Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
International Monetary Fund
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Publication
Featured researches published by Giovanni Dell'Ariccia.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 2010
Olivier J. Blanchard; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Paolo Mauro
The great moderation lulled macro-economists and policymakers alike in the belief that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. The crisis clearly forces to question that assessment. This paper reviews the main elements of the pre-crisis consensus, identify where we were wrong and what tenets of the pre-crisis framework still hold, and take a tentative first pass at the contours of a new macroeconomic policy framework.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 2008
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Deniz Igan; Luc Laeven
This paper studies the relationship between the recent boom and current delinquencies in the subprime mortgage market. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which this relationship can be explained by a decrease in lending standards that is unrelated to improvements in underlying economic fundamentals. We find evidence of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the number of loan applications. We also find that the underlying market structure of the mortgage industry mattered, with larger declines in lending standards being associated with increases in the number of competing lenders. Finally, increased ability to securitize mortgages appears to have affected lender behaviour, with lending standards experiencing greater declines in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator models based on asymmetric information, and shed some light on the underlying causes and characteristics of the current crisis in the subprime mortgage market.
Journal of Finance | 2006
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Robert Marquez
This paper examines how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volumes, and the aggregate allocation of credit. In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients creditworthiness, we show that banks may loosen lending standards when information asymmetries vis a vis other banks are low. In equilibrium this reduction in standards leads to a deterioration of banks portfolios, a reduction in their profits, and an aggregate credit expansion. Furthermore, we show that although these low standards may increase aggregate surplus, they also increase the risk of financial instability. We, therefore, provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises that have occurred in many emerging markets.
Journal of Financial Economics | 2004
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Robert Marquez
Private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. We analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders. First, we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries. Second, when faced with greater competition from outside lenders, banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers (flight to captivity). Third, if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated, an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lenders overall loan portfolio. The model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations. liberalization
The RAND Journal of Economics | 1999
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Ezra Friedman; Robert Marquez
Banks offering credit to borrowers are faced with uncertainty about their creditworthiness. If banks obtain information about borrowers after lending to them, they are able to reject riskier borrowers when refinancing. Potential entrant banks will face an adverse-selection problem stemming from their inability to distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank. We analyze the effects of asymmetric information on the market structure of the banking industry. We characterize the equilibrium under Bertrand competition with two banks, and show than an equilibrium where a third bank enters does not exist (blockaded entry).
IMF Staff Papers | 1998
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
This paper analyzes the effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade flows. Through use of a gravity model and panel data from western Europe, exchange rate uncertainty is found to have a negative effect on international trade. The results seem to be robust with respect to the particular measures representing exchange rate uncertainty. Particular attention is reserved for problems of simultaneous causality, stemming from the endogenous behavior of monetary authorities. The negative correlation between trade and bilateral volatility remains significant after controlling for the simultaneity bias.
IMF Occasional Papers | 1998
Michael Mussa; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Barry Eichengreen; Enrica Detragiache
Capital account liberalization - orderly, properly sequence, and befitting the individual circumstances of countries- is an inevitable step for all countries wishing to realize the benefits of the globalized economy. This paper reviews the theories behind capital account liberalization and examines the dangers associated with free capital flows. The authors conclude that the dangers can be limited through a combination of sound macroeconomic and prudential policies.
IMF Staff Discussion Note: Policies for Macrofinancial Stability: How to Deal with Credit Booms | 2012
Bas Bakker; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Luc Laeven; Jérôme Vandenbussche; Deniz Igan; Hui Tong
This note explores the costs and benefits of different policy options to reduce the risks associated with credit booms, drawing upon several country experiences and the findings from econometric analysis.
Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending : A Test | 2002
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Isabel Schnabel; Jeromin Zettelmeyer
We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived probability of future crisis lending to emerging markets. In the presence of moral hazard, such an event should raise not only the level of spreads, but also the sensitivity with which spreads reflect fundamentals as well as their cross-country dispersion. We find strong evidence for all three effects.
IMF Occasional Papers | 2008
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia; Paolo Mauro; Andre Faria; Jonathan D. Ostry; Julian Di Giovanni; Martin Schindler; Ayhan Kose; Marco E. Terrones
Financial globalization has increased dramatically over the past three decades, particularly for advanced economies, while emerging market and developing countries experienced more moderate increases. Divergences across countries stem from different capital control regimes, and factors such as institutional quality and domestic financial development. Although, in principle, financial globalization should enhance international risk sharing, reduce macroeconomic volatility, and foster economic growth, in practice its effects are less clear-cut. This paper envisages a gradual and orderly sequencing of external financial liberalization and complementary reforms in macroeconomic policy framework as essential components of a successful liberalization strategy.