Hans Radder

Experiment, Technology and the Intrinsic Connection Between Knowledge and Power

The paper starts with an analysis of similarities and differences between experimentation and technological production. It is argued that both imply an active intervention in nature and society, but that the cognitive and social aspects of experiment and technology may display considerable differences. The theoretical analysis is illustrated by means of examples taken, in particular, from the technology of nuclear energy production. Next, it is shown that, from the viewpoint of this paper, the technology conception prevailing in public debates on technology and in technology policy is inadequate; again, the case of nuclear energy serves as an example. Finally, it is concluded that scientific or technological knowledge and social power are intrinsically connected.

Heuristics and the Generalized Correspondence Principle

Several philosophers of science have claimed that the correspondence principle can be generalized from quantum physics to all of (particularly physical) science and that in fact it constitutes one of the major heuristical rules for the construction of new theories. In order to evaluate these claims, first the use of the correspondence principle in (the genesis of) quantum mechanics will be examined in detail. It is concluded from this and from other examples in the history of science that the principle should be qualified with respect to its nature and relativized with respect to its scope of application. At the same time this conclusion implies a qualification and a relativization of the heuristic power of the principle. Generally speaking, intertheoretical correspondence is primarily of a formal-mathematical and empirical but not of a conceptual nature. Moreover, it only applies to certain parts of the theories involved. Finally, a number of philosophical justifications of the principle are discussed and some conclusions are drawn concerning the debates on theory reduction and on the discovery-justification distinction.

The Academic Manifesto: From an Occupied to a Public University

Abstract Universities are occupied by management, a regime obsessed with ‘accountability’ through measurement, increased competition, efficiency, ‘excellence’, and misconceived economic salvation. Given the occupation’s absurd side-effects, we ask ourselves how management has succeeded in taking over our precious universities. An alternative vision for the academic future consists of a public university, more akin to a socially engaged knowledge commons than to a corporation. We suggest some provocative measures to bring about such a university. However, as management seems impervious to cogent arguments, such changes can only happen if academics take action. Hence, we explore several strategies for a renewed university politics.

Philosophy and history of science: beyond the Kuhnian paradigm

Abstract At issue in this paper is the question of the appropriate relationship between the philosophy and history of science. The discussion starts with a brief sketch of Kuhns approach, followed by an analysis of the so-called ‘testing-theories-of-scientific-change programme’. This programme is an attempt at a more rigorous approach to the historical philosophy of science. Since my conclusion is that, by and large, this attempt has failed, I proceed to examine some more promising approaches. First, I deal with Hackings recent views on the issues in question, particularly his notion of a ‘style of reasoning’. Next, Nickless reconstructionist interpretation of the development of science and his views on Whig history are addressed. Finally, I propose an account of philosophy as a theoretical, an interpretative and explanatory, enterprise. Thus, three alternatives to the Kuhnian paradigm are discussed, alternatives that share a recognition of the relative autonomy of philosophy from history. Hence, they assume a less tight relationship between philosophy and history of science than is the case within the Kuhnian paradigm.

Science, technology and the science-technology relationship

This chapter discusses the principal philosophical questions concerning the relationship between science and technology. As for science, the discussion is meant to cover a variety of disciplines. As for technology, in the present chapter, this notion will be used in a broad sense. That is to say, technology is taken to embrace the technological sciences, while the technological sciences include several disciplines in addition to the engineering sciences, such as information science, medical science and agricultural science. Technology is taken to embrace the technological sciences, while the technological sciences include several disciplines in addition to the engineering sciences, such as information science, medical science and agricultural science. Making such a direct link between technology, more broadly, and the technological sciences makes sense in view of the fact that these sciences aim to contribute towards realizing contemporary or future technologies.

The philosophy of scientific experimentation: a review

Practicing and studying automated experimentation may benefit from philosophical reflection on experimental science in general. This paper reviews the relevant literature and discusses central issues in the philosophy of scientific experimentation. The first two sections present brief accounts of the rise of experimental science and of its philosophical study. The next sections discuss three central issues of scientific experimentation: the scientific and philosophical significance of intervention and production, the relationship between experimental science and technology, and the interactions between experimental and theoretical work. The concluding section identifies three issues for further research: the role of computing and, more specifically, automating, in experimental research, the nature of experimentation in the social and human sciences, and the significance of normative, including ethical, problems in experimental science.

Does the brain "initiate" freely willed processes? A philosophy of science critique of Libet-type experiments and their interpretation

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain.

Why technologies are inherently normative

Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the philosophy of technology. Any systematic philosophical discussion of the normativity of technology should be based on a plausible account of the very idea of ‘technology’. Explaining and defending the claim that technologies are inherently normative requires, first, a plausible account of the notions of ‘technology’ and ‘normativity’ is essential. The distinct elements of this characterization of technologies can be described as a system. A system is any aggregate (or collective) of mutually interacting material entities within a certain region of space and time. Thus, a system possesses not only a spatial but also a temporal dimension, which allows to see processes as systems. Although the notion of a system may also be used in more substantial ways, this unassuming definition is appropriate in the present context. It may also be phrased by saying that technologies have a systemic character, because they result from bringing, and keeping, together two or more material entities.

Critical Philosophy of Technology: The Basic Issues

This paper proposes a framework for a critical philosophy of technology by discussing its practical, theoretical, empirical, normative and political dimensions. I put forward a general account of technology, which includes both similarities and dissimilarities to Andrew Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory. This account characterizes a technology as a “(type of) artefactual, functional system with a certain degree of stability and reproducibility”. A discussion of how such technologies may be realized discloses five different levels at which alternative choices might be made. On this basis, I argue that a critical philosophy of technology should analyse and assess the choices that have, and have not, been made in actual practice, and contribute to social experiments that aim at more democratic and more desirable alternatives.

Science, Realization and Reality: The Fundamental Issues

1. Change and Work Is TRUE scientific knowledge ‘about’ an independent reality? Someone who is inclined to answer this question in the affirmative will have to face two different (though not unrelated) basic sources of difficulties concerning this answer. The first is ‘change’, the second ‘work’. Let me explain. If true knowledge means knowledge about a reality that is independent of the existence of human beings or of the process in which it has been produced, true knowledge is invariant knowledge. But, when we look at the historical development of actual knowledge claims endorsed by scientists or scientific communities, we often see radical changes rather than invariance. The representations of reality turn out to be variable both temporally and spatially. This fact entails a severe challenge to realist interpretations, if one rightfully wants to avoid one’s interpretation being completely disconnected from scientific practice. This ‘Kuhnian challenge’ to scientific realism has been much debated in the history, philosophy and sociology of science of the last decades. ‘Conceptual discontinuity’, ‘incommensurability’ and ‘interpretative flexibility’ constitute the key notions of these debates.’ The second source of problems facing a realist interpretation of science is the work that is needed to produce scientific knowledge. Today virtually no one adheres any more to the view that knowledge is somehow imprinted by reality on passive knowers. Nearly all modern philosophers insist that acquiring scientific knowledge demands an active contribution from human beings. Because of this, anti-realists may and do argue that the nature of the knowledge product is not at all defined by an independent reality but rather by the specific characteristics of this production process. The work done to