Gottfried Haber

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union: A Simulation Analysis

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation with fiscal policy-makers. In particular, strategies involving: (a) a money supply target, (b) tracking European inflation, (c) stabilizing European nominal income, and (d) fixing the exchange rate of the Euro with respect to the Dollar are evaluated and compared with respect to the associated welfare effects. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand side shocks. Nominal income targeting by the ECB has to be regarded as inferior to inflation targeting, while fixing the exchange rate leads to quite satisfactory results in most cases.

Global macroeconomic policy implications of an enlarged EMU

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after the enlargement of the EU by Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). For the European Central Bank, the intermediate targets monetary versus inflation targeting are examined. For European fiscal policies, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new EU members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. We analyze global effects of different European institutional arrangements under varying assumptions about policy reactions of the USA. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin-Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend on the nature and scope of the shocks the economies are faced with and on the assumptions made about policy feedbacks from outside Europe.

Is the Austrian public debt sustainable

Sustainability of public deficit and debt in the long run has received much attention in the international political agenda. This paper analyses whether Austrian fiscal policies have been sustainable during the last five decades. Tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were sustainable from 1960 to 1974, while from 1975 onwards public debt grew much more rapidly. Starting in 1975, the rate of unemployment played a significant role in the sense of a counter-cyclical orientation of Austrian fiscal policy as part of the concept of ‘Austrokeynesianism’. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not only by ideology, but also by structural causes and a shift of the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated solely by one party run higher deficits than coalitions of the two large parties or the two conservative parties. There are no indications of a political business cycle.

Die Absicherung von Exportrisiken

Exportgeschafte unterliegen wie alle wirtschaftlichen Transaktionen einer Vielzahl von Risiken. Manche dieser Risiken treten spezifisch im internationalen Waren- und Dienstleistungsverkehr auf (z. B. politische Risiken oder Wahrungsrisiken), einige Risiken sind bedeutender als im Binnenhandel (z. B. Transportrisiken), wieder andere unterscheiden sich nur unwesentlich von den ublicherweise zu beobachtenden Risiken (z. B. Kreditrisiken). Im Rahmen eines Risikomanagementprozesses ist zu entscheiden, welche Risiken in welcher Art und Weise adressiert werden. Dabei stehen je nach Art, Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit und moglichen Auswirkungen unterschiedliche Instrumente zur Verfugung. Ein institutionalisiertes Risikomanagementsystem im Unternehmen dient jedoch auch unabhangig vom Export der Professionalisierung von Geschaftsprozessen.