Gregor Schiemann

The Significance of the Hypothetical in Natural Science

How was the hypothetical character of theories of experiencethought about throughout the history of science? The essays cover periods from the middle ages to the 19th and 20th centuries. It is fascinating to see how natural scientists and philosophers were increasingly forced to realize that a natural science without hypotheses is not possible.

The Loss of World in the Image: Origin and Development of the Concept of Image in the Thought of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz

In searching for the origins of current conceptions of science in the history of physics, one encounters a remarkable phenomenon. A typical view today is that theoretical knowledge-claims have only relativized validity. Historically, however, this thesis was supported by proponents of a conception of nature that today is far from typical, a mechanistic conception within which natural phenomena were to be explained by the action of mechanically moved matter.

Towards a Theory of Spacetime Theories

I begin by reviewing some recent work on the status of the geodesic principle in general relativity and the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. I then turn to the question of whether either of these theories might be said to “explain” inertial motion. I argue that there is a sense in which both theories may be understood to explain inertial motion, but that the sense of “explain” is rather different from what one might have expected. This sense of explanation is connected with a view of theories—I call it the “puzzleball view”—on which the foundations of a physical theory are best understood as a network of mutually interdependent principles and assumptions.

INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND DISCOVERY. ON HANS REICHENBACH'S FOUNDATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification continues to be relevant all the way up to the present. This can be seen clearly in the tense relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. In the current debates about the relationships between these two disciplines one encounters arguments that Reichenbach used to defend this distinction, as well as arguments brought forth by his critics. 1 Sometimes the discussions even refer directly to the influence of Reichenbach’s distinction (Giere 1999, pp. 11–18 and 217–230). Historically, this influence can be understood to have gone hand in hand with the significance of logical empiricism in the twentieth century for the development of philosophy of science and science studies, i.e., history, sociology and psychology of science. Reichenbach used the distinction in 1938 in his “Experience and Prediction”, which played a key role in the new beginning of logical empiricism in the US. Among the many motives that might have led Reichenbach to formulate this distinction, his intention to contribute to the foundation of the autonomy of a “scientific philosophy” presumably had central importance. 2 In this context, its function was to clarify Reichenbach’s stance towards other philosophical trends, to prove the homogeneity of the methodology and content of philosophy of science, and to distance philosophy of science from rival disciplines. Reichenbach’s remarks suggest—and I shall return to this point—that “context of discovery” means above all a part of the research conducted in the natural sciences. One of the messages that Reichenbach wanted to communicate with his distinction was: the “scientific philosophy” of logical empiricism can provide a justification for the theories brought forth in the natural sciences, whereas the natural sciences themselves are not in a position to do so. Since the “historical turn” accompanying Thomas S. Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, the distinction of contexts has been increasingly influential in distinguishing among the philosophy of science and the disciplines of science studies— in particular to the relationship between the philosophy and the history of science. To put it simply, from the perspective of analytical philosophy of science—into which the tradition of logical empiricism passed over—the historical presentation of the natural sciences now stands alongside the natural sciences, which are themselves the province of the context of discovery. I do not want to go into the details of the debates about the justification of disciplinary boundaries and relationships between the history and the philosophy of science. Rather, I would like to assume that Reichenbach’s distinction lives on, and

One Cognitive Style Among Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Lifeworld and of Other Experiences

In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological concepts fruitful for the social sciences, Alfred Schutz has laid foundations for a characterization of an manifold of distinct domains of experience. My aim here is to further develop this pluralist theory of experience by buttressing and extending the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or minimizing lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. After a critical discussion of the criterion-catalogue Schutz develops for the purpose of characterizing different cognitive styles, I move on to examine its application to one special style, the lifeworld. I appeal, on the one hand, to Husserl’s characterization of the lifeworld as a world of perception, and on the other hand to the layer-model of the lifeworld developed by Schutz and Thomas Luckmann. A consequence of this approach is that the lifeworld appears as a socially definable context that is detached from other experiences but on an equal footing with them with respect to their claim of validity. The term “lifeworld” does not denote a category that encompasses culture or nature but refers to a delimited action-space. Finally, I draw upon Schutz’s criterion-catalogue to characterize two domains of experience outside of the lifeworld, which play a central role for the process of differentiation of experience in modernity and for the phenomenological analysis of types of experience: experimental science and subjectivity.

Rationalität und Erfahrung

Die Pluralitat der Erfahrung kann in entgegengesetzter Weise zum Begriff der Rationalitat stehen. Gibt man einen einheitlichen Begriff der Rationalitat — etwa im Sinn der Wohlbegrundetheit von Handlungen, Meinungen, Wunschen oder Normen — vor,1 dann wird man finden, dass diese Eigenschaft in zahlreichen Erfahrungsweisen keine oder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt. Sucht man hingegen die Pluralitat der Erfahrung in den Begriff der Rationalitat aufzunehmen, wird dessen Einheit in dem Mas problematisch, wie man der vorausgesetzten Erfahrungsstruktur eine irreduzible Heterogenitat zuschreibt.2

Hermann von Helmholtz

Medizinstudium an der Militararzteschule in Berlin u. a. bei J. Muller und G. Magnus; nach Promotion Chirurg des Husarenregiments in Potsdam; 1848 Ruckkehr nach Berlin, lehrte Anatomie an der Kunstakademie und als Assistent von J. Muller; durch Fursprache von Alexander von Humboldt Professor fur Physiologie und Pathologie an der Konigsberger Universitat; wichtige Leistungen u. a. Messung der Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit von Erregungsvorgangen im Nervensystem, Erfindung des Augenspiegels und Formulierung des Energieerhaltungssatzes; lehrte ab 1855 in Bonn und ab 1858 in Heidelberg; 1871 Lehrstuhl fur Physik in Berlin; ab 1888 Prasident der Physikalisch- Technischen Reichsanstalt in Charlottenburg.

Lebensweltliche und physikalische Zeit

Zur Aufklarung der vielschichtigen Beziehungen zwischen Lebenswelt und Physik diskutiere ich die fur die beiden Erfahrungsweisen jeweils typischen Konzeptualisierungen von Zeit. Nach einer Einleitung beginne ich mit der Analyse der subjektiven und objektiven lebensweltlichen Zeitformen. Anschliesend erortere ich im dritten Abschnitt das Verhaltnis von lebensweltlichen und physikalischen Elementen der Weltzeit. Vier physikalische Zeitverstandnisse stelle ich in ihrer Differenz zur lebensweltlichen Auffassung im vierten Abschnitt dar. Historisch hat sich die generelle Tendenz zur Vergroserung dieser Differenz fortgesetzt, ohne dass schon Instanzen zur Vermittlung der divergierenden Begriffe entstanden waren. Vor diesem Hintergrund pladiere ich im abschliesenden Teil fur eine plurale Begrifflichkeit.