Gottfried Vosgerau

The experience of agency: an interplay between prediction and postdiction

The experience of agency, i.e., the registration that I am the initiator of my actions, is a basic and constant underpinning of our interaction with the world. Whereas several accounts have underlined predictive processes as the central mechanism (e.g., the comparator model by C. Frith), others emphasized postdictive inferences (e.g., post-hoc inference account by D. Wegner). Based on increasing evidence that both predictive and postdictive processes contribute to the experience of agency, we here present a unifying but at the same time parsimonious approach that reconciles these accounts: predictive and postdictive processes are both integrated by the brain according to the principles of optimal cue integration. According to this framework, predictive and postdictive processes each serve as authorship cues that are continuously integrated and weighted depending on their availability and reliability in a given situation. Both sensorimotor and cognitive signals can serve as predictive cues (e.g., internal predictions based on an efferency copy of the motor command or cognitive anticipations based on priming). Similarly, other sensorimotor and cognitive cues can each serve as post-hoc cues (e.g., visual feedback of the action or the affective valence of the action outcome). Integration and weighting of these cues might not only differ between contexts and individuals, but also between different subject and disease groups. For example, schizophrenia patients with delusions of influence seem to rely less on (probably imprecise) predictive motor signals of the action and more on post-hoc action cues like e.g., visual feedback and, possibly, the affective valence of the action outcome. Thus, the framework of optimal cue integration offers a promising approach that directly stimulates a wide range of experimentally testable hypotheses on agency processing in different subject groups.

Me or not me – An optimal integration of agency cues?

Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Conscious and Cognition] aimed to provide further evidence for this view by demonstrating that external agency cues might outweigh or even substitute efferent signals to install a basic registration of self-agency. Although the study contains some critical points that, so we argue, are central to a proper interpretation of the data, it hints at a new perspective on agency: optimal cue integration seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. We here argue that this framework could allow integrating the findings of Moore and colleagues and other recent agency studies into a comprehensive picture of the sense of agency and its pathological disruptions.

Putting egocentric and allocentric into perspective

In the last decade many studies examined egocentric and allocentric spatial relations. For various tasks, navigators profit from both kinds of relations. However, their interrelation seems to be underspecified. We present four elementary representations of allocentric and egocentric relations (sensorimotor contingencies, egocentric coordinate systems, allocentric coordinate systems, and perspective-free representations) and discuss them with respect to their encoding and retrieval. Elementary representations are problematic for capturing large spaces and situations which encompass both allocentric and egocentric relations at the same time. Complex spatial representations provide a solution to this problem. They combine elementary coordinate representations either by pair-wise connections or by hierarchical embedding. We discuss complex spatial representations with respect to computational requirements and their plausibility regarding behavioral and neural findings. This work is meant to clarify concepts of egocentric and allocentric, to show their limitations, benefits and empirical plausibility and to point out new directions for future research.

Weighting models and weighting factors

Abstract We defend our multifactorial weighting model of the sense of agency and our critique of the comparator model ( Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008 ) against the critiques that have been brought forward by Carruthers, 2012 , Wong, 2012 . Building on the specification of our model that emerges from this response, we will suggest a distinct mechanism how weighting of different agency factors might work: internal and external agency cues are constantly weighted according to their reliability in a given situation. Thus, the weighting process underlying the sense of agency might follow the principles of optimal cue integration. We review recent empirical evidence for this hypothesis, demonstrating that the multifactorial weighting model is not only testable, but has in fact already received first empirical support.

Conceptuality in Spatial Representations

The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations’ structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, which allows for new explanations of certain features of spatial representations and how they are linked to other capacities, like perception and reasoning.

The Perceptual Nature of Mental Models

Abstract In the first comprehensive formulation of the theory of mental models, Johnson-Laird proposes several constraints on any psychological theory of reasoning. He argues that his theory fulfills these constraints due to two properties of mental models: structure preservation and naturalness. However, during the elaboration of his theory over the last decades, especially the central property of naturalness was not paid much attention to. It hence has to be questioned if the theory in its present form still possesses the explanatory power originally claimed. In this chapter, I will outline an interpretation of structure preservation and naturalness within a philosophical framework. This leads to the claim that mental models are structures partially isomorphic to what they represent and that they contain exclusively perceptual relations. I will close with some proposals for refining the theory of mental models, such that the originally proposed constraints can be met (again). Only this refined version can stand as a true alternative to theories of mental logics.

Beyond the comparator model.

