Heather Eckert

Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation

Abstract This paper examines the use of inspections and warnings to enforce environmental regulations. An empirical model of petroleum storage inventory reconciliation regulations is developed based on a state-dependent penalty system. I estimate a two-stage probit model on a dataset of inspections and warnings at petroleum storage sites in the province of Manitoba, Canada between 1983 and 1998. The results suggest that, even in the absence of frequent prosecutions, inspections deter future violations but that this effect is small.

Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?

Abstract This paper examines the possible strategic advantage enjoyed by a country when its regional governments negotiate international environmental agreements rather than the federal government. A model in which two countries negotiate an international agreement on the abatement of a shared pollutant is developed. Each countrys exogenous constitution determines whether the federal or regional government negotiates and enforces international agreements. We show that a regions relative aversion to abatement can provide the country with a strategic advantage when the region holds the regulatory powers. If the domestic region is sufficiently large and the foreign countrys regulatory powers lie with either the federal government or a larger region, the country is better off relative to federal jurisdiction. This strategic advantage is analogous to that enjoyed by a federal government that can delegate negotiation power. Therefore, domestic political institutions can create the same advantages as the ability to delegate.

Public Complaints and Alberta's Environmental Regulation

Abstract In recent years, different levels of government in Canada and the United States have claimed that public complaints are an important source of information for the enforcement of environmental regulations. Public complaints provide monitoring at a lower cost than inspections but are inaccurate because citizens lack the information to assess a potential environmental threat properly. Little existing literature examines the use of public complaints in enforcing environmental regulations. Using a dataset of environmental reports in the province of Alberta between January 1996 and September 2002, this paper details the use of public complaints to enforce Albertas environmental legislation and examines the effectiveness of public complaints in different industries and for different environmental threats. I find that that the majority of public complaints are simply odour complaints, and that public complaints are investigated less often over time and very rarely lead to enforcement action.