Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst

Engineering and the problem of moral overload.

When thinking about ethics, technology is often only mentioned as the source of our problems, not as a potential solution to our moral dilemmas. When thinking about technology, ethics is often only mentioned as a constraint on developments, not as a source and spring of innovation. In this paper, we argue that ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a constraint and technological progress can create moral progress rather than just moral problems. We show this by an analysis of how technology can contribute to the solution of so-called moral overload or moral dilemmas. Such dilemmas typically create a moral residue that is the basis of a second-order principle that tells us to reshape the world so that we can meet all our moral obligations. We can do so, among other things, through guided technological innovation.

Deontic logic and computer-supported computer ethics

We provide a description and informal analysis of the commonalities in moral discourse concerning issues in the field of information and communications technology, present a logic model (DEAL) of this type of moral discourse that makes use of recent research in deontic, epistemic, and action logic, and indicate - drawing upon recent research in computer implementations of modal logic - how information systems may be developed that implement the proposed formalization.

Andersonian Deontic Logic, Propositional Quantification, and Mally

We present a new axiomatization of the deontic fragment of Andersons relevant deontic logic, give an Andersonian reduction of a relevant version of Mallys deontic logic previously discussed in this journal, study the effect of adding propositional quantification to Andersons system, and discuss the meaning of Andersons propositional constant in a wide range of Andersonian deontic systems.

An Intuitionistic Reformulation of Mally’s Deontic Logic

In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed a number of deontic postulates. He added them as axioms to classical propositional logic. The resulting system was unsatisfactory because it had the consequence that A is the case if and only if it is obligatory that A. We present an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally’s deontic logic. We show that this system does not provide the just-mentioned objectionable theorem while most of the theorems that Mally considered acceptable are still derivable. The resulting system is unacceptable as a deontic logic, but it does make sense as a lax logic in the modern sense of the word.

Computational Meta-Ethics

It has been argued that ethically correct robots should be able to reason about right and wrong. In order to do so, they must have a set of do’s and don’ts at their disposal. However, such a list may be inconsistent, incomplete or otherwise unsatisfactory, depending on the reasoning principles that one employs. For this reason, it might be desirable if robots were to some extent able to reason about their own reasoning—in other words, if they had some meta-ethical capacities. In this paper, we sketch how one might go about designing robots that have such capacities. We show that the field of computational meta-ethics can profit from the same tools as have been used in computational metaphysics.

Ernst Mally's Deontik (1926)

In 1926, Mally proposed the first formal deontic system. As Mally and others soon realized, this system had some rather strange consequences. We show that the strangeness of Mallys system is not so much due to Mallys infor- mal deontic principles as to the fact that he formalized those principles in terms of the propositional calculus. If they are formalized in terms of relevant logic rather than classical logic, one obtains a system which is related to Andersons relevant deontic logic and not nearly as strange as Mallys own system.

“The Neuroscience of Responsibility”—Workshop Report

This is a report on the 3-day workshop “The Neuroscience of Responsibility” that was held in the Philosophy Department at Delft University of Technology in The Netherlands during February 11th–13th, 2010. The workshop had 25 participants from The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Canada and Australia, with expertise in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and law. Its aim was to identify current trends in neurolaw research related specifically to the topic of responsibility, and to foster international collaborative research on this topic. The workshop agenda was constructed by the participants at the start of each day by surveying the topics of greatest interest and relevance to participants. In what follows, we summarize (1) the questions which participants identified as most important for future research in this field, (2) the most prominent themes that emerged from the discussions, and (3) the two main international collaborative research project plans that came out of this meeting.

Anderson's Relevant Deontic and Eubouliatic Systems

We present axiomatizations of the deontic fragment of Andersons relevant deontic logic (the logic of obligation and related concepts) and the eubouliatic fragment of Andersons eubouliatic logic (the logic of prudence, safety, risk, and related concepts).

Where did Mally go wrong

In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed the first system of deontic logic. His system turned out to be unacceptable. How can it be repaired? We discuss several proposals to reformulate it in terms of strict implication, relevant implication and strict relevant implication.

Martin Peterson: The Ethics of Technology: A Geometric Analysis of Five Moral Principles : Oxford University Press, 2017, 252 pp, USD 74.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9780190652265

Peterson discusses five principles (the cost–benefit, precautionary, sustainability, autonomy, and fairness principles) that are used in the ethics of technology. He analyzes these principles by means of the mathematical theory of Voronoi regions. The concept of a Voronoi region is a simple but intuitively appealing one. Given a finite set of distinct, isolated points in a continuous space, we associate all locations in that space with the closest member of the point set. The result is a partitioning of the space into a set of Voronoi regions. The mathematical theory of Voronoi regions has successfully been applied in many areas, including philosophy (notably by Peter Gärdenfors in his works on “conceptual spaces”). Its application to the ethics of technology seems new. However, Peterson’s book raises several problems. First, in his book, “closest” means “most similar in a moral sense.” But how is “most similar in a moral sense” to be understood? As most similar with respect to what? As most similar with respect to catastrophic consequences? As most similar with respect to fairness? Or as most similar with respect to one of the traditional virtues mentioned at http s://www.virt uesc ienc e.com/the-virt ues.html , namely, acceptance, accountability, ambition, assertiveness, beauty, benevolence, bravery, caring, charity, chastity, caution, cleanliness, commitment, compassion, confidence, consideration, contentment, cooperation, courage, courtesy, creativity, curiosity, defiance, dependability, detachment, determination, devotion, diligence, discernment, discretion, discipline, eloquence, empathy, enthusiasm, excellence, faith, faithfulness, flexibility, focus, forbearance, forgiveness, fortitude, friendliness, frugality, generosity, gentleness, grace, gratitude, helpfulness, honesty, honor, hope, humbleness, humility, humor, idealism, integrity, impartiality, industry, innocence, joyfulness, justice,