Herbert Hamers

Operations Research Games: A Survey

This paper surveys the research area of cooperative games associated with several types of operations research problems in which various decision makers (players) are involved. Cooperating players not only face a joint optimisation problem in trying, e.g., to minimise total joint costs, but also face an additional allocation problem in how to distribute these joint costs back to the individual players. This interplay between optimisation and allocation is the main subject of the area of operations research games. It is surveyed on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the underlying optimisation problem: connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory.

Economic Lot-Sizing Games

In this paper we introduce a new class of OR games: economic lot-sizing (ELS) games. There are a number of retailers that have a known demand for a fixed number of periods. To satisfy demand the retailers order products at the same manufacturer. By placing joint orders instead of individual orders, costs can be reduced and a cooperative game arises. In this paper we show that ELS games are balanced. Furthermore, we show that two special classes of ELS games are concave.

On games corresponding to sequencing situations with ready times

This paper considers the special class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which all jobs have equal processing times and the ready time of each job is a multiple of the processing time.By establishing relations between optimal orders of subcoalitions, it is shown that each sequencing game within this class is convex.

Supplier-initiated outsourcing: A methodology to exploit synergy in transportation

Over the last decades, transportation has been evolving from a necessary, though low priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge over their competitors. To cut down transportation costs, shippers often outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice. This paper proposes a new procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead: supplier-initiated outsourcing. This procedure is based on both operations research and game theoretical insights. To stress the contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing, and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the logistics service provider, we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking. Insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential. Moreover, these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of a so-called Shapley Monotonic Path of customized tariffs. Insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the Dutch grocery transportation sector.

On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games

This paper studies m-sequencing games that arise from sequencing situations with m parallel and identical machines. These m-sequencing games, which involve n players, give rise to m-machine games, which involve m players. Here, n corresponds to the number of jobs in an m-sequencing situation, and m corresponds to the number of machines in the same m-sequencing situation. We prove that an m-sequening game is balanced if and only if the corresponding m-machine game is balanced. Furthermore, it is shown that m-sequencing games are balanced ifm 2 f1;2g. Finally, ifm 3, balancedness is established for two special classes of m-sequencing games.

On some balanced, totally balanced and submodular delivery games

Abstract.This paper studies a class of delivery problems associated with the Chinese postman problem and a corresponding class of delivery games. A delivery problem in this class is determined by a connected graph, a cost function defined on its edges and a special chosen vertex in that graph which will be referred to as the post office. It is assumed that the edges in the graph are owned by different individuals and the delivery game is concerned with the allocation of the traveling costs incurred by the server, who starts at the post office and is expected to traverse all edges in the graph before returning to the post office. A graph G is called Chinese postman-submodular, or, for short, CP-submodular (CP-totally balanced, CP-balanced, respectively) if for each delivery problem in which G is the underlying graph the associated delivery game is submodular (totally balanced, balanced, respectively).For undirected graphs we prove that CP-submodular graphs and CP-totally balanced graphs are weakly cyclic graphs and conversely. An undirected graph is shown to be CP-balanced if and only if it is a weakly Euler graph. For directed graphs, CP-submodular graphs can be characterized by directed weakly cyclic graphs. Further, it is proven that any strongly connected directed graph is CP-balanced. For mixed graphs it is shown that a graph is CP-submodular if and only if it is a mixed weakly cyclic graph.Finally, we note that undirected, directed and mixed weakly cyclic graphs can be recognized in linear time.

Constrained optimization involving expensive function evaluations: A sequential approach

This paper presents a new sequential method for constrained non-linear optimization problems.The principal characteristics of these problems are very time consuming function evaluations and the absence of derivative information. Such problems are common in design optimization, where time consuming function evaluations are carried out by simulation tools (e.g., FEM, CFD).Classical optimization methods, based on derivatives, are not applicable because often derivative information is not available and is too expensive to approximate through finite differencing.The algorithm first creates an experimental design. In the design points the underlying functions are evaluated.Local linear approximations of the real model are obtained with help of weighted regression techniques.The approximating model is then optimized within a trust region to find the best feasible objective improving point.This trust region moves along the most promising direction, which is determined on the basis of the evaluated objective values and constraint violations combined in a filter criterion.If the geometry of the points that determine the local approximations becomes bad, i.e. the points are located in such a way that they result in a bad approximation of the actual model, then we evaluate a geometry improving instead of an objective improving point.In each iteration a new local linear approximation is built, and either a new point is evaluated (objective or geometry improving) or the trust region is decreased.Convergence of the algorithm is guided by the size of this trust region.The focus of the approach is on getting good solutions with a limited number of function evaluations (not necessarily on reaching high accuracy).

On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games

This paper considers a special class of sequencing situations with two parallel machines in which each agent has precisely two jobs to be processed, one on each machine. The costs of an agent depend linearly on the final completion time of his jobs. We describe a procedure that provides an optimal processing order of the jobs for some particular classes. Furthermore, we study cooperative games arising from these sequencing situations. Our main result will be on the balancedness of these games.

On the concavity of delivery games

Abstract Delivery games, introduced by Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs in 1994, are combinatorial optimization games that arise from delivery problems closely related to the Chinese postman problem (CPP). They showed that delivery games are not necessarily balanced. For delivery problems corresponding to the class of bridge-connected Euler graphs they showed that the related games are balanced. This paper focuses on the concavity property for delivery games. A delivery game arising from a delivery model corresponding to a bridge-connected Euler graph need not be concave. The main result will be that for delivery problems corresponding to the class of bridge-connected cyclic graphs, which is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected Euler graphs, the related delivery games are concave. Further, we discuss some extreme points of the core and the τ-value for this class of concave delivery games.

On Heterogeneous Covert Networks

Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeoff between secrecy and operational efficiency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to deter- mine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into account. In this paper this framework is put to the test by applying it to the 2002 Jemaah Islamiyah Bali bombing. It is found that most aspects of this covert network can be explained by the theoretical framework. Some interactions however provide a higher risk to the network than others. The theoretical framework on covert networks is extended to accommodate for such heterogeneous interactions. Given a network structure the optimal location of one risky interaction is established. It is shown that the pair of individuals in the organization that should conduct the interaction that presents the highest risk to the organization, is the pair that is the least connected to the remainder of the network. Furthermore, optimal networks given a single risky interaction are approximated and compared. When choosing among a path, star and ring graph it is found that for low order graphs the path graph is best. When increasing the order of graphs under consideration a transition occurs such that the star graph becomes best. It is found that the higher the risk a single interaction presents to the covert network the later this transition from path to star graph occurs.