Géraldine Broye

Are Joint Audits Associated with Higher Audit Fees

Abstract In its October 2010 Green Paper on audit policy, the European Commission suggested that joint audits might be a way of improving the audit market in Europe. However, some parties consider that a joint audit system is not an efficient solution because the perceived improvements in audit quality, if any, are not commensurate with the significant increase in audit fees. We compare audit fees paid during the years 2007–2011 by listed companies in France, where joint audits are mandatory, with those paid by British and Italian companies. Theory suggests that audit fees in countries with high investor protection, such as the UK, are likely to be greater than those in countries with lower investor protection, such as France and Italy, ceteris paribus. However, we find significantly higher audit fees in France after controlling for well-documented auditor, client, and engagement attributes, which vary across countries. Furthermore, since we do not find statistically significant differences in the magnitude of abnormal accruals, the higher audit fees observed in France do not appear to be associated with higher audit quality.

The Effects of Concentration on Competition and Efficiency: Some Evidence from the French Audit Market

This paper aims at investigating the effects of concentration on competition and cost efficiency of the French audit market. Competition is measured with the Rosse-Panzar model, while cost efficiency is estimated with stochastic frontier approach. Cost efficiency levels are estimated at around 75% with greater efficiency for Big-Four firms, while the nature of competition appears to be monopolistic competition. Dynamic analysis shows a reduction in competition, and a decrease in cost efficiency for Big-Four and non-Big-Four firms between 1999 and 2003. We therefore provide support to a negative impact of concentration on competition and cost efficiency.

Pratiques de divulgation des éléments de rémunération des dirigeants et incidence de l’actionnariat familial

Cet article examine dans quelle mesure les entreprises se conforment au code de gouvernance en ce qui concerne la communication des elements relatifs a la remuneration des dirigeants, et s’interesse a l’incidence du controle familial sur le niveau de divulgation. A partir d’un echantillon de societes cotees sur Euronext, nous mettons en evidence une conformite relativement faible des entreprises avec les recommandations du code AFEP / MEDEF et de l’AMF. Nous montrons par ailleurs que les entreprises familiales sont associees a des scores de divulgation significativement plus faibles, et apparaissent ainsi comme un frein a la diffusion de l’information concernant les pratiques de remuneration.