Shaun Breslin

Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New

The 1990s saw regions, regionalism and regionalisation return to prominence in the study of international politics in a way not experienced since the early 1970s.1In part this was a ree ection of the resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s of a number of signie cant regional projects; notably the move of the European Community (EC) to secure the Single Integrated Market, the creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the creation of Mercosur, the growing assertiveness of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the much hyped birth of Asia Pacie c Economic Cooperation (APEC). In Africa, great rhetorical store (at least) was set by the prospects of regional cooperation via Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the end of apartheid. It is, therefore, perhaps worth attempting to offer some insight into the state of contemporary analysis and theorising about regions. This special issue of New Political Economy gathers together the ree ections of some established and some newer scholars of international political economy on the contemporary state of the theoretical and empirical analysis of regions at the beginning of a new century. 2 Within this general context, the articles are motivated by two specie c considerations. The e rst ree ects a need to rethink the role and signie cance of regions in the aftermath of the e nancial crises that began in Asia and then swept through other parts of the world, notably Latin America and central Europe in the closing stages of the twentieth century. Given the aspirations held for various regional projects prior to these events, and their general ineffectiveness in the face of these crises, the crises have posed not only practical questions for many of these projects, but also theoretical ones for scholars as well. As the spate of recent publication attests, the study of regions is back in fashion in a big way. 3Thus the second aim of this issue ree ects a desire to locate the study of regions after these crises in a wider context. While we assume that broader global imperatives are at work, intra- and inter-regional differences remain salient. As a consequence, comparative analytical insight is required. While, like many academic subjects, the study of regions has at one level simply been rediscovered by new generations of scholars, there is a case to be made that the regionalism and regionalisation of the late twentieth and early twenty-e rst

New regionalisms in the global political economy

Preface and Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations List of tables and figures Chapter 1. Regions in Comparative Perspective Chapter 2. Regionalism and the Emerging (Intrusive) World Order: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity Chapter 3. Theorising the Rise of Regionness Chapter 4. The Trade-Environment Nexus and the Potential of Regional Trade Institutions Chapter 5. Governance after Financial Crisis: South American Perspectives on the Reformulation of Regionalism Chapter 6. Regionalism and development after the global financial crisis Chapter 7. Regionalism and Asia Chapter 8. Asian multilateral institutions and their response to the Asian economic crisis: the regional and global implications Chapter 9. Europeanisation and globalization: complementary or contradictory trends? Chapter 10. Austrias and Swedens accession to the European Union: a comparative neo-Gramscian analysis Chapter 11. Discovering the frontiers of Regionalism: Fostering Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Competitiveness in the European Union

Decentralisation, Globalisation and China' s Partial Re-engagement with the Global Economy

There is a tendency for research on processes of regional economic integration to be built on national-based paradigms and levels of analysis. Even those approaches that move away from intergovernmental processes of state-led regionalism and instead emphasise non-state directed regionalisation are often concerned with integration between two or more national economies. But, in many cases, real integration is taking place below the national scale. This is ree ected in the growing number of formal agreements between subnational political administrations, and also by the uneven geographic spread of international economic relations in many states. This notion of partial or microregional 1 economic integration is particularly important in understanding the processes and implications of China’ s re-engagement with the global economy. Indeed, national-based perspectives of regional integration are all but inapplicable in the Chinese context. This article assesses two case studies of microregional integration involving subnational territories of the People’ s Republic of China (PRC)— growing economic integration across the border between Guangdong Province and Hong Kong in the south, and the development of the North East Asian microregion (NEA) in the Chinese northeast. Using wider theoretical concepts and approaches not only facilitates our understanding of the political economy of specie c case studies, but also allows us to test the validity of those concepts and approaches themselves. Thus this article has two main aims. On a domestic level, it aims to assess both the importance and implications of microregional integration for economic governance within China. The dual processes of decentralisation and globalisation are recone guring loci of decision making and authority and, in combination, are simultaneously strengthening and weakening the relevance of political administratively dee ned territories for economic activity. This apparently contradictory statement is explained by distinguishing between local and national political administrative boundaries. On the one hand, decentralisation has consolidated the importance of provincial 2 boundaries as determinants of economic activity. On the other hand, China’ s transition from relative isolationism has increased the

