Harry G. Broadman
World Bank
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Featured researches published by Harry G. Broadman.
The World Economy | 1997
Harry G. Broadman
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in Chinas push toward a market-oriented economy. Recent inflows account for 40 percent of combined flows of FDI to all developing countries, making China the biggest developing country FDI recipient. This record is impressive, but certain problems must be overcome if FDI is to continue to help sustain the countrys record growth rate and further its economic development. For one thing, FDI in China is highly concentrated geographically, and its sector distribution is highly uneven. The authors empirically analyze the geographic determinants of FDI in China. They find that FDIs geographical distribution in China is determined mostly by GNP, infrastructure development, level of general education, and coastal location. Although the sectoral distribution of FDI is coming into line with the rest of the world, in the past, FDI has been biased toward speculative types of investment, especially in the real estate sector.
Review of Industrial Organization | 1999
Harry G. Broadman
Many industrial firms in Russia have undergone changes in ownership, but relatively few have been competitively restructured. Using survey and other data, the author suggests that much of Russian industry is immune from robust competition because of heavy vertical integration, geographic segmentation, and the concentration of buyers and sellers, in selected markets. Moreover, regulatory constraints protect incumbent firms from competition with new entrants, both domestic and foreign. The author sketches a reform agenda for Russias post-privatization program, which emphasizes the restructuring of anti-competitive structures and the reduction of barriers to entry. The authors proposed reform agenda calls broadly for strengthening Russias nascent rules-based framework for competition policy to reduce discretion, increase transparency, and improve accountability.
Moct-most Economic Policy in Transitional Economies | 1999
Harry G. Broadman; Francesca Recanatini
Ten years into the transition process, corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon thatcan seriously jeopardize the best intentionedreform efforts. Because of the complex anddeep political economy dynamics surroundingthe process transition economies areundergoing it is essential for policy-makersto understand the causes of corruption. Thispaper develops an integrated analyticalframework of the role basic marketinstitutions play as determinants ofrent-seeking and illicit behavior intransition economies. Using data onlyrecently available on the incidence ofcorruption and institutional development inthese economies, we provide preliminaryevidence on both the systemic links betweendevelopment of market institutions andincentives for corruption and the relativeimportance of such institutions. The mainlesson from our analysis is that awell-established system of marketinstitutions – one characterized by clear andtransparent rules, fully functioning checksand balances, including strong enforcementmechanisms, and a robust competitiveenvironment – reduces rent-seekingopportunities and, in turn, the incentives forcorruption. The empirical results suggestthat high barriers to new business entrantsand soft budget constraints on incumbent firmsare particularly important institutionalfactors engendering opportunities andincentives for corruption. As in otherstudies, the empirical results also supportthe notion that economic development andmaturation of democratic processes both tempercorruption, as does, to a lesser extent,openness to trade.
Journal of Economic Policy Reform | 2002
Harry G. Broadman; Francesca Recanatini
Corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon that can seriously jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. This paper presents an analytical framework for examining the role basic market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. The empirical results suggest that high barriers to new business entry and soft budget constraints on incumbent firms are particularly important institutional factors engendering opportunities for corruption. The findings also support the notion that economic development and maturation of democratic processes both temper corruption, as does, to a lesser extent, openness to international trade.
The Journal of Asian Studies | 2002
Harry G. Broadman; Hongying Wang
This is a clearly written and well-paced discussion of how foreign companies have been able to invest in China and profit from their investments through informal relationships in the absence of consistently enforced formal legal protection for such business investments.
Review of Industrial Organization | 1998
Julia Lane; Harry G. Broadman; Inderjit Singh
Developed and developing countries alike areprivatizing or corporatizing state owned enterprises(SOEs), often citing the flexibility to hire and shedlabor as an advantage. However, there is littleempirical evidence on the extent to which thisimproves firm performance. This paper investigates thelinkage between labor flexibility, ownership and firmperformance using China as a case study. We find thatSOEs are much less able to adjust quickly to demandshocks than are other ownership forms and that thedegree of worker input into hiring and firingdecisions slows the ability of firms to adapt,negatively affecting firm performance.
Washington Quarterly | 2004
Harry G. Broadman
Recognizing Russias remaining internal challenges to WTO accession and devising strategies to overcome them are critical to lock in domestic reforms and bring about the benefits of integration—both to Russians and to the world economy.
Social Science Research Network | 2000
Harry G. Broadman
Progress in reforming Chinas state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a litmus test for assessing the Chinese leadership?s willingness to seek membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The more extensive the reform of the SOEs, the more resilient they would become to the rigors of the international marketplace and less strain would be placed on China?s economy. By the same token, Chinas accession to the WTO will spur SOE reform, since the greater external competitive pressure will induce enterprise restructuring. The November 1999 agreement between Chinese and U.S. authorities on terms for China?s WTO accession signals an important commitment by the Chinese to expose their SOEs to more fundamental market discipline and reform. However, even after China becomes a member of the WTO, the effectiveness of its implementation of WTO commitments will turn on continued reform of the SOE sector. This paper sheds light on these challenges by analyzing the incentives and constraints on Chinas SOE reform program. Four critical aspects of the reforms are highlighted and evaluated against the backdrop of international experience: clarification of property rights; establishment of large group/holding companies and other new organizational structures; improved corporate governance incentives; and implementation of international financial accounting and auditing practices. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy | 2010
John Wilson; Xubei Luo; Harry G. Broadman
This paper examines the impact of improved trade facilitation measures and institutional capacity in a set of economies in transition Europe. Our results suggest that behind-the-border barriers play an important role in determining bilateral trade flows (controlling for the effects of tariffs, development levels, distance, and regional characteristics of exporters and importers, among other factors). For European Union (EU) members that joined the Union in 2004 and less developed and candidate members raising capacity in port efficiency and information technology infrastructures halfway to the EU-15 average, trade could expand by US
International Journal of The Economics of Business | 2002
Julia Lane; Robert M. Feinberg; Harry G. Broadman
49 billion and US