Helen E. S. Nesadurai

Globalisation, Domestic Politics and Regionalism: The ASEAN Free Trade Area

Introduction: Ambiguities and Contradictions in AFTA 1. Globalisation and Economic Regionalism 2. The Unfolding of a Regional Economic Cooperation Project: AFTA, 1991-2002 3. Foreign Capital and Open Regionalism: The Growth Imperative 4. Domestic Capital and Developmental Regionalism: Domestic Distributive Concerns Temper the Growth Imperative 5. Renegotiating AFTA Commitments: The Domestic Distributive Imperative Overwhelms 6. Implementation as a Political Process: Taking Care of Growth and Distribution Conclusion: Globalisation, Domestic Politics and Regionalism

ASEAN and regional governance after the Cold War: from regional order to regional community?

Abstract This paper first reviews and critiques the dominant realist and constructivist accounts of ASEAN, which have enjoyed much prominence in The Pacific Review since the journals founding in 1988. ASEAN behaviour and outcomes cannot be fitted into neat theoretical categories that emphasize either material or ideational variables in explanation. Instead, ASEAN displays complexities in behaviour that are the product of the contingent interaction between the material (power, territory, wealth) and the ideational (norms, ideas, identity) as member states actively seek to manage domestic order as well as regional order within and beyond ASEAN. In all of this, state interests and identities remain paramount, which means that the long-standing ASEAN norms of sovereignty/non-interference remain central to regional governance. Under these conditions, and despite the Charters newly articulated political norms of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law, the prospects seem doubtful for building a people-centred ASEAN Community in which regional governance displays inclusiveness, seeking to address the interests and needs of the regions ordinary people as opposed to what its elites deem appropriate. The final portion of the paper explores what a critical approach to studying ASEAN might reveal. In particular, the paper attempts to identify whether there may be any political spaces opening up within existing structures and practices from which progressive change could emerge, even if slowly, particularly in the area of human rights and social justice, key elements in building an inclusive, ASEAN Community.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as one of the more successful regional organisations in the developing world, credited for maintaining regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia for more than three decades. 1 Formed in 1967, ASEANs founding members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined the grouping in 1984 following its independence from Britain, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma (Myanmar) in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999, bringing ASEANs current member- ship to ten. The fact that ASEAN was established at all is remarkable given the highly charged relations among its five founding members during the 1960s. Not only were there disputes over inter-state borders, some governments were accused of aiding secessionist groups in neighbouring states. In addition, Indonesia and the Philippines challenged the legitimacy of the independent state of Malaysia, with Indonesia under President Sukarno launching a limited guerrilla war against Malaysia from 1963 -5, termed Konfrontasi (Confrontation) to protest Malaysias formation through the 1963 merger of Malaya, independent since 1957, with the British colonies of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. However, by 1967, these governments had come to realise that these inter-state conflicts were unproductive and had diverted their attention from more pressing internal security and political governance problems. Sukarnos ouster from power by General Suharto in a military coup paved the way for the formation of ASEAN as a regional mechanism to help moderate inter-state relations, thereby freeing up attention and resources that could now be directed towards building unified nation-states out of societies deeply divided along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious lines. Although ASEANs initial goals were modest, and confined to moderating regional inter-state relations, the Association expanded its remit when it chose to get diplomatically involved in the Cambodian crisis of the 1980s, following

Food security, the palm oil–land conflict nexus, and sustainability: a governance role for a private multi-stakeholder regime like the RSPO?

Abstract This paper examines the nexus between food security and sustainability governance through a case study of palm oil. Palm oils advocates claim that campaigns against palm oil and actions to halt its expansion due to sustainability concerns can undermine its food security role. However, palm oil expansion more directly undermines the food and livelihood security of rural and indigenous communities when land that rightfully belongs to, or has been used by, these communities is alienated to firms for oil palm cultivation with little or no consultation or compensation provided or alternatives considered. It is in this context that the paper examines whether the multi-stakeholder Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is able to ensure that this commodity is cultivated in ways that minimise environmental damage and livelihood disruption, thereby safeguarding palm oils contribution to food security. The findings are mixed. RSPO certification provides fairly comprehensive and progressive socio-environmental regulation that has enhanced sustainable production practises in this industry especially by the larger transnational plantation companies mindful of their global reputation. The RSPO is also far more responsive than governments have been to the land rights of rural and indigenous communities, providing due process for land claimants as well as recognising that these communities may have legitimate rights to land even if companies were awarded legal title by governments. However, multi-stakeholder regimes can be fragile, requiring a great deal of internal accommodation and trade-offs to work. Already, different interests in the RSPO are pulling in different directions while national certification systems have emerged that are less onerous compared to the RSPO even as the latter seeks to further enhance its sustainability credentials.

APEC: A tool for US regional domination?

Abstract This paper examines the possibility that the United States could ‘capture’ the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and use it to impose Americas economic agenda on the region. It discusses Washingtons ability to shape the choices of APECs East Asian members at APEC negotiations to reflect US interests through employing its military, economic, cultural, and ideological resources as instruments of leverage and influence. While interdependence constrains Washingtons use of military and/or economic leverage to influence the choices of APECs East Asian members, the complex bargaining and consensual decision‐making features of APEC further prevent Washington from imposing its agenda on APEC. On the other hand, Washingtons capture of APEC could be facilitated if East Asian policy‐making elites were socialized through the APEC process to accept American norms. This would tend to lead to preference convergence since the values of both the US and East Asia would coincide. The analysis sugg...

