Wyn Q. Bowen

Deterrence and asymmetry: non-state actors and mass casualty terrorism

The attacks against the US homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on US territory, citizens and infrastructure. Often these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy sanctuary and protection of states but some have the resources and capabilities to operate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of CBRNE technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks might involve such weapons. Quadrennial Defense Review, US DOD, 30 September 2001

Missile defence and the transatlantic security relationship

This article examines the re-emergence of ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a contentious issue in US-European security relations since 1999. It begins by outlining three phases in the recent evolution of US missile defence policy from 1995 to mid-2001. The article then examines five key factors that have dominated European views and concerns in relation to BMD: a divergence between European and American assessments of the emerging ballistic missile threat; concern over the implications for nuclear arms control stemming from Russian and Chinese opposition to BMD; the impact of missile defence on deterrence and the Atlantic alliance; scepticism about the technological feasibility of BMD; and the potential opportunity costs associated with resource allocation to missile defence. It is shown that European anxieties have been exacerbated by a perception of a growing unilateralism in American security policy in recent years. The article proceeds by arguing that the US-European debate over BMD looks set to evolve in one of two directions. The more likely and most desirable scenario would involve the US reaching an understanding with its European allies on the way forward. The less desirable scenario would involve key European countries, such as France and Germany, deciding ultimately to withhold their political support for BMD, which would have the potential of causing significant rifts in both transatlantic and intra-European security relations. In both cases, it is argued that the BMD debate will be defined by the interaction of several key variables. These include the extent to which the Bush administration engages in meaningful consultations with the Europeans; the administrations ability or otherwise to reach an agreement with Russia on the way ahead; the architecture options of a future allied or global BMD system; the related issues of technological feasibility and financial cost; and the evolving missile threat.

Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran's nuclear strategy

For the past decade, much attention has been devoted to the potential consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet the binary ‘acquisition/restraint’ lens through which the Iranian nuclear issue is frequently viewed is limiting. There is now much evidence to suggest that Iran is engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than an outright pursuit of the bomb. This does not change the need to contain Tehrans proliferation potential, yet it does add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Iran will retain a low level of latency whatever the final outcome of longstanding diplomatic efforts to constrain the scope and pace of its nuclear efforts. This article will explore the implications of Iranian nuclear hedging and consider how regional rivals might interpret and respond to Tehrans nuclear strategy. On a larger scale, the article will explore the potential impact of the international communitys approach to the Iranian case—implicitly recognizing, even giving legitimacy to, hedging—both in terms of the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the ability of the international community to limit the negative effects of this form of proliferation behaviour

Iran's Nuclear Programme: A Case Study in Hedging?

Abstract: This article examines Iranian proliferation behaviour through the lens of nuclear hedging. Defined as ‘nuclear latency with intent’, hedging is an area of proliferation behaviour that has not been fully explored. The Iranian case presents an outstanding example of the questions and types of evidence required to judge whether a nuclear programme is engaged in a hedging strategy. By examining a nuclear programme from three distinct angles – technical, narrative and diplomatic – key elements of strategic hedging can be identified. Applied to Iran, evidence supports a diagnosis of hedging. But this assessment is further complicated by Irans domestic political context, which has engendered an approach that is as much ‘hedging by default’ as it is ‘hedging by design’. This approach allows Tehran to reconcile restraint with domestic consensus on nuclear advancement. In this regard, our analysis shows that international exposure of Irans undeclared nuclear activities had an enormous impact on the direction of Irans nuclear programme, placing important constraints on Irans nuclear progress. The article argues that any solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge must be based on realistic goals. The international community should focus on containing Iranian advancements rather than rollback, with a view to restricting hedging to a low level of latency.

Sensitive Nuclear Information: Challenges and Options for Control

Abstract This article starts by discussing sensitive nuclear information and how malicious non-state actors could exploit this to facilitate acts of nuclear terror. Our analysis shows that there is a significant information security challenge in this area due to the diversity of sensitive information, the different communities within which it resides and the range of mechanisms by which it could be transferred. We then turn our attention to assessing different steps that could be taken to protect sensitive nuclear information. Here there are limits to the effectiveness of international instruments and national laws and consequently bottom-up initiatives designed to promote responsible self-governance should be developed and supported.

Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: An Introduction to the Special Issue

This article was published in the journal, Intelligence and National Security [© Taylor & Francis (Routledge)] and the definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.895590

Silent partnership: The G-8's nonproliferation program

Insiders say that a major international collaboration to reduce proliferation threats is one of the most successful G-8 initiatives ever, yet its achievements have been ignored publicly and its future is uncertain.

The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence

The previous chapters set out a concise history of verification, both in the broad area of arms control and non-proliferation, and in the specific context of nuclear warhead dismantlement. This overview demonstrated that verification has, for many years now, been a highly active area of research, development and application. Insights were also provided into the innovative ways in which the scientific community has sought to harness technological advances to address the challenges around veracity and authentication in nuclear warhead dismantlement. From engineering to informatics, approaches here draw from a range of scientific disciplines. Yet, significant as these advances are, their scope remains limited, as they have only sought to address technical aspects of verification challenges.

Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification: Opportunities and Challenges

The previous chapter explored some of the ways that the idea of verification has found expression in the nuclear arena. From the complexities of IAEA safeguards, to the challenges associated with bilateral and international treaties, this brief and eclectic overview of verification-related initiatives provided an insight into the evolution of the concept and its application. Of particular interest here is the fact that the scope of nuclear verification activities carried out under bilateral and international treaties to date has been limited to civil materials and facilities, delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and the remote identification of nuclear tests. The New START Treaty provided inspectors with “the opportunity to confirm that the actual number of warheads emplaced on a designated missile matches the declared figure at the pre-inspection briefing”, but this did not go beyond visual confirmation.

Simulating Disarmament Verification: Design and Methods

The preceding chapters have had three principal objectives. First, to delve into the history of verification in the nuclear arena with a view to providing the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the various challenges that have been encountered by researchers in this space, particularly with regard to nuclear warhead dismantlement. In this complex area of enquiry, some of these challenges have been overcome, while others, such as the impossibility of 100 per cent certainty in verification outcomes, have endured. Second, to highlight what we regard as a significant gap in verification research, namely the role and influence of human factors in what is usually considered to be an objective, technical process. In our view, this techno-centric view is reductive and limiting, and fails to adequately account for the complexities and nuances of verification as practice. This leads directly to our third objective: to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to thinking about human factors relevant to the verification context, such as trust and confidence, and develop a robust conceptual framework within which these factors can be considered. These objectives achieved, the remainder of the book is devoted to exploring the research findings drawn from a two-year project designed to isolate for study, in so far is possible, the human factors of verification.