Justus Baron

Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools

This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.

The private and social value of patents in discrete and cumulative innovation

This article analyzes the relationship between private and social value of patents, comparing discrete and cumulative innovation. Indicators of the social value of patents are known to be less correlated with measures of private value in technological fields where innovation is more cumulative. We test whether this is because the link between private and social value is weaker, or because the indicators are less informative of the underlying concepts of value. Furthermore we analyze whether these differences between technological fields are really due to cumulativeness. We observe cumulative innovation by making use of databases of patents declared essential for technological standards. Using factor analysis and a set of patent quality indicators, we test the relevance of social value for predicting the private value of a patent measured by renewal and litigation. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link for discrete technologies; neither common factors nor any indicator of social value allows predicting the private value of essential, very cumulative patents. Nevertheless, this result cannot be generalized to whole technological classes identified as “complex” by the literature.

The strategies of patent introduction into patent pools

This article explores patterns of patent introduction into seven patent pools over time, analyzing 1337 essential patents. Pools grow significantly after their launch, in particular through the addition of new patents by incumbent members. The generality, width and significance of patents introduced into pools decreases significantly over time. Incumbent members file and introduce patents that are narrower, more incremental and less cited than new entrants. Pool members, however, also introduce patents relevant to larger parts of the standard.

Patent Quality and Value in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation

This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literature.

Unpacking 3GPP Standards

This paper describes a new database with detailed information on standardization procedures at the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). 3GPP is the most relevant standard‐setting organization (SSO) in the field of mobile telecommunications. Empirical research on technology standards and SSOs has so far been limited by the scarcity of available data. The present database contains information on membership, meeting attendance, chairmanship, work items, contributions, and votes at 3GPP. These data shed light on the technical complexity of standard development and illustrate the importance of voluntary contributions from SSO members. The data allow addressing important policy questions regarding the regulation of voluntary SSOs and the role of standard‐essential patents in standardization.

Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases

The prospect of licensing patents that are essential to standards on an industry-wide scale is a major incentive for companies to invest in standardization activities. Most standard development organizations (SDOs) have defined intellectual property rights (IPR) policies whereby SDO members must commit to licensing their standard-essential patents (SEPs) on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. This study aims to provide a consistent framework for both the interpretation of FRAND commitments and the definition of FRAND royalties. Our methodology is built on the analysis of landmark and significant decisions taken by courts and competition authorities in Europe and worldwide. The purpose of the comparative analysis is to provide a comprehensive overview of how FRAND licensing terms have been defined in the evolving case law, while testing the economic soundness of the concepts and methodologies applied by courts and antitrust authorities.

Mapping Standards to Patents Using Declarations of Standard-Essential Patents

This paper describes a new database of declared standard‐essential patents (SEPs), discusses methods for matching declared SEPs to specific standard documents, and presents empirical evidence on technology standards subject to declared SEPs. Although there is a growing body of empirical research using data on declared SEPs, this research has so far focused on the declared patents, and neglected the implications of SEP declarations for specific standards. Furthermore, we present a new methodology for matching standards with technology classes, using the classification of declared SEPs. This method allows identifying other standard‐related patents, and provides information on technological relationships between standards and standard‐related patenting. The paper discusses opportunities for new empirical research using databases of declared SEPs and data on patenting in standard‐related technology classes.

Selected Quantitative Studies of Patents in Standards

After an introduction into the principle data and methodology, this study starts by providing a quantitative overview of the general features of standard essential patents (also called SEPs). It considers the occurrence of essential patents, how their existence has developed over time, and how essential patents are distributed among SSOs, technology areas, standards, and owners (including their business models). It also considers the legal status of such patents, for example whether they are actually enforceable. The study continues with an analysis on how SEPs differ from ‘regular’ patents. To make a fair comparison, a matched control set of patents was developed. We consider and compare the citation performance, the family size, and the patent grant likelihood. The final four chapters of the study focus on a set of specific topics: (1) ‘blanket disclosures’, (2) essential patent transfer, (3) patent pools, and (4) and litigation.

R&D coordination in standard setting organizations: The role of consortia

We analyze R&D competition and cooperation between firms involved in the development of a technology standard. Our model captures two types of incentives these firms are subject to: free-riding due to the public good nature of the standard and patent races in order to derive royalties from essential patents. As a consequence, R&D may be excessive or insufficient as compared to the collective optimum. Our goal is to test if consortia can address any type of inefficiency, by either reducing or increasing collective R&D investment. We address this question empirically on a large dataset of ICT standards, by assessing the effect of consortia on the number of standard-related patents filed by companies. After sorting standards entailing over or underinvestment, our results confirm that in the first case consortia have a chilling effect on patent filings, while it has an inflating effect in the second case.