Harris Sondak

An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental negotiation studies: Impasse rates and pareto efficiency

Abstract We discuss the importance of appropriate measures of dyadic performance in negotiations research. We review how the quality of negotiated agreements has been measured in recent experimental research on mixed-motive, dyadic negotiations. We argue that impasse rates have been largely ignored as a dependent variable and that failure to take account of impasse rates may bias experimental results. In addition, we show that impasse rates can vary across experimental treatments as a result of differences in the balance of power. Pareto efficiency is argued to be a better measure of the quality of dyadic agreements than is joint profit, the more commonly used measure. We discuss the theoretical implications of these two measurements and show when they would lead to different conclusions. Finally, we evaluate alternative operationalizations of Pareto efficiency.

Power balance and the rationality of outcomes in matching markets

Abstract Negotiated outcomes in market contexts where unique goods are offered include the matching of buyers and sellers and the terms of dyadic agreements. In a laboratory simulation of the MBA job market, subjects played the roles of job candidates or corporate recruiters. Subjects found jobs or hired employees and agreed to the terms of their employment contracts. The balance of power between the sides of the market was manipulated by 1) increasing the longevity of employment offers, or 2) improving the alternatives to agreement of recruiters. The results suggest that the quality of negotiated agreements between dyad members increased by unequal power. At the market level of analysis, the results suggest that exploding offers lower the quality of matching outcomes. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for competitive practices in matching markets.

Relationship frames and cooperation

We examine how various categories of relationships, and the time horizons of those relationships, affect rates of cooperation and competition in a mixed-motive decision task. We suggest that whether managers are likely to cooperate or compete depends on whether the task is framed as involving a colleague, customer, supplier, or competitor relationship. We suggest that these differences will exist only when the time horizon of the relationship is long term. We test these proposals in an experimental role-play exercise conducted by personal computer. When the time horizon is long, subjects are more likely to cooperate with customers, colleagues, and suppliers than with competitors. Counter to expectations, subjects are more likely to cooperate with competitors than with colleagues when the time horizon is short than when the time horizon is long. In addition, we show how the four business relationship frames vary along several dimensions that successfully discriminate among the relationships. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for helping managers cooperate when cooperation is appropriate.

Making sense of the phenomenology of groups and group membership

This chapter considers the previous contributions to this volume from two perspectives. First, I discuss how the chapters contribute to the under-standing of groups and group membership in terms of McGraths (1986) prescriptions for research on groups. Second, I compare the chapters to the characteristics of sense-making studies outlined by Weick (1995). While this volume leaves many issues for further investigation, this volume makes important contributions to the study of groups from a phenomenological point of view.

Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in the 20th Century (revised edition)

The article reviews the book ‘Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in the 20th Century,’ revised edition, by Sanford M. Jacoby.