Lisa R. Anderson

Predicting health behaviors with an experimental measure of risk preference

We conduct a large-scale economics experiment paired with a survey to examine the association between individual risk preference and health-related behaviors among adults aged 18-87 years. Risk preference is measured by the lottery choice experiment designed by Holt and Laury [Holt, C.A., Laury, S.K., 2002. Risk aversion and incentive effects. The American Economic Review 92(5), 1644-1655]. Controlling for subject demographic and economic characteristics, we find that risk aversion is negatively and significantly associated with cigarette smoking, heavy drinking, being overweight or obese, and seat belt non-use. In additional specifications, we find that risk aversion is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood a subject engaged in any of five risky behaviors and the number of risky behaviors reported.

Social Capital and Contributions in a Public-Goods Experiment

Recent empirical studies from across the social and behavioral sciences find that social capital is associated with various measures of well-being, including economic growth (Stephen Knack and Phillip Keefer 1997) and mortality (Ichiro Kawachi, Bruce P. Kennedy and Kimberly Lochner 1997). These findings have inspired subsequent studies by economists examining the determinants of individual level measures of social capital (e.g., Alberto Alesina and Elianna La Ferrara 2002). However, experimental evidence from trust games conducted by Edward L. Glaeser, David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman and Christine L. Soutter (2001) calls into question the efficacy of the most prevalent measures of social capital employed in the literature. In contrast, we show that these same measures are significantly associated with contributions in a public goods experiment and perform as well as the alternative measures of social trust suggested by Glaeser, et al. Because social capital is thought to influence wellbeing through its effect on public good provision, our results bolster previous empirical work on the causes and consequences of social capital.

An Experimental Analysis of Rent Seeking Under Varying Competitive Conditions

We test several predictions of Gradsteins(1995) rent seeking model using anexperimental design that includes avariable number of participants, costheterogeneity, and an entry fee. Consistentwith theoretical predictions, costheterogeneity and the entry fee decreasethe number of participants. Overall,participation is much lower than predicted. Also consistent with Gradsteins model, wefind that rent seeking expendituresincrease with the number of competitors anddecrease with the addition of an entry fee. Experimental results do not support theprediction that cost heterogeneitygenerally decreases expenditures in rentseeking contests.

Did the Devil Make Them Do it? The Effects of Religion in Public Goods and Trust Games

Observational studies frequently support the popular belief that religion is associated with more other-regarding behavior; however, such studies are well known to be susceptible to the confounding effects of unobserved determinants of cooperation and trust. We test whether religious affiliation and participation in religious services are associated with behavior in public goods and trust games. Contrary to popular wisdom, religious affiliation is unrelated to individual behavior. However, we do find some weak evidence that among subjects attending religious services, increased participation is associated with behavior in both public goods and trust games.

Punishment in a Regulatory Setting: Experimental Evidence from the VCM

To analyze the effectiveness of punishment in inducing regulatory compliance, we modify a standard public goods experiment to include a financial penalty for free riding. The design allows us to vary both punishment probability and severity. We introduce the punishment mechanism in both a one-time and a repeated treatment and find that compliance (contributing to the public good) is increasing in expected punishment cost in both treatments. We also find that punishment severity has a larger effect on behavior than punishment probability. In the repeated treatment, we find that past punishment has a negative rather than positive effect on compliance.

Discrimination: Experimental Evidence from Psychology and Economics

Discriminations dynamic nature means that no single theory, method, data or study should be relied upon to assess its magnitude, causes, or remedies. Despite some gains in our understanding, these remain active areas of debate among researchers, practitioners and policymakers. The specially commissioned papers in this volume, all by distinguished contributors, present the full range of issues related to this complex and challenging problem.

Yes, Wall Street, There Is A January Effect! Evidence from Laboratory Auctions

There is a large literature using financial market data on the causes of a “January effect,” which produces higher stock prices in January than in other months of the year. We present the first experimental study of this phenomenon in the context of two well-known auction experiments. After controlling for variables that could influence subject bids, such as differences in private values, cumulative earnings, and learning effects, the prices in the January markets were systematically higher than those in December, a difference that is economically large and statistically significant. The results provide support for the conjecture that psychological factors may contribute to the well-documented January effect in empirical stock market data.

Cultural differences in attitudes toward bargaining

Abstract This experimental study tests for cultural differences in attitudes toward bargaining. Individuals’ distaste for bargaining helps to explain why previous bargaining experience has a negative spillover effect on generosity in the United States but no spillover effect in Honduras.

Agendas and Strategic Voting

This paper describes a simple classroom experiment in which students decide which projects to fund on the basis of majority voting. Several agendas are used to generate a voting cycle and an inefficiently high level of public spending. Classroom discussion allows students to discover for themselves how to manipulate outcomes through agenda design and strategic voting. The exercise leads naturally to a discussion of political institutions and the size of government. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory and public economics classes to teach concepts of voting cycles and inefficiencies in public choice. Time required: Twenty minutes for reading instructions and taking votes and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: A printout of the instructions for each participant and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each group of seven voters.

Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games

A popular perception among the American electorate is that Democrats and liberals are more caring and kind-hearted than Republicans and conservatives. This stems in part from the consistent finding in opinion surveys that left-leaning individuals tend to support increased public spending on social programs. In this study, we put conventional wisdom to the test by examining differences in the behavior of liberal versus conservative subjects in two classic experimental settings: the public goods game and the bilateral trust game. First, we test whether Democrats or liberals are more likely to contribute to a group account when such actions are contrary to self-interest. Next, we test whether Democrats and liberals choose to trust strangers or to behave in a trustworthy fashion, despite monetary incentives to the contrary. To address the concern that liberals may not behave more compassionately in the artificially egalitarian setting of the laboratory, we induce inequality among subjects by manipulating the show-up fee paid to all participants. We find that despite conventional wisdom and survey evidence, there is no tendency for adherents of either major party to play nice, nor do self-described liberals have a greater tendency to make contributions in a public goods experiment. However, in keeping with conventional wisdom (but not necessarily national survey results), we find some evidence that self-described liberals behave in a more trusting and trustworthy manner.