Heather Dyke

Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions

There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, and of the connection between truth and reality on the one hand, and that between truth and meaning on the other. I argue that Smiths objections to the token-reflexive theory stem from his confusing these two aspects of the notion of truth.

What is Analytic Metaphysics For

We divide analytic metaphysics into naturalistic and non-naturalistic metaphysics. The latter we define as any philosophical theory that makes some ontological (as opposed to conceptual) claim, where that ontological claim has no observable consequences. We discuss further features of non-naturalistic metaphysics, including its methodology of appealing to intuition, and we explain the way in which we take it to be discontinuous with science. We outline and criticize Ladyman and Rosss 2007 epistemic argument against non-naturalistic metaphysics. We then present our own argument against it. We set out various ways in which intellectual endeavours can be of value, and we argue that, in so far as it claims to be an ontological enterprise, non-naturalistic metaphysics cannot be justified according to the same standards as science or naturalistic metaphysics. The lack of observable consequences explains why non-naturalistic metaphysics has, in general, failed to make progress, beyond increasing the standards of clarity and precision in expressing its theories. We end with a series of objections and replies.

Temporal Language and Temporal Reality

It has recently been argued that the new B-theory of time argues invalidly from the claim that tensed sentences have tenseless truth-conditions to the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless. But while early B-theorists may have relied on some such inference, new B-theorists do not. Giving tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences is not intended to prove that temporal reality is tenseless. Rather it is intended to undermine the A-theorists move from claims about the irreducibility of tensed language to the conclusion that temporal reality must be tensed. I examine how A-theorists have used facts about language in attempting to establish their conclusions about the nature of temporal reality. I take the recent work of William Lane Craig, and argue that he moves illicitly from facts about temporal language to his conclusion that temporal reality is tensed.

What Shall We Do with Analytic Metaphysics? A Response to McLeod and Parsons

We defend our characterization of non-naturalistic metaphysics. Specifically we question McLeod and Parsonss interpretation of the idea of an auxiliary hypothesis. We further argue that our original article does not require that we abandon debate on important metaphysical issues. What it requires is that we reinterpret some metaphysical issues as conceptual analysis rather than ontological investigation.

Propositions: Truth vs. Existence

I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses outlining the roles they are normally thought to play and the features they are normally thought to possess. I then highlight a number of tensions inherent in the standard view. I illustrate how this very tension creates problems for some realist theories of propositions. I discuss the distinction between the truth of a proposition and its existence, and argue that paying heed to this distinction allows us to identify, and clear up, a particular confusion that leads us to posit propositions in the first place. Finally, I consider where a rejection of propositions leaves us, ontologically and theoretically.

Existence and ∃ xistence

This note is about the relationship between mind and metaphysics, examined through the lens of a recent paradox due to Williamson (2002). An apparent consequence of two popular doctrines – the Russellian account of structured propositions and the modal logic S5 – is that everything, of necessity, exists. If this paradoxical conclusion is at all acceptable, then there must be some notion of existence that makes it so. Call this minimal form of existence, the bare logical notion, ∃ xistence. We show that, if applied to the original arguments for the paradox, ∃ xistence is too weak to make the argument valid to begin with. Reading the argument in terms of ∃ xistence highlights the limitations of both the ontological import of propositions and how quantifiers are interpreted in first-order modal logics. The ∃ xistential status of propositions is identified as a distinctive marker of the boundary between mind and metaphysics.