Power and production : rethinking China’s global economic role

the country that is home to a fifth of humankind is overrated as a market, a power, and a source of ideas. At best, China is a second-rank middle power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater: it has us willingly suspending our disbelief in its strength. In fact, China is better understood as a theoretical power a country that has promised to deliver for much of the last 150 years but has consistently disappointed. After 50 years of Maos revolution and 20 years of reform, it is time to leave the theater and see China for what it is. Only when we finally understand how little China matters will we be able to craft a sensible policy toward it.1

Centralization and Decentralization

Decentralization, by definition, entails a reduction in central power. But it does not necessarily mean that the provinces will exercise devolved powers in a manner that conflicts with central priorities. Nor does it necessarily mean that the centre cannot return to centralized control when it sees fit. In order to understand how decentralization measures influenced centre-province relations in the 1980s, it is essential to recognize the inherent tensions involved in governing a massive and diverse nation state, and to investigate the relationship between two different types of decentralization – administrative decentralization and market decentralization.

China and the global order: signalling threat or friendship?

Although there is clear dissatisfaction in China with the nature of the current global order, it is hard to find a clear and coherent Chinese vision of what an alternative world might look like. This is partly a result of conflicting understandings within the country of the benefits and drawbacks of taking a more proactive global role and perhaps undertaking more leadership functions. But it is also a consequence of how elites frame Chinese interests and demands in different ways for different audiences. Furthermore, the existing order has in fact served China quite well in its transition towards becoming a global power. So while at times China appears to be the main driver for reform and change, at other times (or to other people) the emphasis is on China as a responsible stakeholder in the existing system. How others receive and interpret these conflicting signals is likely to be influenced by the way China exercises, rather than talks about, its growing power—perhaps most notably in terms of its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas and its role as a regional power.

China's Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power

China has (re-)emerged as a great power in a world not of its own making. The distribution of power in major organisations and the dominant norms of international interactions are deemed to favour unfairly the existing Western powers, and at times obstruct Chinas ability to meet national development goals. Nevertheless, engaging the global economy has been a key source of economic growth (thus helping to maintain regime stability), and establishing Chinas credentials as a responsible global actor is seen as a means of ensuring continued access to what China needs. As an emerging great power which is also still in many respects a developing country, Chinas challenge is to change the global order in ways that do not cause global instability or generate crises that would damage Chinas own ability to generate economic growth and ensure political stability.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

This paper is a response to the article by Wu and Flynn that appeared in Volume 3 of this journal in 1995. Wu and Flynn identified the major causes of environmental problems in China and then assessed the growth in environmental consciousness, planning and regulation in contemporary China. Although I believe that their assessment of most of the causes of Chinas current environmental problems were by and large correct, I feel that they have underestimated the importance of some of these problems. In doing so, they end up with a more positive assessment of Chinas (and therefore the worlds) environmental future than myself. In particular, I will argue that they have underestimated the short-term legitimacy priorities of the party elites and the longer term consequences of the dispersal of central power in the post-Mao era.

Reforming China's Embedded Socialist Compromise: China and the WTO

After 15 years of negotiation, China finally entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 accepting terms that not only had it rejected for much of the negotiating period, but also were far more stringent than those previously negotiated by new developing country members. This is partly because the legal structure of the WTO provides developed country members with considerable leeway to impose conditions on prospective entrants. But the main explanation is found in a changing conception of how best to achieve Chinas long-term economic interests, and the need for key leaders to form transnational alliances in order to pursue their policy preferences.

The politics of Chinese trade and the Asian financial crises: Questioning the wisdom of export-led growth

Between 1987 and 1996 Chinese exports increased by an average of 14% each year. During this decade, export growth became a crucial determinant of overall economic growth. However, as a consequence of the East Asian financial crises, Chinese export growth slowed, threatening the successful implementation of plans to restructure the domestic Chinese economy. This paper traces the reasons for the rapid growth and subsequent slowing of Chinese exports, and asks whether the strategy provides a solid basis for the long term development of the Chinese economy. In particular, the paper focuses on the role and significance of the processing trade in boosting Chinese exports. The high proportion of imported components in processed exports questions whether China is really benefiting as much from export growth as aggregate trade figures seem to suggest.