Economic surveillance as a new mode of regional governance: contested knowledge and the politics of risk management in East Asia

Most critics argue that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Plus Three regional surveillance is limited by its peer review process because governments reject external interference in matters of domestic economic management. This article suggests that surveillances limits also arise because of a more fundamental conflict over how financial/economic risk is problematised. The governmentality framework and the East Asian experience reveal how the process of constituting economic/financial risk using disciplinary knowledge is inherently subjective and, consequently, political and open to contestation. In addition to the contested nature of disciplinary knowledge, three other phenomena—the prevalence of imitative behaviour in markets, the value of practical knowledge for governance and the problem of ‘ambiguous economics’—complicate surveillance and make it difficult for surveillance processes to deliver objective and neutral assessments, despite a genuine demand for them. In view of these realities, the ideal institutional form for surveillance appears to be a non-hierarchical setting in which dialogic interactions take centre stage, thereby allowing surveillance participants to debate assessments, offer reasons for adopting particular practices, exchange practical experiences and collectively work out responses to contested issues. However, these are precisely the features of the present surveillance structure that critics argue ought to be changed in favour of a more hierarchical mechanism. This articles analysis of surveillance using the governmentality framework leads to the counter-intuitive insight that surveillance is best structured as a form of Habermasian ‘public sphere’.

In defence of national economic autonomy? Malaysia's response to the financial crisis

As a result of the financial crisis, some commentators see the reform process in the East Asian states as an outcome of the disciplining behaviour of financial markets that will lead to the emergence of a neoliberal form of capitalism. The Malaysian experience suggests, however, that progress to neoliberal forms of economic organization will not be inevitable, despite governments having to increasingly accommodate global markets. In Malaysia, the degree to which a neoliberal adjustment response could be embraced was limited by domestic political factors. First, the government needed to maintain the ethnic based distributive policy that favours ethnic Malays with material entitlements for reasons of state and regime security. Second, the state was not wholly insulated from a key social group that emerged as a result of the ethnic-based distributive policy, namely an elite Malay corporate group. A third reason was economic nationalism, a major component of Prime Minister Mahathirs vision for the country that stressed the building up of Malaysian corporations and conglomerates. Access to domestic sources of funds for adjustment and the centralization of power in the government, particularly in the office of the Prime Minister, facilitated this process of defending national economic arrangements, at least during the period in question. The limited liberalization of the ethnic based distributive policy did not, however, imply a shift in the ideological and policy agenda towards complete embrace of neoliberal norms and practices. The imposition of capital controls, although announced as a temporary measure to allow space for the government to pursue its preferred course of adjustment, further indicates that the commitment to free markets in Malaysia is instrumental. The Malaysian case suggests that movement towards neoliberal forms of economic organization as a result of the financial crisis may be limited and is not inevitable.

Malaysia's conflict with the Philippines and Indonesia over labour migration: economic security, interdependence and conflict trajectories

Abstract If labour migration increases the potential for interstate conflicts, does the economic interdependence thus created make such conflicts easier to address, given the economic gains to both sides from such labour movements? This article addresses this question by using the concepts of economic security and interdependence to compare the Malaysia-Philippines and Malaysia-Indonesia conflicts over labour migration. Although the limited cases make generalizations difficult, the analysis suggests that the economic interdependence constraint on conflict escalation may not always work well as it may be offset by national security concerns in the labour receiving states about the illegal migrant workers and by the shifting economic underpinnings of economic security. The theoretically pacifying effect of interdependence can also be weakened by preventing the ‘aggrieved country’ from articulating clearer demands from the other side for fear of jeopardizing the economic gains from the migrant outflows. Comparing the two conflicts suggests that clearly articulated demands matched by effective state capacity in translating those demands into actions on the ground can help in conflict management. The potential for the migrant worker issue to evoke deep emotions and the ease with which that can translate into nationalist outpourings mean that both sending and receiving countries must develop bilateral or regional frameworks that outline clear best practice standards for the treatment of migrant workers, including during detention and repatriation.

Rethinking the Southeast Asian Development Model Bringing Ethical and Governance Questions in

This paper argues that the Southeast Asian Development Model (SEADM), as practised in parts of Southeast Asia, reflected an overwhelming emphasis on growth as a goal while neglecting issues of equity and justice. This was clearly seen in the Thai and Indonesian experiences where rising growth rates and income levels under open/free market policies was accompanied by widening income and wealth disparities as well as growing feelings of marginalisation, deprivation and of injustice among large segments of the local population. In both countries, these developments led to growing challenges to the open market system well before the regional financial crisis. Yet, rethinking the SEADM does not mean doing away with open market policies. Instead, approaches to development must take seriously the goals of equity and social justice to overcome the danger of open conflict and societal resistance that will likely emerge to challenge the very policies that have the best chance of delivering economic well being over the long run.

New Constellations of Social Power: States and Transnational Private Governance of Palm Oil Sustainability in Southeast Asia

ABSTRACT This article considers whether private sustainability standards can lead to lasting change in corporate and state agricultural practices implicated in the environmental damage and social conflicts caused by oil palm cultivation in Indonesia and Malaysia by examining in detail the social processes through which non-state actors engage in governance. Sceptics of private regulation point to the powerful state–business patronage networks in these countries as structural impediments to reforming this sector. Drawing on the literature on global production networks, I show how producers deeply embedded within such supportive local political economies nevertheless choose to comply with stringent global private standards to reduce risks to their global operations. It was the renewed emphasis on supply chain “traceability” to demonstrate responsible corporate behaviour to investors, buyers and consumers that served to embed globally-oriented palm oil plantation firms and their upstream suppliers into emerging ethical supply chains. Embedding occurs through three social processes – surveillance, normalising judgement and knowledge transfer. The private regulatory developments analysed in this article, though relatively recent, are supported by a diverse transnational coalition of principled and instrumental interests and have created significant openings for a new, or at least, parallel, and more progressive, private regulatory order in Malaysia and Indonesia.