Heather Montgomery

Micro Finance and Poverty Reduction in Asia: What is the Evidence?

Despite the extensive spread of micro finance, studies on the actual impact of MFIs are often more ambivalent about its impact than is the aid community. Much has been written on the range of institutional arrangements pursued in different organizations and countries and in turn a vast number studies have attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such schemes. However, amongst the academic development community there is a recognition that perhaps we know much less about the impact of these programs than might be expected given the enthusiasm for these activities in donor and policy-making circles. In recognition of this uncertainty this paper aims to bring together some of the recent evidence that has been accumulating on the impact of microfinance activities on poverty reduction. In particular we ask what is the evidence on three specific issues: (1) the extent to which microfinance initiatives have made a lasting difference in pulling households out of poverty on a permanent basis; (2) the extent to which microfinance programs reach only the better-off amongst the poor, leaving the ‘core poor’ unaffected; and (3) how far micro finance is a cost-effective means of transferring income to the poor. The evidence surveyed here suggests that the conclusion from the early literature, that whilst micro finance clearly may have had positive impacts on poverty it is unlikely to be a simple panacea for reaching the core poor, remains valid. Reaching the core poor is difficult and some of the reasons that made them difficult to reach with conventional financial instruments mean that they may also be high risk and therefore unattractive microfinance clients. Hence there is a need to continually improve design and outreach and to see MFIs as part of the package for targeting the poor, rather than the whole solution.

The role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia: the importance of method of entry

This study examines the role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia, focusing particularly on the four countries most affected by the Asian Crisis of 1997 - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. First, using data on the presence of foreign banks via branching as well as subsidiaries, the study shows that the presence of foreign banks in the four crisis-hit countries is actually much larger than has been previously reported once the presence of foreign branches is accounted for in the data. However, the percentage of assets controlled by foreign banks in Asia is still lower than that of other emerging economies, despite great increases in the post-crisis period. The author reviews regulations on foreign bank entry that may have limited the presence of foreign banks or influenced the method of entry (branching versus subsidiary). Given recent regulatory changes and the need for bank recapitalization in the region, the presence of foreign banks is expected to increase in the near future, so this study next takes up the policy implications of this trend. To date, foreign banks in most Asian countries appear to perform relatively worse than their domestic counterparts as measured by return on equity, cost to income ratios, and the ratio of problem loans to total loans. This finding contradicts previous research in other emerging economies, and may be due to the fact that foreign bank entry in Asia is still a very recent phenomenon, and has occurred mostly through the takeover of troubled banks in the region. The second policy issue examined here is the stability of lending by foreign banks relative to domestic banks. Macroeconomic data suggests that foreign bank lending may in some cases be more stable than domestic bank lending, particularly during crisis, but that the stability of foreign bank lending varies greatly by method of entry. Cross border claims of foreign banks are the most volatile, followed by foreign bank branch lending. Lending by foreign bank subsidiaries capitalized in the host country appear to be more stable than domestic lending, perhaps providing much needed capital during times of crisis. Therefore, foreign banks play an important role in Asia, not only in the traditional ways by providing new services and stimulating competition and efficiency, but also by contributing to stability of the banking sector in the face of macroeconomic fluctuations. However, the mode of foreign entry seems to have important implications for the contributions of foreign banks. Since lending by off-shore banks and foreign bank branches seems to be more volatile than locally capitalized foreign subsidiaries, policy makers in Asia should encourage foreign players to enter via fully-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures and move away from the previous pattern of branch-based entry.

Serving the Poorest of the Poor: The Poverty Impact of the Khushhali Bank’s Microfinance Lending in Pakistan

It is widely recognized that while high and sustained economic growth is critical for poverty reduction, there are other policy interventions that may also be significant in a ‘growth plus’ approach to poverty reduction. This volume brings together a series of case studies on the poverty impact of alternative interventions in a broad range of Asian economies. The measures examined within the book cover trade liberalization both in general and in a specific market, infrastructure investment (particularly in roads), population policies, cash transfers, microfinance, employment guarantee programs and contract farming. The countries covered include the Philippines, Lao PDR, Pakistan, India and Thailand. While the results illustrated by the contributors are mixed, they demonstrate the potential for further progress in poverty reduction.

