Justice 7. Rawls Political Constructivism and Democratic Values 8. Procedural Justice Conclusion Appendix Bibliography Index

Rebellious Collective Action Revisited

Why does it happen that ordinary people can come to participate in rebellious collective action? In the June 1986 issue of this Review , Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp argued a public-goods model to account for why rational citizens may become rebels. They offered empirical data drawn from samples in New York City and Hamburg, Germany in support of the public-goods model. George Kolsko takes issue with the rationale of Muller and Opp, arguing that their public-goods model is not a rational-choice explanation of rebellious collective action. In response, Muller and Opp clarify their theory and further elaborate its assumptions.

Multiple Principles of Political Obligation

Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation based on individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. Astronger position can result fromcombining different principles in a single theory. I develop a multiprinciple theory of political obligation, based on the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the “common good” principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: “cumulation,” combining the separate state services that different principles cover; “mutual support,” combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The resulting theory is able to satisfy the main conditions for an adequate theory of obligation: demonstrating that all or nearly all inhabitants of society have moral requirements to obey the law, and that these extend to the full range of state services.

Rawls's “Political” Philosophy and American Democracy.

John Rawls has recently argued that political philosophy can significantly contribute to making democratic societies stable. He seeks moral principles that can ground what he calls an overlapping consensus and argues that his well-known principles of justice can serve in this capacity. I criticize both Rawlss general claims about the role of political philosophy and his particular defense of the principles of justice. Both arguments commit Rawls to specific empirical claims about existing liberal societies that are highly questionable. In particular, the Kantian moral views that Rawls believes to be central to liberal culture are controverted by extensive empirical research on the actual beliefs of liberal citizens. Despite the problems with Rawlss arguments, I suggest that a rather different overlapping consensus appears to contribute to stable democracies. This centers on support of the political system rather than more substantive moral principles.

Political Constructivism in Rawls's Political Liberalism

In Political Liberalism , John Rawls employs a distinctive method of “political constructivism” to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an “overlapping consensus.” Setting aside the question of whether Rawlss method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawlss “political” philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The “method of convergence” would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

The Nocturnal Council in Plato's Laws

Serious problems are encountered in integrating the nocturnal council, described in Book XII of the Laws, into the institutional structure presented in Platos earlier Books. These difficulties are addressed by Glenn Morrow in Platos Cretan City, and most authorities have accepted Morrows ‘informal view’. This article contends that an alternative account, the ‘institutional view’, accords more closely with the evidence.

Are Political Obligations Content Independent

Current scholars generally view political obligations as “content independent.” Citizens have moral reasons to obey the law because it is the law, rather than because of the content of different laws. However, this position is subject to criticism on both theoretical and practical grounds. The main consideration in favor of content independence, the so-called “self-image of the state,” does not actually support it. Properly understood, the state’s self-image is to comply with laws because of the underlying moral reasons that justify them, rather than because they are laws. Because content independence has played a central role in the widespread belief that a suitable theory of political obligation is not possible, rejecting it allows the possibility of a theory that establishes moral requirements for virtually all citizens to behave in accordance with virtually all laws, although these requirements are particular to different laws, and subjects are not required to obey them because they are laws.

Implementing the Ideal State

W HAT I INTEND to demonstrate in this paper is that throughout his career, Plato was deeply concerned with a range of political problems for which he is commonly not given credit. Basically, I will argue that Plato was serious about implementing the ideal state sketched in the Republic, and that in his works we find a realistic assessment of the political obstacles that stood in the way of establishing it. However, not only is Plato frequently not cited for exploring these questions, but often, when his ideas along these lines are examined, they are discussed in a cursory, superficial fashion, while an increasing number of commentators has set about to dismiss them altogether. And so the task here is to show that in Platos analysis of the question of implementing the ideal state can be found a political side to his political theory that is frequently overlooked, and what is more, that in his treatment of these questions Plato touches upon fundamental political truths, basic to any theory of radical reform.

Samaritanism and Political Obligation: A Response to Christopher Wellman’s “Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”*

In a recent article, Christopher Wellman formulates a theory of political obligation based on a principle of samaritanism. Wellman claims to offer a “new solution” to the problem of political obligation (p. 735). However, while I believe that samaritanism does make an important contribution, this is somewhat different from what Wellman envisions. In this brief article I argue that the theory of political obligation that Wellman develops is unable to ground moral requirements to support central state functions. After reviewing Wellman’s theory in Section I, I present criticisms in Section II, and close with brief remarks about the proper role a principle of samaritanism should play in theories of political obligation.

The Moral Force of Political Obligations

Political obligations vary in force. Though we have strong obligations to obey certain laws, our obligations to obey others appear to be considerably weaker. Because the weakness of the obligations to obey certain laws has been employed as an argument against the existence of general prima facie political obligations, an adequate theory of political obligation must account for this. By employing the obligation to keep promises as a model, I sort out the factors that contribute to the force of prima facie political obligations. Their varying force can be explained according to a general theory of political obligation founded on the principle of fairness.