Hassan Elbahtimy

The Future of Chemical Weapons: Implications from the Syrian Civil War

Abstract With chemical weapons (CW) use in Syria raising questions about the health of the CW norm, this article analyzes whether the Syrian case will lead to further proliferation and use of chemical weapons by states. We examine the use of chemical weapons at Ghouta in 2013 and on the Hama Plains in 2014 and find that: first, chemical weapons have demonstrated limited military utility in Syria, either tactically or as a tool of civilian victimization; second, the costs of use have been repeatedly demonstrated by the international reaction to their use; and third, the use of sarin—a nerve agent—has attracted a stronger international response than the use of chlorine, a less lethal agent. Consequently, we conclude that the Syrian case is unlikely to lead to significant proliferation and use of chemical weapons; any that does occur is most likely to involve states already outside the CW norm.

The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence

The previous chapters set out a concise history of verification, both in the broad area of arms control and non-proliferation, and in the specific context of nuclear warhead dismantlement. This overview demonstrated that verification has, for many years now, been a highly active area of research, development and application. Insights were also provided into the innovative ways in which the scientific community has sought to harness technological advances to address the challenges around veracity and authentication in nuclear warhead dismantlement. From engineering to informatics, approaches here draw from a range of scientific disciplines. Yet, significant as these advances are, their scope remains limited, as they have only sought to address technical aspects of verification challenges.

Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification: Opportunities and Challenges

The previous chapter explored some of the ways that the idea of verification has found expression in the nuclear arena. From the complexities of IAEA safeguards, to the challenges associated with bilateral and international treaties, this brief and eclectic overview of verification-related initiatives provided an insight into the evolution of the concept and its application. Of particular interest here is the fact that the scope of nuclear verification activities carried out under bilateral and international treaties to date has been limited to civil materials and facilities, delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and the remote identification of nuclear tests. The New START Treaty provided inspectors with “the opportunity to confirm that the actual number of warheads emplaced on a designated missile matches the declared figure at the pre-inspection briefing”, but this did not go beyond visual confirmation.

Simulating Disarmament Verification: Design and Methods

The preceding chapters have had three principal objectives. First, to delve into the history of verification in the nuclear arena with a view to providing the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the various challenges that have been encountered by researchers in this space, particularly with regard to nuclear warhead dismantlement. In this complex area of enquiry, some of these challenges have been overcome, while others, such as the impossibility of 100 per cent certainty in verification outcomes, have endured. Second, to highlight what we regard as a significant gap in verification research, namely the role and influence of human factors in what is usually considered to be an objective, technical process. In our view, this techno-centric view is reductive and limiting, and fails to adequately account for the complexities and nuances of verification as practice. This leads directly to our third objective: to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to thinking about human factors relevant to the verification context, such as trust and confidence, and develop a robust conceptual framework within which these factors can be considered. These objectives achieved, the remainder of the book is devoted to exploring the research findings drawn from a two-year project designed to isolate for study, in so far is possible, the human factors of verification.

Conclusion: Looking to the Future

Studying the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is a challenging task. This is an area of activity characterised by uncertainty, where 100 per cent ‘proof’ remains an unattainable aspiration. At root, the problem here lies in the enduring tension between the transparency needed for effective verification and the secrecy demanded by national security requirements and non-proliferation obligations. From a monitoring or inspection perspective, the space between these two poles is marked by a host of evidentiary gaps, each one with the potential to fundamentally undermine the verification process. Furthermore, the problem is magnified by the potential costs of failure or misjudgement. The illicit diversion of nuclear weapons or their constituent parts would have far-reaching consequences and likely pose a significant threat to international security.

Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance and Practice

In his seminal research on verification and trust in arms control, Allan Krass notes that “no word has suffered more from scepticism and cynicism in superpower diplomacy than ‘trust’”. Clearly, this observation reflects the fact that in a shifting and uncertain international arena, where national interests reign supreme, any rhetoric prioritising trust between states is inevitably counterbalanced by an approach that seeks to verify claims and agreements, and to ensure that national interests are safeguarded as a state enters any bilateral or multilateral commitment. Consequently, the concept of verification pervades all aspects of international relations.

Allies at arm’s length: Redefining Egyptian–Soviet relations in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war

ABSTRACT This article examines Egyptian–Soviet relations in the run up to the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. It argues that Egypt and the Soviet Union stumbled into brinkmanship with little coordination and no agreement on common objectives or goals. The article demonstrates how frustration and mutual disappointment were recurring features of the interactions between the two allies during the critical weeks prior to the war. In doing so, the article exposes new aspects of how Cairo and Moscow managed their alliance and assesses what that means to our understanding of the origins of this transformative war. These conclusions challenge revisionist accounts that attribute the start of the war to Egyptian–Soviet collusion and some traditional narratives that present the Soviet Union as an enterprising risk-taker invested in regional brinkmanship. The article draws heavily on Egyptian and Arabic language sources to examine Egyptian–Soviet interactions during this key period of Middle Eastern history.