Henry Delcamp

Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools

This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.

The private and social value of patents in discrete and cumulative innovation

This article analyzes the relationship between private and social value of patents, comparing discrete and cumulative innovation. Indicators of the social value of patents are known to be less correlated with measures of private value in technological fields where innovation is more cumulative. We test whether this is because the link between private and social value is weaker, or because the indicators are less informative of the underlying concepts of value. Furthermore we analyze whether these differences between technological fields are really due to cumulativeness. We observe cumulative innovation by making use of databases of patents declared essential for technological standards. Using factor analysis and a set of patent quality indicators, we test the relevance of social value for predicting the private value of a patent measured by renewal and litigation. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link for discrete technologies; neither common factors nor any indicator of social value allows predicting the private value of essential, very cumulative patents. Nevertheless, this result cannot be generalized to whole technological classes identified as “complex” by the literature.

The strategies of patent introduction into patent pools

This article explores patterns of patent introduction into seven patent pools over time, analyzing 1337 essential patents. Pools grow significantly after their launch, in particular through the addition of new patents by incumbent members. The generality, width and significance of patents introduced into pools decreases significantly over time. Incumbent members file and introduce patents that are narrower, more incremental and less cited than new entrants. Pool members, however, also introduce patents relevant to larger parts of the standard.

Patent Quality and Value in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation

This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literature.

Essential patents in pools: Is value intrinsinc or induced ?

This paper analyzes empirically the value - as measured by patent citations - of a set of 1363 essential patents belonging to 9 different patent pools. We find that pooled patents receive more cites than control patents having the same characteristics but not included in a pool. This difference stems only partly from the pools’ ability to select the most cited patents. Indeed we show that being included in a pool also tends to increase the value of patents. This induced effect reflects the incentive for patent owners to join a pool. We analyze it in details in order to better understand the drivers of enhanced patent value.

The Strategic Use of Licensing Commitments in a Standardization Context

Abstract Purpose This paper focuses on the strategic inclusion of reciprocity clauses in the licensing commitments disclosed by firms claiming standard essential patents (SEPs) in the telecom industry. We highlight the main cost and benefit of using these clauses for SEPs holders, namely, a possible deterrence effect for potential standard users on the one hand, and a legal instrument to prevent holdup and negotiate cross-licenses with other SEPs owners on the other hand. Methodology/approach We formulate general hypotheses explaining firms’ disclosure strategies with respect to reciprocity clauses, and use an original dataset of 19,601 patent disclosures in 12 different ETSI (European Telecommunications Standard Institute) projects (including UMTS, GSM, 3GPP, or GPRS) to test them empirically. Findings Our econometric results first confirm our predictions that reciprocity clauses are used as an insurance mechanism in technologically complex environments. They are more frequently included in patent disclosures when the ownership of SEPs at the project level is more fragmented. We also find that firms do not claim reciprocity clauses before having already declared a significant number of non-reciprocal SEPs in the same project, which suggests a deterrence effect on standard users that must be balanced by a strong patent position. Practical implications/originality Our findings highlight a trade-off for the SEPs holder to insert a reciprocity clause. There is both a cost and a benefit of adding this clause to the patent licensing commitment. Contrary to the usual literature on the subject, we do not analyze the general patenting strategies but the conducts on the licensing terms.