Micro-finance and Poverty Reduction in Asia

The micro-finance revolution has changed attitudes towards helping the poor in many countries and in some has provided substantial flows of credit, often to very low-income groups or households, who would normally be excluded by conventional financial institutions. Bangladesh is starkest example of a very poor country, where currently roughly one quarter of rural households are direct beneficiaries of these programs (Khandker 2003). Much has been written on the range of institutional arrangements pursued in different organizations and countries and in turn a vast number studies have attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such schemes. However, amongst the academic development community there is a recognition that perhaps we know much less about the impact of these programs than might be expected given the enthusiasm for these activities in donor and policy-making circles. To quote a recent authoritative volume on micro finance: “MFI field operations have far surpassed the research capacity to analyze them, so excitement about the use of micro-finance for poverty alleviation is not backed up with sound facts derived from rigorous research. Given the current state of knowledge, it is difficult to allocate confidently public resources to micro-finance development.” (Zeller and Meyer 2002). This is a very strong statement of doubt and in part reflects lack of accurate data, but also in part methodological difficulties associated with assessing exactly what proportion of income and other effects on the beneficiaries of micro credit can actually be attributed to the programs themselves. In recognition of this uncertainty this paper aims to bring together some of the recent evidence that has been accumulating on the impact of micro finance activities on poverty reduction. In particular we ask what is the evidence on three specific issues - the extent to which micro finance initiatives have made a lasting difference in pulling households out of poverty on a permanent basis; - the extent to which micro finance programs reach only the better-off amongst the poor, leaving the ‘core poor’ unaffected; - how far micro finance is a cost-effective means of transferring income to the poor.

The Japanese Big Bang: The Effects of 'Free, Fair and Global'

The Japanese “Big Bang” financial deregulations started in 1996. The objective was to make the Japanese banking sector more “free, fair and global”, spurring competition and resulting in a more profitable and efficient financial sector. The Big Bang brought about a massive consolidation of Japan’s already relatively concentrated banking sector. Japan’s “Top 20” banks have now merged to just three financial conglomerates that are among the largest in the world. Is this a sign of the success? Focusing on the Big Bang’s stated objectives of promoting profitability and efficiency, this study examines the Japanese “Big Bang” deregulation from its start in 1996 to completion in 2001, and the following eight years. On profitability, we find that the banking sector as a whole did not become more profitable than the pre-deregulation period. Rather, we see a steady decline in profitability. In addition, the main targets of the deregulation (and the most active in mergers and acquisitions activity during our sample period), the city, trust and long-term credit banks, actually exhibit lower profitability measured in ROA and ROE than the smaller regional banks. The “Big Bang” did not succeed in promoting a more profitable banking sector. We next turn to efficiency. We find that in terms of cost reduction, the banking sector did become more efficient after the Big Bang deregulation. However, the real bottom line of performance, profit efficiency, declined. In addition, we again see a significant difference between the big city, trust long-term credit banks and the smaller regional banks. The biggest banks are statistically significantly less profit efficient, despite their higher cost efficiency. Thus, on the whole, the Japanese “Big Bang” financial deregulation was not successful in achieving its stated objectives. Both profitability and efficiency declines on the whole, and the main targets of the deregulation, the big city, trust and long-term credit banks, exhibit statistically significantly lower profitability and efficiency than their smaller counterparts.

Are Bank Mergers Good News for Shareholders? The Effect of Bank Mergers on Shareholder Value in Japan: Effect of Bank Mergers on Shareholder Value in Japan

This study investigates the effects of bank mergers on the welfare of affiliated client firms. The findings demonstrate that, in general, bank mergers increase the welfare of client firms. However, there are significant differences in the impact of a bank merger on client firms across different merger, bank, and firm characteristics. Client firms of banks involved in mega‐mergers do not enjoy an increase in welfare. Client firms of undercapitalized banks in fact suffer significant welfare losses. In the long‐run, weak “zombie” firms also in many cases experience welfare losses following the announcement of a merger by their main bank.

Effect of Bank Mergers on Client Firms: Evidence from the Credit Supply Channel

This study investigates the effects of bank mergers on client firms. A rich panel of data detailing firm borrowing from individual banks enables controls for demand-side effects to isolate the effect of bank mergers on the supply of credit. The impact of bank mergers on other firm outcomes (growth in total borrowing, distance to default and investment) is also examined. A merger announcement by a firm’s main bank results in a contraction in credit supply from the merging bank. Firms are not able to compensate for the reduced credit supply from the main bank, so overall borrowing also declines.

The Effect of Bank Mergers on Shareholder Value and Performance in Japan

This chapter uncovers significant differences in the effect of bank mergers on shareholder value and bank performance in Japan. Banks entering into huge mega-mergers enjoy large and highly statistically significant excess returns. However, the size of the merger does not seem to affect longer-term measures of performance. Taken together, these findings suggest that the benefits accruing to shareholders of mega-merger banks are not due to newly created business synergies, but perhaps a “flight-to-safety” on the part of shareholders seeking banks that are too big to fail.