H. Clark Barrett

Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.

Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies

Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3–14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity.

Colloquium Paper: Adaptive specializations, social exchange, and the evolution of human intelligence

Blank-slate theories of human intelligence propose that reasoning is carried out by general-purpose operations applied uniformly across contents. An evolutionary approach implies a radically different model of human intelligence. The task demands of different adaptive problems select for functionally specialized problem-solving strategies, unleashing massive increases in problem-solving power for ancestrally recurrent adaptive problems. Because exchange can evolve only if cooperators can detect cheaters, we hypothesized that the human mind would be equipped with a neurocognitive system specialized for reasoning about social exchange. Whereas humans perform poorly when asked to detect violations of most conditional rules, we predicted and found a dramatic spike in performance when the rule specifies an exchange and violations correspond to cheating. According to critics, peoples uncanny accuracy at detecting violations of social exchange rules does not reflect a cheater detection mechanism, but extends instead to all rules regulating when actions are permitted (deontic conditionals). Here we report experimental tests that falsify these theories by demonstrating that deontic rules as a class do not elicit the search for violations. We show that the cheater detection system functions with pinpoint accuracy, searching for violations of social exchange rules only when these are likely to reveal the presence of someone who intends to cheat. It does not search for violations of social exchange rules when these are accidental, when they do not benefit the violator, or when the situation would make cheating difficult.

Recognizing Intentions in Infant-Directed Speech Evidence for Universals

In all languages studied to date, distinct prosodic contours characterize different intention categories of infant-directed (ID) speech. This vocal behavior likely exists universally as a species-typical trait, but little research has examined whether listeners can accurately recognize intentions in ID speech using only vocal cues, without access to semantic information. We recorded native-English-speaking mothers producing four intention categories of utterances (prohibition, approval, comfort, and attention) as both ID and adult-directed (AD) speech, and we then presented the utterances to Shuar adults (South American hunter-horticulturalists). Shuar subjects were able to reliably distinguish ID from AD speech and were able to reliably recognize the intention categories in both types of speech, although performance was significantly better with ID speech. This is the first demonstration that adult listeners in an indigenous, nonindustrialized, and nonliterate culture can accurately infer intentions from both ID speech and AD speech in a language they do not speak.

White-faced capuchin monkeys show triadic awareness in their choice of allies

The social intelligence hypothesis, which holds that social challenges have selected for increased intelligence and social skills, has been supported by evidence that, in catarrhine primates, individuals know about the characteristics of groupmates’ social relationships. Evidence for such ‘triadic awareness’ has not been sought for platyrrhine primates, although two platyrrhine genera, capuchins, Cebus, and squirrel monkeys, Saimiri, are among the most highly encephalized primates. We examined patterns of coalitionary recruitment in wild white-faced capuchins, C. capucinus. Analyses have shown that more dominant individuals are more likely to join aggressive coalitions than low-rankers, and that individuals preferentially support those with whom they have stronger affiliative relationships. Data from 110 fights, analysed using simulation techniques that produced distributions of results expected under null hypotheses, revealed that contestants preferentially solicited prospective coalition partners that (1) were dominant to their opponents, and (2) had better social relationships (higher ratios of affiliative/ cooperative interactions to agonistic interactions) with themselves than with their opponents. Further analyses showed that soliciting dominant partners could be explained by either of two simpler rules, ‘Solicit an ally that outranks yourself’ or ‘Solicit the highest-ranking available individual’. However, soliciting partners with better social relationships appears to indicate triadic awareness, because subjects did not preferentially solicit the nearby individual with whom they shared the highest-quality social relationship. Effects of relative relationship quality on coalition solicitation decisions were independent of effects of dominance rank.

Children's understanding of death as the cessation of agency: a test using sleep versus death

An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.

Vocal Emotion Recognition Across Disparate Cultures

There exists substantial cultural variation in how emotions are expressed, but there is also considerable evidence for universal properties in facial and vocal affective expressions. This is the first empirical effort examining the perception of vocal emotional expressions across cultures with little common exposure to sources of emotion stimuli, such as mass media. Shuar hunter-horticulturalists from Amazonian Ecuador were able to reliably identify happy, angry, fearful and sad vocalizations produced by American native English speakers by matching emotional spoken utterances to emotional expressions portrayed in pictured faces. The Shuar performed similarly to English speakers who heard the same utterances in a content-filtered condition. These data support the hypothesis that vocal emotional expressions of basic affective categories manifest themselves in similar ways across quite disparate cultures.

Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies

The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development.

Can Manipulations of Cognitive Load Be Used to Test Evolutionary Hypotheses

D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey proposed that if sex-differentiated responses to infidelity are evolved, then they should be automatic, and therefore cognitive load should not attenuate them. DeSteno et al. found smaller sex differences in response to sexual versus emotional infidelity among participants under cognitive load, an effect interpreted as evidence against the evolutionary hypothesis. This logic is faulty. Cognitive load probably affects mechanisms involved in simulating infidelity experiences, thus seriously challenging the usefulness of cognitive load manipulations in testing hypotheses involving simulation. The method also entails the assumption that evolved jealousy mechanisms are necessarily automatic, an assumption not supported by theory or evidence. Regardless of how the jealousy debate is eventually settled, cognitive load manipulations cannot rule out the operation of evolved mechanisms.

THE ENCRYPTION THEORY OF HUMOR: A KNOWLEDGE-BASED MECHANISM OF HONEST SIGNALING

Abstract We propose that intentionally produced humor is a form of communication that evolved to broadcast information about the self and to obtain information about others by honestly signaling the fact of shared common knowledge. According to this model, humorous utterances and acts are encrypted in the sense that what makes the joke funny is not merely its surface content, but a relationship between the surface content and one or more unstated implicatures which are known by both the sender and the receiver. It is the non-random nature of the match between this unstated knowledge and the surface content which provides evidence that the producer possesses that knowledge, and that those who appreciate the joke do as well, thus rendering humor a means of assessing shared underlying knowledge, attitudes, and preferences. We present evidence from two experimental studies of humor evaluation in support of the encryption theory.