Raphael van Riel

Nagelian Reduction beyond the Nagel Model

Nagel’s official model of theory reduction and the way it is represented in the literature are shown to be incompatible with the careful remarks on the notion of reduction Nagel gave while developing his model. Based on these remarks, an alternative model is outlined, which does not face some of the problems the official model faces. Taking the context in which Nagel developed his model into account, it is shown that the way Nagel shaped his model and, thus, its well-known deficiencies are best conceived of as a mere by-product of his philosophical background.Nagel’s official model of theory reduction and the way it is represented in the literature are shown to be incompatible with the careful remarks on the notion of reduction Nagel gave while developing his model. Based on these remarks, an alternative model is outlined, which does not face some of the problems the official model faces. Taking the context in which Nagel developed his model into account, it is shown that the way Nagel shaped his model and, thus, its well-known deficiencies are best conceived of as a mere by-product of his philosophical background.

The concept of reduction

Preface.- Chapter 1. Introduction.- Part 1. The Concept of Reduction-An Explication.- Chapter 2. How to Approach Reduction: Explication and Meta-Science.- Chapter 3. The Puzzle of Reduction.- Chapter 4. Reductive Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation.- Chapter 5. Reductive Explanation.- Part 2. The Explication at Work.- Chapter 6. Reduction in the Philosophy of Mind.- Chapter 7. Conceptions of Reduction in the Philosophy of Science.- Chapter 8. Theory Reduction and Holism.- Chapter 9. Reduction Beyond the Reduction Debate.- Chapter 10. The Reductionists Commitment.

The good, the bad, and the timely: how temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection

Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent to be the actual cause. Second, the impact of temporal location on causal selection is almost canceled out if the later agent did not violate a norm while the former did. We argue that this is due to the impact that judgments of norm violation have on causal selection—even if the violated norm has nothing to do with the obtaining effect. Third, moral judgments about the effect influence causal selection even in the case in which agents could not have foreseen the effect and did not intend to bring it about. We discuss our findings in connection to recent theories of the role of moral judgment in causal reasoning, on the one hand, and to probabilistic models of temporal location, on the other.

On how we perceive the social world. Criticizing Gallagher's view on direct perception and outlining an alternative.

Criticizing Gallaghers view on direct perception, I develop a basic model of social perception. According to the Cartesians another persons intentions (and similar properties) are not directly accessible to an observer. According to the cognitivist Cartesians (quasi-)conscious processes are necessary for social understanding. According to the Anti-Cartesians (Gallaghers view) social perception is direct. Since both of these latter approaches face serious problems, I will argue in favor of an alternative: anti-cognitivist Cartesianism. Distinguishing between an active- and a passive part of the perceptual system we can describe the situation as follows: Some functionally individuated parts of our nervous system generate percepts that correspond to the properties that causally trigger the system, whilst others form percepts of properties that do not causally trigger the system. The model is basic in that it merely helps clarifying some of the fundamental concepts we need in order to describe empirical findings.Abstract Criticizing Gallagher’s view on direct perception, I develop a basic model of social perception. According to the Cartesians another person’s intentions (and similar properties) are not directly accessible to an observer. According to the cognitivist Cartesians (quasi-)conscious processes are necessary for social understanding. According to the Anti-Cartesians (Gallagher’s view) social perception is direct. Since both of these latter approaches face serious problems, I will argue in favor of an alternative: anti-cognitivist Cartesianism. Distinguishing between an active- and a passive part of the perceptual system we can describe the situation as follows: Some functionally individuated parts of our nervous system generate percepts that correspond to the properties that causally trigger the system, whilst others form percepts of properties that do not causally trigger the system. The model is basic in that it merely helps clarifying some of the fundamental concepts we need in order to describe empirical findings.

The content of model-based information

The paper offers an account of the structure of information provided by models that relevantly deviate from reality. It is argued that accounts of scientific modeling according to which a model’s epistemic and pragmatic relevance stems from the alleged fact that models give access to possibilities fail. First, it seems that there are models that do not give access to possibilities, for what they describe is impossible. Secondly, it appears that having access to a possibility is epistemically and pragmatically idle. Based on these observations, an alternative is developed.

Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction

Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so, water is identical to H2O (according to one interpretation of the term ‘reduction’). At the same time, if water reduces to H2O, then H2O does not reduce to water—the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle—if water just is H2O, it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The article proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that (i) the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts; and that (ii) to account for the asymmetry, we should develop conditions on the meanings of expressions that flank the reduction predicate in true reduction statements. Finally, it is argued that if we adopt this interpretation, we can illuminate the epistemological difference between reduced and reducing item commonly referred to in the literature. 1 A Puzzle about Identity and Reduction 2 An Argument for Thesis 1 3 An Argument for Thesis 2 4 Accounting for the Epistemological Difference 5 Conclusion 1 A Puzzle about Identity and Reduction 2 An Argument for Thesis 1 3 An Argument for Thesis 2 4 Accounting for the Epistemological Difference 5 Conclusion

Pains, Pills and Properties – Functionalism and the First‐Order/Second‐Order Distinction

Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according to which properties are second order if they are properties of first-order properties. It is shown that in the context of functionalism reference to these interpretations is misguided, and it is suggested that the notion of an ordering of properties in this context is best understood as being tied to dependence-relations.

If You Understand, You Won’t Be Lucky

The present paper argues that there is a structural difference between classical cases involving knowledge-undermining environmental luck, and cases where a subject acquires understanding in the presence of environmental luck. This difference appears to bear on arguments against the reductionist thesis that understanding is a special form of knowledge.

Designing an introductory course to elementary symbolic logic within the blackboard E-learning environment

We report on the design of a blended-learning course in elementary symbolic logic. Challenges and solutions pertaining to the Blackboard e-learning environment (Blackboard Academic Suite Release 8.0) and a customized Gentzen-style proof checker are described. The purpose is to provide orientation for those in the planning stage of similar projects.

Systematik der Junktoren

Nachdem wir uns im letzten Kapitel mit der Semantik der Aussagenlogik und damit auch ihrer Beziehung zur naturlichen Sprache sowie ihrer Funktion fur uns auseinandergesetzt haben, soll nun noch einmal das Verstandnis der zentralen Bausteine von AL gescharft werden, unabhangig davon, in welchem Zusammenhang AL zur naturlichen Sprache oder zu Argumenten steht. Wir wenden uns damit der internen Struktur unseres Modells zu und sehen von seiner Reprasentationsfunktion oder seiner potentiellen Funktion mit Bezug auf unsere Argumentationspraxis ab. Um AL zu verstehen und um mit AL auch arbeiten zu konnen, muss man sich mit einigen der Details von AL vertraut machen. Dazu soll dieses Kapitel Anregungen bieten. Im Kapitel 5.3 werden wir kurz auf eine prominente Rolle eines Junktors in der Philosophiegeschichte verweisen – den Versuch Wittgensteins, unter Rekurs auf einen einzelnen Junktor eine allgemeine Form von Satzen anzugeben.