Gordon B. Dahl

The Effect of Schooling on Cognitive Skills

To identify the causal effect of schooling on cognitive skills, we exploit conditionally random variation in the date Swedish males take a battery of cognitive tests in preparation for military service. We find an extra ten days of school instruction raises scores on crystallized intelligence tests (synonyms and technical comprehension tests) by approximately 1% of a standard deviation, whereas extra nonschool days have almost no effect. In contrast, test scores on fluid intelligence tests (spatial and logic tests) do not increase with additional days of schooling but do increase modestly with age.

What is the Case for Paid Maternity Leave

We assess the case for generous government-funded maternity leave, focusing on a series of policy reforms in Norway that expanded paid leave from 18 to 35 weeks. We find the reforms do not crowd out unpaid leave and that mothers spend more time at home without a reduction in family income. The increased maternity leave has little effect on childrens schooling, parental earnings and labor force participation, completed fertility, marriage, or divorce. The expansions, whose net costs amounted to 0.25% of GDP, have negative redistribution properties and imply a considerable increases in taxes at a cost to economic efficiency.

Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of a Censored Location-Scale Regression Model

In this article we consider identification and estimation of a censored nonparametric location scale-model. We first show that in the case where the location function is strictly less than the (fixed) censoring point for all values in the support of the explanatory variables, the location function is not identified anywhere. In contrast, when the location function is greater or equal to the censoring point with positive probability, the location function is identified on the entire support, including the region where the location function is below the censoring point. In the latter case we propose a simple estimation procedure based on combining conditional quantile estimators for various higher quantiles. The new estimator is shown to converge at the optimal nonparametric rate with a limiting normal distribution. A small-scale simulation study indicates that the proposed estimation procedure performs well in finite samples. We also present an empirical illustration on unemployment insurance duration using administrative-level data from New Jersey.

Bargaining and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration

Expert agents, such as lawyers, play a prominent role in conflict resolution, yet little is known about how they affect outcomes. We construct a model that permits us to estimate the influence of agents and test whether the parties in a dispute face prisoners dilemma incentives. Using eighteen years of final-offer arbitration data from New Jersey, we find the parties do significantly better when they retain agents and that the parties learn about this benefit over time. However, we also find that the gain to using an agent is fully offset when the opposing party also hires an agent. Since agents are costly, this noncooperative equilibrium is Pareto inferior.

Incarceration, Recidivism and Employment

Understanding whether, and in what situations, time spent in prison is criminogenic or preventive has proven challenging due to data availability and correlated unobservables. This paper overcomes these challenges in the context of Norway’s criminal justice system, offering new insights into how incarceration affects subsequent crime and employment. We construct a panel dataset containing the criminal behavior and labor market outcomes of the entire population, and exploit the random assignment of criminal cases to judges who differ ystematically in their stringency in sentencing defendants to prison. Using judge stringency as an instrumental variable, we find that imprisonment discourages further criminal behavior, and that the reduction extends beyond incapacitation. Incarceration decreases the probability an individual will reoffend within 5 years by 29 percentage points, and reduces the number of offenses over this same period by 11 criminal charges. In comparison, OLS shows positive associations between incarceration and subsequent criminal behavior. This Sharp contrast suggests the high rates of recidivism among ex-convicts is due to selection, and not a consequence of the experience of being in prison. Exploring factors that may explain the preventive effect of incarceration, we find the decline in crime is driven by individuals who were not working prior to incarceration. Among these individuals, imprisonment increases participation in programs directed at improving employability and reducing recidivism, and ultimately, raises employment and earnings while discouraging further criminal behavior. For previously employed individuals, while there is no effect on recidivism, there is a lasting negative effect on employment. Contrary to the widely embraced ‘nothing works’ doctrine, these findings demonstrate that time spent in prison with a focus on rehabilitation can indeed be preventive for a large segment of the criminal population.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration

In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New Jersey with data we have systematically collected over the 18-year life of the program. Covering the wages of police officers and firefighters, this system provides virtually a laboratory setting for the study of the evolution of strategic interaction. Our empirical analysis provides convincing evidence that, left alone, the parties do not construct and present their offers as successfully as when they retain expert agents to assist them. In principle, expert agents may be helpful to the parties for two different reasons: (a) they may move the arbitrator to favor their position independently of the facts, or (b) they may help eliminate inefficiencies in the conduct of strategic behavior. In this paper we construct a model where the agent may influence outcomes independent of the facts, but where the agent may also improve the outcomes of the process by moderating any self-serving biases or over-confidence that may have led to impasse in the first instance. Our data indicate that expert agents may well have had an important role in moderating self-serving biases early in the history of the system, but that the parties have slowly evolved to a non-cooperative equilibrium where the use of third-party agents has become nearly universal and where agents are used primarily to move the fact finders decisions.