Hector-Neri Castañeda

Thinking and the structure of the world

This paper formulates a basic system of ontology that has several interesting qualities: (1) it is suggested very strongly by the most naive and simplest consideration of certain perplexities involving psychological states; (2) the system does justice to several apparently conflicting insights that have been debated by many philosophers; (3) the system separates the a priori from the empirical elements of the world very nicely and neatly; (4) indeed, the system concentrates all the empirical elements of the world on two irreducible dyadic predicates; (5) for this reason the system seems to be a nice formulation of a conception of the world that was started by Plato, was envisioned by Leibniz, guided Frege, at least in part, and was defended by Meinong. The system appears, therefore, to have the historico-philosophical value of illuminating the long and important abstractist and rationalist tradition. I motivate its development with an initial discussion of a problem widely discussed nowadays. This is meant to honor those great metaphysicians by suggesting how contemporary their insights into the problems were, even if their solutions are not followed. Among other things, the system accomplishes the following: (i) provides an account of possible objects; (ii) provides

The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to all of them in one Fell Swoop

Deontic logic, as a discipline of study, deals with the structure of our ordinary reasoning about obligations, ought’s, interdictions, prohibitions, wrongs, rights, and freedoms to act. Thus, it is supposed to: (i) reveal and clarify the criteria for valid reasoning about those matters; (ii) illuminate and give us understanding of the logical structure of the ordinary language through which we live our experiences of obligations, requirements, wrongs, rights, etc. Consequently, a formal calculus proposed as a deontic calculus together with its primary interpretation is a theory about the logical structure of our ordinary deontic language and about our ordinary deontic reasonings. Clearly, then, such a calculus should be proposed after a careful examination of the linguistic data pertaining to our deontic experiences.

Perception, belief, and the structure of physical objects and consciousness

ConclusionWe have now provided an overall simple theoretical account of the structure of perceptual experience proto-philosophically examined in Part I. The next task is to find the proper logical machinery to formulatte those accounts rigorously.

Hector-Neri Castañeda

One.- Self-Profile.- I. De Re: My Search for Philosophy.- 1. Family and Ecological Background.- 2. Sunday School: My Philosophico-Theological Crisis.- 3. Public Schools: My First Educational Crisis.- 4. Expulsion from the Normal School: My Second Educational Crisis.- 5. Exilio from Highschool.- 6. The Costa Rican Experience: A Grammatological Crisis.- 7. The 1944 Revolution of Guatemala.- 8. University of Minnesota: Philosophical Training and My First Professional Crisis.- 9. Return to Guatemala: My Major Professional Crisis.- 10. Paradisiacal-Hellish Year at Oxford: A Minor Philosophical Crisis.- 11. Philosophizing in the United States.- 12. Promenading Outside the Ivory Tower: u and Its Professional Services.- 13. Wandering Outside the Ivory Tower: Dean of Latino Affairs.- II. De Dicto: My Philosophical Search.- A. Diachronic Capsule.- 1. The Subjective/Objective Tension.- 2. God, Morality, and the Unity of Practical Reasoning.- 3. Language as the Depository of World, Self, and Experience.- 4. Wittgensteins Anti-Private Language Arguments.- 5. Reference, the Language of Other Minds, and Guise Theory.- 6. Overall View of My Philosophical Constructions.- 7. My Concern with the History of Philosophy.- B. Self, Thinking, and Reality.- 1. Exegesis of the Anti-Private Language Situation.- 2. Realism, the Past, Sameness, and Phenomenological Linguistics.- 3. Metaphysical Internalism and the Holistic Indivisible Noumenon.- 4. The Metaphysical Dimension of Semantic Vocabulary.- 5. Five Dimensions of Certainty.- 6. Gross Individual Guises.- 7. The Multifarious Ontological Semiotics of the First-Person Pronoun.- 8. The I-Manifold and Semantic Denotation vs Doxastic Denotation.- 9. The Problem of Sameness in the I-Network.- 10. Self-Consciousness and First-Person Reference.- 11. Indexical Reference and Indexical Guises.- 12. Indicators, David Kaplans Direct Reference, and Indexical Subjectivity.- 13. Perception, Direct Reference, and Perceptual Guises.- 14. Intentional Action and Indexical Reference.- 15. The Causation of Intentional Action.- 16. The Grammar of Indexical (Experiential) Reference.- 17. Ontological Exegesis of Indexical Reference.- 18. The Non-Worldliness of Indexical Guises and Other Minds.- 19. The Transcendental Prefix and Experience.- Two.- Casta?edas Ontology.- Mind and Guise: Castanedas Philosophy of Mind in the World Order.- Castanedas Philosophy of Language.- Castanedas Theory of Knowing.- Thinking-to-Be and Thinking-to-Do: Some Remarks on Casta?eda on Believing and Intending.- Good Samaritans and Castanedas System of Deontic Logic.- Casta?edas Theory of Deontic Meaning and Truth.- Casta?eda Theory of Morality.- Casta?eda on Plato, Leibniz, and Kant.- Replies.- Three.- Philosophical Bibliography of Hector-Neri Casta?Eda.- Index Of Names.- Index Of Subjects.

Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations

ConclusionI am pleased to have been able to vindicate Plato from the oft-rehearsed charge of not having distinguished relations from qualities. Not only does Phaedo 102B7-C4 show quite clearly that he did make the proper distinction, but the theory of relations he adumbrated there is logically sound and ontologically viable. Furthermore, it is refreshing to think of relations not as Forms or universals, but as chains of ontologically tied universals.Naturally, now that we have a clear understanding of Platos Phaedo theory of relations and relational facts there is plenty of work to do. We must examine the other dialogues for alterations or even preservation of that theory. Moreover, there are those arguments of Aristotle that purport to reduce Platos Theory of Forms to absurdity on account of relations. But of this I shall say more at some other time.

Causes, Energy and Constant Conjunctions

Most contemporary philosophers writing on causality proudly declare their adoption of a Humean framework. But many who ostensibly write from an anti-Humean perspective also adopt Hume’s main tenets about the nature of causality. This is the case even with Kant and those who believe that we have a definite concept of causal necessity on a par with the concept of logical necessity. To be sure, these opponents of Hume do disagree with him on very important issues. Yet their disagreements with Hume are not for the most part about the structure or nature of causality. The disagreements are, rather, about the origin of the concept of cause, or about the constitution of the mind that has the concept of causality, or, in the most radical cases, about the metaphysical source of causality, but not about the causal connection itself.

The Twofold Structure and the Unity of Practical Thinking

This is a contribution to the foundations of the theory of institutions. My immediate aim is to defend and formulate a comprehensive theory of the basic logical structure of judgments about duties or obligations. The theory is comprehensive in two respects: (i) it relates ought-judgments to the other contents of practical thinking, and (ii) it deals with the connections, seldom considered, between ought (or obligation) and identity (and quantification). The theory is systematized in rich formal system D** for propositions, imperatives, intentions, and deontic judgments with quantification and identity.

Intentions and Intending

In this chapter we continue the study of intentions began in Chapter 2, §5. Recall that an intention is in this book what a person intends, not a state of intending. We tackle the question raised there whether intentions are actions or propositions. We argue that they are neither. Obviously, they are not prescriptions or mandates. Intentions and prescriptions exhaust the category of practitions. We show that intentions have a two-valued logical structure in a way exactly parallel to that of prescriptions, studied in Chapter 4. We need again Meta-theorem I of Chapter 3, § 14. Similarly we have the problem of elucidating the designated value of intentions involved in implication. Maintaining the principle of the unity of reason, since prescriptions and intentions are complementary basic units of content of practical thinking, we adopt the view that that value is very much the same as the Legitimacy of prescriptions. Thus, we built on Chapter 5 an account of the Legitimacy values of intentions. The causal role of intending is discussed in Chapter 10.

Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances

ConclusionThe distinction between deontic focus and deontic circumstance is obvious and essential to the understanding of our reasonings about obligations, permissions, rights, and wrongs. Here we have dealt with the basics. These basics must be developed into a full deontic logic. Fortunately, such a comprehensive deontic logic that includes identity, quantification over individuals, and quantification over properties has already been proposed, and applied to the interpretation of legal texts. It should be an excellent basis for Feldmans intriguing and promising idea of world utilitarianism.

The Multiple Faces of Knowing: The Hierarchies of Epistemic Species

Claims, and attributions, of knowledge or justified belief are made against varying backgrounds of assumptions or takings for granted, which are not themselves known or justifiedly believed. Offering an account of the constitution of epistemic backgrounds and an elucidation of their roles are the main parts of a Theory of Epistemic Coherence. This study belongs to the foundations of such a theory. We examine some data and discuss certain theoretical alternatives.