Gregory J. DeAngelo

Life and Death in the Fast Lane: Police Enforcement and Traffic Fatalities

This paper estimates the causal effect of police on traffic fatalities and injuries. Due to simultaneity, estimating the causal effect of police on crime is often difficult. We overcome this obstacle by focusing on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003, stemming from changes in property tax assessment in the prior decade. Due solely to budget cuts, 35 percent of the roadway troopers were laid off, which dramatically reduced citations. The subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities, with the strongest effects under fair weather conditions outside of city-limits where state police employment levels are most relevant. The effects are similar using control groups chosen either geographically or through data-driven methods. Our estimates suggest that a highway fatality can be prevented with

A Dynamic and Stochastic Analysis of Fertilizer Use in Swidden Agriculture

309,000 of expenditures on state police.

An Analysis of Economic Cost Minimization and Biological Invasion Damage Control Using the AWQ Criterion

AbstractThe number of times a crop can be harvested on a cleared parcel of forest land (CPFL) before this land must be fallowed is dependent on the decision to use or not to use fertilizers to enhance soil fertility. As such, we first construct a theoretical model of fertilizer use by a swidden cultivator when this cultivator can choose whether or not to enhance soil fertility by using fertilizers. Second, we analyze two different policies (fertilizer use and no fertilizer use) for overseeing the problem of soil fertility deterioration on the CPFL. Finally, we identify a particular likelihood function and we show that whether the problem of soil fertility impairment is best addressed with a fertilizer use policy or with a no fertilizer use policy depends essentially on this likelihood function.

On Economic Cost Minimization Versus Biological Invasion Damage Control

DeAngelo et al. (2006) have recently used the AWS criterion in a M/G/1 queuing model to show that there is no necessary tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. In this paper, we use an alternate cost criterion (AWQ criterion) to investigate the generality of this central result in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no unambiguous answer to this question. Therefore, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two findings. First, for many values of the model parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model parameter that depicts the volume of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency.

Public Outcry and Police Behavior

Recently, Batabyal et al. (2005) have used a queuing model to show that there is a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in invasive species management in the following sense: Greater (lesser) inspection stringency with a larger (smaller) number of inspectors leads to higher (lower) economic costs. We use a more general queuing model to investigate whether there is, in fact, a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no definite answer to this question. Therefore, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions. For many values of the model parameters that delineate the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. In contrast, for most values of the model parameter that describes the volume of maritime trade handled by the port under study, there is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency.

To match or not to match: Aspects of marital matchmaking under uncertainty

Abstract Numerous empirical studies have documented policing behavior and response to public opinion, social norms, changing laws, neighborhood context and a litany of other subject areas. What is missing from this literature is a general theoretical framework that explains the conflicting goals of properly applying the law and responding to social norms and the consequences of the law. We build a theoretical framework where law enforcement officials care about both reputation and performance. Outside evaluations assess the quality of the decision making of the officers, but can be influenced by strategic challenging of the sanctioning by the suspected violators. We first establish that reputational concerns can distort law enforcement, encouraging either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law, depending on the prior beliefs of violations and the observed signal. Introducing strategic challenging by the violator eliminates over-enforcement and allows for an even larger reduction in application of the law by less-skilled officers. Connections to empirical findings of distortions in law enforcement, along with an extension to deterrence are highlighted.

Goods Allocation by Queuing and the Occurrence of Violence: A Probabilistic Analysis

Researchers have paid scant attention to matchmaking from the perspective of a matchmaker. Therefore, our purpose is to analyze the circumstances under which a matchmaker optimally accepts or rejects individual matching assignments. We concentrate on two specific cases. In the first (second) case, our matchmakers reservation profit is exogenous (endogenous).

Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Goods for which demand greatly exceeds supply are frequently allocated to citizens using queuing mechanisms. However, violence can occur either when queues are very long or when large numbers of citizens are not provided goods being allocated with queuing mechanisms. Hence, we use the theory of discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) to construct and analyze models in which we explicitly account for queue length and the number of citizens who are not provided a good that is allocated with a queuing mechanism. Specifically, we first delineate a version of our DTMC model in which there is no capacity constraint. Second, we state two key properties of this model and then we derive our first metric of the likelihood of violence. Finally, we describe an alternate version of our DTMC model with a capacity constraint and then we derive our second metric of the likelihood of violence.

Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence

Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We experimentally test a two-stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses reveal a number of behavioral findings. Subjects are deterred by past convictions, even though the probability of detection is independent across decisions. Further, subjects appear to take the two-stage nature of the decision making task into account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence.

Does Fairness Constrain Profit Maximization? New Evidence from a Dictator Monopoly Experiment

Monopolists set prices and if the good is unessential this may place the consumer in an uncomfortable position. But if the good is essential the consumer faces a pay-to-live or -die choice. Dictator and ultimatum games are superficially similar in that one game offers the right of refusal, while the other does not. The dictator monopoly is, however, not a game, and behaviour could be radically different in the market environment versus game environment. We recast the dictator game as a dictator monopoly experiment and find that the fairness characteristic of the game evaporates quickly as rounds progress.