H. Aaldering

Conflict in medical teams: opportunity or danger?

Medical Education 2012: 46: 935–942

Conflict and negotiation within and between groups.

Intergroup competition and conflict are pervasive problems in human society, giving rise to such phenomena as prejudice, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and interstate war (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Fiske, 2002). This chapter reviews classic and contemporary theory and research on (a) the origins of intergroup competition and conflict, and (b) the way humans regulate intergroup competition and conflict. To some extent, this chapter builds on earlier analyses of interpersonal and small-group conflict (de Dreu, 2008, 2010a; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Although interpersonal and small-group competition and conflict share critical features with intergroup competition and conflict, the latter includes structural features and psychological mechanisms not present in the former. Specifically, intergroup competition and conflict operate at two distinct yet closely intertwined levels of analysis: that of the individual and that of the group to which one belongs (henceforth, the in-group). Intergroup competition and conflict thus represents an amalgam of individual self-interests, values, and beliefs that converge into and are informed by group interests, values, and beliefs, and both the individual and group-level interests, values, and beliefs are shaped by and instrumental to the intergroup competition and conflict.

Parochial Cooperation in Nested Intergroup Dilemmas Is Reduced When It Harms Out-Groups.

In intergroup settings, humans often contribute to their in-group at a personal cost. Such parochial cooperation benefits the in-group and creates and fuels intergroup conflict when it simultaneously hurts out-groups. Here, we introduce a new game paradigm in which individuals can display universal cooperation (which benefits both in- and out-group) as well as parochial cooperation that does, versus does not hurt the out-group. Using this set-up, we test hypotheses derived from group selection theory, social identity, and bounded generalized reciprocity theory. Across three experiments we find, first, that individuals choose parochial over universal cooperation. Second, there was no evidence for a motive to maximize differences between in- and out-group, which is central to both group selection and social identity theory. However, fitting bounded generalized reciprocity theory, we find that individuals with a prosocial value orientation display parochial cooperation, provided that this does not harm the out-group; individualists, in contrast, display parochialism whether or not nut it hurts the out-group. Our findings were insensitive to cognitive taxation (Experiments 2–3), and emerged even when universal cooperation served social welfare more than parochialism (Experiment 3).

How representatives with a dovish constituency reach higher individual and joint outcomes in integrative negotiations

Representative negotiations often take a competitive course due to constituency pressures. However, in multi-issue integrative negotiation settings, using a competitive value-claiming strategy may result in less than optimal outcomes for both parties. In this experiment, we compared the negotiation process and outcomes of representatives with hawkish versus dovish constituencies. Representatives with a dovish constituency engaged in more information exchange and less contentious tactics, resulting in fewer impasses and higher quality agreements. Although representatives with a hawkish constituency claimed more value by placing higher demands, this negatively affected not only their joint, but also their individual outcomes. Overall, results suggest that representatives with a dovish constituency achieve better outcomes, both on an individual and dyadic level.