Gina Yannitell Reinhardt

State-Level Institutional Effects on Legislative Coalition Unity in Brazil

Research on political institutions suggests that sub-national factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together. We estimate the effects of such forces operating at the State-level - intra-list electoral competition, and alliance with governors. We propose that larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, should be less unified than smaller cohorts. We also derive from theoretical hypotheses that cohorts allied with governors may be either more or less unified than other cohorts. We analyze unity among coalition cohorts on recorded floor votes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. We find support for the hypothesis that larger cohorts are less unified, but detect no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape their influence relative to national-level legislative actors.

Shortcuts and Signals: An Analysis of the Micro-Level Determinants of Aid Allocation, with Case Study Evidence from Brazil

Does the distribution of foreign development assistance depend on the organizational capacity of the recipient organization? I argue that employees at donor agencies seek signals of which recipients will implement aid most effectively, and use these signals to determine the destination of foreign aid on the micro level. Qualitative evidence gathered in the US and Brazil indicates the types of signals donors seek and recipients strive to transmit: signals of a recipients professionalism, reputation, and sustainability. After developing a signaling game to derive the conditions under which these signals might be credible indicators of implementation effectiveness, I present quantitative evidence of aid recipient organizations in Brazil and score them on the three signals. Statistical tests confirm that organizations with higher levels of these signals are more likely to receive funding, suggesting that donors use these signals to determine the destination of development assistance.

Race, Trust, and Return Migration The Political Drivers of Post-disaster Resettlement

After several disasters in the United States, the return-migration rate of blacks to post-disaster areas has been lower than that of other races. Does this pattern have a political explanation? I investigate political trust as the causal mechanism through which race affects people’s decisions of where to live after forced evacuation. After accounting for economic, demographic, and sociological influences on return migration, I use mediation analysis to find that political trust acts as a mediator between race and return migration. I am thus able to explain the salience of race to the return-migration decision: race does not have a direct effect on return migration but rather works through the causal mechanism of political trust to determine return-migration decisions. As blacks are more likely to have low levels of political trust, and those with lower political trust are less likely to return, blacks are less likely to return to post-disaster areas.

Competing for the Platform: The Politics of Interest Group Influence on Political Party Platforms in the United States

While parties view interest groups as a means to mobilize voters, interest groups view parties and their platforms as a means to articulate interests. We demonstrate the conditions under which parties will articulate an organized interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform. A formal theoretical model predicts that parties will reward groups that can mobilize voters, as evidenced by a group’s resources, loyalty to the party, and ideological similarity to the party status quo. We test the formal model using content analysis on three years of DNC platforms and group testimony. Results show that parties reward loyal groups that are ideologically near the party, but that resources have no effect.

Imagining worse than reality: comparing beliefs and intentions between disaster evacuees and survey respondents

We often credit disasters, and their coverage in the media, with changes in the public perception of risk associated with low-probability, high-consequence events (LPHCs). With a change in perceptions, we also expect changes in beliefs, preferences, and behaviors. Do beliefs and behaviors change in different ways for people who live through these LPHC critical events, as opposed to people who observe them? This study compares hypothetical hurricanes with actual hurricane effects in a survey quasi-experiment. Findings indicate that hypothetical disasters induce stronger reactions than those experienced in the natural world, as Hurricane Katrina bystanders imagine themselves incurring much higher damages, and being much less likely to return to live in their hurricane-damaged homes, than actual Hurricane Katrina evacuees. Ultimately, respondents considering a hypothetical low-probability, high-consequence event exhibit exaggerated beliefs and opposite decisions of those who actually lived through one of these events. Results underline the importance of examining the differences between public perceptions and experiential reality.

I Don't Know Monica Lewinsky, and I'm Not in the CIA. Now How about that Interview?

On January 18, 1998, I walked off a plane in Sao Paulo, Brazil. As I cleared customs and weaved through the hot, steamy airport, the cafes and newsstands, I noticed one young womans face on the front pages of all the newspapers and journals I passed. She was wearing a beret and hugging Bill Clinton in the photo, and her name was Monica Lewinsky. Never having heard of her before, I assumed the interest in her was specific to Brazil. Surely I would know her name if she actually mattered to anyone , I thought, and went on.

Competing for the platform: How organized interests affect party positioning in the United States

What explains which groups are included in a party coalition in any given election cycle? Recent advances in political party theory suggest that policy demanders comprise parties, and that the composition of a party coalition varies from election to election. We theorize three conditions under which parties articulate an interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform: when groups are ideologically proximate to the party median, when groups display party loyalty, and when groups are flush with resources. Using computer-assisted content analysis on a unique and rich data source, we examine three cycles of testimony that 80 organized groups provided to the Democratic Party. The analysis compares group requests with the content of Democratic and Republican National Committee platforms in 1996, 2000, and 2004. Results show that parties reward loyal groups and those that are ideologically proximate to the party but offer no confirmation of a resource effect.