Hal S. Scott

When the Euro Falls Apart

This paper recounts some well-known problems confronting European monetary union (EMU), such as withstanding asymmetric shocks and maintaining domestic political support. It then examines how a speculative attack could damage a target countrys banking system, and how the basic structure of EMU could facilitate its break-up. On the basis of this analysis, one might reasonably conclude that there is a significant chance – over one in ten – that EMU may break up in whole or in part. The paper then focuses primarily on two significant problems related to a break-up. First, a country seeking to leave EMU, particularly after the transition period, may have difficulty re-establishing its national currency unilaterally, as its economy is likely to have become thoroughly ‘euroized’. Second, any break-up accompanied by re-denomination of existing euro obligations, including government bonds, will create great legal uncertainty and costly litigation. There are no continuity of contract rules for exiting EMU equivalent to those for entering. Both problems require cooperative and deliberative solutions and will be difficult and costly to solve. If such problems are properly taken into account, which has not previously been the case, a euro break-up in the foreseeable future, particularly after transition, is considerably less likely than the above estimate of one in ten.

Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance

This book is timely since the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements is in the process of making major changes in the capital rules for banks. It is important that capital adequacy regulation helps to achieve financial stability in the most efficient way. Capital adequacy rules have become a key tool to protect financial institutions. The research contained within the book covers some key issues at stake in the capital requirements for insurance and securities firms. The contributors are among the leading scholars in financial economics and law. Their contributions analyze the use of subordinated debt, internal models, and rating agencies in addition to examining the effect on capital of reinsurance, securitization, credit derivatives, and similar instruments. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0195169719/toc.html

Asian Money Markets

The countries of East and Southeast Asia have the worlds most dynamic money markets. Essential to the Asian economy, their performance plays a crucial role in the successful development of other financial markets, such as those for business and consumer loans. This original study of the effect of government policy on the performance of money markets in the economies of this region (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea) is the only comprehensive book addressing this topic available today. Individual chapters were written by experts in the field, and were guided by a common research methodology. This book will be of great value to Pacific Basin specialists, bankers, academics, and public policy planners in finance.

Bank Capital for Operational Risk: A Tale of Fragility and Instability

Operational risk is fundamentally different from all other risks taken on by a bank. It is embedded in every activity and product of an institution, and in contrast to the conventional financial risks (e.g. market, credit) is harder to measure and model, and not straight forwardly eliminated through simple adjustments like selling off a position. Operational risk tends to be about 9-13% of the total risk pie, though growing rapidly since the 2008-09 crisis. It tends to be more fat-tailed than other risks, and the data are poorer. As a result, models are fragile--small changes in the data have dramatic impacts on modeled output--and thus required operational risk capital is unstable. Yet the regulatory capital regime is, surprisingly, more rigidly model focused for this risk than for any other, at least in the U.S. We are especially concerned with the absence of incentives to invest in and improve business control processes through the granting of regulatory capital relief. We make four, not mutually exclusive policy suggestions. First, address model fragility through anchoring of key model parameters, yet allow each bank to scale capital to their data using robust methodologies. Second, relax the current tight linkage between statistical model output and required regulatory capital, incentivizing prudent risk management through joint use of scenarios and control factors in addition to data-based statistical models in setting regulatory capital. Third, provide allowance for real risk transfer through an insurance credit to capital, encouraging more effective risk sharing through future product innovation. Fourth, expand upon the standard taxonomy of event type and business line to include additional explanatory variables (such as product type, flags for litigated events, etc.) that would allow more effective inter-bank sharing and learning from experience. Until our understanding of operational risks increases, required regulatory capital should be based on methodologies that are simpler, more standardized, more stable and more robust.

Establishing credible rules for Fed emergency lending

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose a set of five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed. Findings The authors find that the current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – is inadequate and not credible, and that their proposed framework would constitute a credible balancing of costs and benefits. Practical implications Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision. Originality/value This framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

The Importance of the Retail Payment System

This article explores the importance of an efficient retail payment system and develops an integrated framework for evaluation of the retail payment system by policy makers. It examines the costs and benefits of the various types of retail payment system, focusing on the seven desirable benefits of the retail payment system: (1) finality and reversibility; (2) universality (ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; (6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) fungibility and ease of use (seven benefits).The article discusses the Coase Theorem, a proposition from transaction cost economics that provides a useful tool for analyzing transaction efficiency. Increased costs are not bad per se since parties are often willing to incur higher costs to achieve their desired results, e.g. higher costs for a more secure form of payment. Indeed, higher costs may often generate higher value to both parties to a transaction. What one wants to reduce are “friction” costs, costs that neither party wants to pay to achieve a desired result, e.g. higher costs produced by lack of information.While each retail payment system provides certain advantages, e.g. cash for small transactions, overall the analysis suggests that debit and credit cards represent the most desirable payment system for achieving the seven benefits set forth above. This is supported by statistics that indicate that retail payments have increasingly moved toward card payments.

Controlling the Long-Term Problems of Short-Term Funding

While financial crises can be triggered by a number of causes, runs on short-term liabilities are at the heart of all financial crises with the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis being no exception. Given the unpredictability of crisis triggers and the overwhelming predictability of short-term funding’s role in financial crises, legislative and regulatory responses to the recent financial crisis should focus on controlling the problem of short-term funding in the financial system. However, in addressing the problem of short-term funding in the financial system, it is important to recognize the social benefits afforded by short-term liabilities and not simply the costs. To this end, this Article provides a brief overview of short-term funding in the U.S. financial system, while also highlighting the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of short-term liabilities. The Article proceeds with an analysis of various proposals aimed at addressing the short-term funding issue.

SRISK as a Measure of Systemic Risk for Insurers: Oversimplified and Inappropriate

The SRISK measure has been used to measure the relative systemic risk for financial institutions, ranking some insurers as vulnerable as banks to large capital shortfalls in stressed macroeconomic environments. This paper argues that the assumptions underpinning the SRISK measure are inappropriate for insurers and hence do not depict an accurate representation of insurer systemic risk.

International finance: rule choices for global financial markets

This major work consists of carefully commissioned original and incisive contributions from leading scholars in the field of international economic law. Covering a full range of topics, the Handbook provides an accessible treatment of the law in each area, as well as a thoughtful synthesis and discussion of related public policy issues from a broadly social science perspective.