The experience of agency, i.e., the registration that I am the initiator of my actions, is a basic and constant underpinning of our interaction with the world: whenever we grasp, type, or walk, we register the resulting sensory consequences as caused by ourselves. At the same time, it is a central constituent of self-awareness: by registering that some sensory events are caused by ourselves, while others are not, we are able to establish stable action-effect covariations and thus a fundamental, basic self-world distinction (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a; Vosgerau, 2009; Vosgerau & Newen, 2007). The borders of this delineation are constantly refined and updated throughout our life (Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006). Although the experience of agency seems to be infallible on first glance, equivocal conditions in our everyday life and, in particular, in neurological and psychiatric patients (e.g. in schizophrenia patients exhibiting delusions of control) teach us that it is in fact an inferential, reconstructive and thus fallible process. Throughout the past two decades, research investigating the underpinnings and disruptions of this process has been greatly inspired by an elegant, parsimonious and highly powerful neurocognitive account of agency, namely the comparator model (CM) (Frith, 1992, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). According to this account, the sensory consequences of one’s behaviour can be predicted based on internal action-related information such as an efference copy of a motor command. By comparing this ‘internal prediction’ with the sensory afference, self-produced sensory information can be distinguished from externally caused events. In case of a match, the afference is interpreted as a result of our own actions. In case of a mismatch, the difference is registered as externally caused. This idea of a comparator as a subpersonal mechanism underlying a subject’s registration of self-agency has manifold theoretical advantages: (1) The information necessary for agency is not added to the perception of an action, e.g., by a higher-order cognitive reasoning process, but is an integral part of the perceptual registration itself and thus directly frames our phenomenal content. (2) The experience of agency is not dependent on conceptual capacities, but functions on a preconceptual, subpersonal level. (3) The self-relation involved in agency is not assumed to be represented as independent of action-processing, as suggested by many philosophical conceptions (e.g. Descartes’ dualism which presupposes an independent self that is able to initiate an act of will unrelated and prior to any bodily movement, or Kant’s transcendental philosophy which presupposes a transcendental I as an independent unknowable entity which constitutes the experience of agency by unifying all our sense-experiences), but is an intrinsic property of the action processing itself. (4) It can nicely be experimentally implemented and tested in various behavioural and imaging paradigms, throughout healthy and neuropsychiatric subjects, and even across different species (Frith, 2005; Frith et al., 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). And, indeed, a magnitude of behavioural, electrophysiological and imaging studies has provided evidence that a constant comparison between internal predictions and external information ensures that we correctly attribute self-produced sensations to our own agency rather than to external causal forces (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Bell, 2001; Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Crapse & Sommer, 2008; Dicke, Chakraborty, & Thier, 2008) and that, in turn, it is this mechanism which goes astray in neuropsychiatric patients exhibiting disorders of agency (Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, & Leube, 2005; Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010). Yet, despite its success, recent work has also pointed out several short-comings of this account, both in explaining agency in healthy subjects and in neuropsychiatric patients (Synofzik et al., 2008b; Vosgerau & Newen, 2007). In particular, it has been argued that the comparator process might often contribute to the sense of agency, but that it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for this experience (Synofzik et al., 2008b). Thus, it is time to ask whether we have to move beyond the comparator model – and, if yes, where to? This special issue presents a timely discussion on this hot topic, bringing together experimental and conceptual papers from different countries and different disciplines. Cameron, Franks, Inglis, and Chua (2012) investigate the adaptability of the perception of one’s own movements and of the control thereof in cases of active versus passive movements. The adaptability of the perception and control of one’s movements is a necessary requirement for a plastic, dynamic sense of agency as

Self as cultural construct? An argument for levels of self-representations

In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does not only allow for a deeper understanding of different self-conceptions, but also for a formulation of new hypotheses regarding the cultural influence on self-representations. As one example, we will highlight the role of the proposed levels of self-representation for emotional experience and formulate some major implications of our interdisciplinary framework for future empirical research.

Implicit attitudes and implicit prejudices

Abstract In social psychology, the concept of implicit attitudes has given rise to ongoing discussions that are rather philosophical. The aim of this paper is to discuss the status of implicit prejudices from a philosophical point of view. Since implicit prejudices are a special case of implicit attitudes, the discussion will be framed by a short discussion of the most central aspects concerning implicit attitudes and indirect measures. In particular, the ontological conclusions that are implied by different conceptions of implicit attitudes will be scrutinized. The main question to be discussed involves whether implicit prejudices are mental states at all, or whether they are (despite the label ‘implicit mental states’) rather dispositions to behave in a certain way. This question will be discussed against the background of principles for belief (and mental state) ascription, which requires ascribed mental states to fulfill some specific explanatory role. We defend a conception of implicit prejudices that does not assume them to be mental states.

Perception, Action and the Notion of Grounding

Traditionally, philosophers and cognitive scientists alike considered the mind as divided into input units (perception), central processing (cognition), and output units (action). In turn, they allowed for little – if any – direct interaction between perception and action. In recent years, theorists challenged the classical view of the mind by arguing that bodily states ground cognition. Even though promising, the notion of grounding is largely underspecified. In this paper, we focus on the debate about the relation between perception and action in order to flesh out the process and in turn clarify the notion of grounding. Given that currently the debate about the relation between perception & action is far from settled, we attempt an assessment of the implications that possible outcomes of this debate would have on Grounding Cognition Theories. Interestingly, some of these possible outcomes seem to threaten the overall program of Grounded Cognition. In an attempt to make this analysis more concrete, we study two closely related speculative hypotheses about possible ways in which perception and action interact. Namely, we focus on Theory of Event Coding and Simulation Theory, and evaluate the levels of compatibility between those two views and Grounded Cognition Theories.