Robin L. Pinkley

Conflict Frames of Reference: Implications for Dispute Processes and Outcomes

Previous research has shown that disputants differ substantially in how they experience, or cognitively “frame,” conflict—even the same conflict. We explored the influence of cognitive frames on ne...

Individual versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact

Abstract Following earlier demonstrations of more competitiveness between groups than between individuals in the context of a PDG matrix, two additional conditions were studied. These were a group-all condition in which the intergroup contact involved all the members in both groups (rather than just representatives as in the previously studied group-representative condition), and an interdependence condition in which physically separated individuals shared their winnings with the other subjects on the same side of the suite of rooms (rather than neither giving winnings to nor receiving winnings from other such subjects as in the previously studied individuals condition). The results indicated that there was a large overall tendency for the group-representative and group-all conditions to be more competitive than the individuals and interdependence conditions, that the group-representative condition was more competitive than the group-all condition, and that the interdependence condition and individuals condition did not differ. The difference between the group-representative and group-all condition was interpreted as consistent with a prediction that intergroup contact can reduce competitiveness even when there is conflict and the absence of norms requiring cooperative behavior. The lack of difference between the interdependence condition and the individuals condition was interpreted as inconsistent with an altruisticrationalization hypothesis according to which group members rationalize their competitiveness toward the other group as being enacted for the sake of fellow group members.

Individual-group discontinuity: The role of a consensus rule

Abstract The present experiment examined the conditions necessary for the creation of psychologically real groups (entitativity). Stated differently, the experiment examined the conditions required to make an aggregate of three individuals separately interact with another aggregate of three individuals in the competitive manner characteristic of the way in which a group of three individuals has been observed to interact with another group of three individuals. Interactions occurred between two aggregates of three individuals via 10 versions of a PDG matrix. In four of the five conditions each subject in one aggregate interacted with a single subject from the “opposing” aggregate. In the first, or interdependence, condition the three individuals in each aggregate were placed in separate rooms, although they did share their earnings. In the second, or contact, condition the three individuals were placed in the same room but not allowed to talk to each other. In the third, or discussion, condition the three individuals were required to discuss their separate PDG choices with each other. In the fourth, or consensus, condition the subjects were required to reach consensus regarding their separate PDG choices. In the fifth, or group-all, condition the subjects in each aggregate collectively interacted with the subjects in the opposing aggregate. The results indicated that the group-all and consensus conditions produced equivalently lower amounts of cooperativeness than the interdependence, contact, and discussion conditions. These results were interpreted as indicating that a consensus rule is necessary for the creation of entitativity.

Impact of knowledge regarding alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiations : whose knowledge counts ?

Study I examined whose knowledge of a best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA) produces documented benefits. The results suggest that (a)joint gain and the number of integrative trade-offs increase when the actor with the alternative is made aware of the alternative and (b) the actor with the alternative obtains a marginal increase in personal gain only when both negotiators (i.e., both the actor and the opponent) are aware of the actors alternative. Study 2 explored changes in actor and opponent cognitions that result when each is informed about the actors alternative. Results suggest that the existence of an attractive alternative changes actor and opponent walk away point ( often referred to as reservation point), perception of efficacy regarding negotiation skill, perceived value of the commodity being negotiated, and distribution of power.

Managerial Third-Party Dispute Intervention: An Inductive Analysis of Intervenor Strategy Selection

Managers as 3rd-party conflict intervenors differ from other, more formal 3rd parties, such as arbitrators and mediators (B. H. Shepperd, D. M. Saunders, & J. W. Minton, 1986 ). The study described in this article was conducted to identify the conflict intervention strategies as recalled by managers in the role of 3rd party. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques were used to determine the dimensions necessary and sufficient to distinguish among the types of intervention strategies described by managers. The MDS procedures revealed 5 dimensions : attention given to stated versus underlying problem, disputant commitment forced versus encouraged, manager versus disputant decision control, manager approaches conflict versus manager avoids conflict, and dispute is handled publicly versus privately. Confirmatory analysis supported the selection of dimension labels. Additional analysis provided preliminary support for the notion that the nature of the conflict and intervenor goals influence manager selection of intervention strategies.

Stairways to Heaven: An Interlocking Self-Regulation Model of Negotiation

We introduce an interlocking self-regulation model of negotiation. A central tenet of this new model is that negotiation is both external (getting the other side to offer what you want) and internal (deciding whether to want what the other side offers). We discuss important issues implicit in this model, and we propose strategies by which negotiators reduce discrepancies between standards and offers, incorporating research on the role of attributions.

Agreement Attraction and Impasse Aversion Reasons for Selecting a Poor Deal Over No Deal at All

In the present studies, we examined the positive value of agreement and the negative value of impasse. Participants chose to give up real value and sacrifice economic efficiency in order to attain an agreement outcome and avoid an impasse outcome. A personally disadvantageous option was selected significantly more often when it was labeled “Agreement” rather than “Option A,” and a personally advantageous option was avoided significantly more often when it was labeled “Impasse” rather than “Option B.” In a face-to-face negotiation, a substantial proportion of individuals reached an agreement that was inferior to their best alternative to agreement. We showed that the appeal of agreement and the aversion to impasse both contribute to this effect, yet the aversion to impasse is the stronger of the two motivations. These findings have important implications for negotiators.