Heather Battaly

Metaethics Meets Virtue Epistemology: Salvaging Disagreement about the Epistemically Thick

Abstract Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology shift the focus of evaluation from thin concepts to thick ones. Simon Blackburn has argued that a shift to thick ethical concepts dooms us to talking past one another. I contend that virtue epistemologists can answer Blackburns objection, thus salvaging genuine disagreement about the epistemically thick. Section I introduces the standard cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses of thick concepts. Section II argues that thick epistemic concepts are subject to combinatorial vagueness. I contend that virtue epistemologists share vague concepts of intellectual virtue and open-mindedness. Section III addresses Allan Gibbards worry that appealing to vagueness exacerbates the problem. I conclude that for genuine disagreement to occur, the parties must (1) share vague concepts; and (2) agree on the goals of their conceptual analyses.

Developing virtue and rehabilitating vice: Worries about self-cultivation and self-reform

Abstract Aristotelian virtue theorists have emphasized the role of the self in developing virtue and in rehabilitating vice. But this article argues that, as Aristotelians, we have placed too much emphasis on self-cultivation and self-reform. Self-cultivation is not required for developing virtue or vice. Nor will sophia-inspired self-reform jumpstart change in the vicious person. In each case, the external environment has an important role to play. One can unwittingly acquire virtues or vices from one’s environment. Likewise, a well-designed environment may be the key ingredient for jumpstarting change in the vicious person. Self-cultivation and late-stage self-reform are not ruled out, but the role of the self in character development and rehabilitation is not as exalted as we might have thought.

Introduction to virtue and control: Lessons from east and west

Aristotle and Confucius agree that individuals have considerable control over their virtues. They think that individuals have control both over the development of their virtues and over their virtuous actions and behavior. In contrast with this tradition, contemporary psychologists have emphasized the influence of external factors on virtue. Developmental psychologists have argued that environmental factors play an important role in the acquisition of virtue. Social psychologists have argued that situational factors have an important influence on virtuous action and behavior. Contemporary philosophers, due partly to an increase in interdisciplinary dialog with psychologists, have also begun to break with tradition. Several virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists have recently argued that situational factors influence virtuous action and the development of virtue. Philosophers who do cross-cultural work have argued that cultural and environmental factors influence whether we acquire virtues at all, and which virtues we acquire. If these contemporary psychologists and philosophers are correct, individuals have considerably less control over their virtues than the tradition has claimed. This interdisciplinary special issue explores ways in which we do, and do not, control the development of virtue and virtuous behavior. The articles are organized around three different themes that pertain to control and virtue. The first theme addresses virtue, control and the challenge of situationism. The second addresses virtue, control, and cultural and environmental factors. The third addresses virtue, control and the individual. Questions that articles in this issue ask and attempt to answer include:

Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge: How damaging is epistemic circularity?

The problem of epistemic circularity maintains that we cannot know that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable without vicious circularity. Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge (2009) offers a solution to this problem. Sosa argues that epistemic circularity is virtuous rather than vicious: it is not damaging. Contra Sosa, I contend that epistemic circularity is damaging. Section 1 provides an overview of Sosa’s solution. Section 2 focuses on Sosa’s reply to the Crystal-ball-gazer Objection. Section 2 also contends that epistemic circularity does not prevent us from being justified in (e.g.) perceptual beliefs, or from being justified in believing that (e.g.) sense perception is reliable. But, Sect. 3 argues that it does prevent us from being able to satisfactorily show that our central belief-forming practices (faculties) are reliable. That is, epistemic circularity prevents us from distinguishing between reliable and unreliable practices, from guiding ourselves to use reliable practices and avoid unreliable ones, and from defending reliable practices against skepticism. Hence, epistemic circularity is still damaging. The concluding section suggests that this has repercussions for Sosa’s analysis of the value of reflective knowledge.