Herbert Marcuse

One-dimensional man : studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society

Introduction to the Second Edition Introduction to the First Edition The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition ONE DIMEMSIONAL SOCIETY 1. The New forms of Control 2. The Closing of the Political Universe 3 The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation 4. The Closing of the Universe of Discourse ONE DIMENSIONAL THOUGHT 5. Negative thinking: The Defeated Logic of Protest 6. From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination 7. The Triumph of Positive Thinking: One-Dimensional Philosophy THE CHANCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE 8. The Historical Commitment of Philosophy 9.The Catastrophe of Liberation 10. Conclusion Index _ _

Marxism and feminism

This lecture was delivered by Herbert Marcuse at Stanford University on March 7, 1974. The text was written and re‐written after intensive, rigorous and often heated discussions with women. In these discussions I gained insight into largely neglected problems of socialism and into the radical potential of the Womens Movement as a subversive force. With grateful appreciation, this text is dedicated to: Catherine Asmann; Carol Becker; Anne‐Marie Feenberg; Ruth George; Antonia Kaus and Susan Orlofsky.

Towards a critical theory of society

Introduction 1. The Problem of Social Change in the Technological Society 2. The Individual in the Great Society 3. The Containment of Social Change in Industrial Society 4. 1966 Political Preface to Eros and Civilization 5. Beyond One-Dimensional Man 6. Cultural Revolution 7. The Historical Fate of the Bourgeois Democracy 8. Watergate: When Law and Morality Stand in the Way 9. A Revolution in Values 10. Letters: Herbert Marcuse to Leo Lowenthal Leo Lowenthal to Richard Popkin Herbert Marcuse to T.W. Adorno T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer to Herbert Marcuse Herbert Marcuse to T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer Herbert Marcuse to Raya Dunayevskaya Raya Dunayevskaya to Herbert Marcuse to Raya Dunayevskaya

On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics

To attempt a fundamental definition of the concept of labor appears superfluous because there is a tacit agreement in economic theory to avoid a “definitional” concept of labor as such and to conceive of labor only as economic activity: the praxis within the economic dimension. “The general concept ‘labor’ has received such an indeterminate content through its ordinary uses that it is hardly possible to unequivocally demarcate it. It is precisely this situation that gives the representatives of economics the right to utilize a specific economic concept of ‘labor’ that is not derived from a general concept of ‘labor’ but, rather, through another procedure.”

On Science and Phenomenology

The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology is Husserl’s last work. Written in the thirties, the first part was published in 1936, the second part only after Husserl’s death.

Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism

It is appropriate to begin with a preliminary outline of the topic. Historical Materialism makes its appearance in the intellectual context of Marxism which comes about, not as a scientific theory or a system of truths whose significance lies in their correctness as knowledge, but as a theory of social activity and historical action. Marxism is the theory of the proletarian revolution and the revolutionary critique of bourgeois society. It is a science to the extent that the revolutionary activity which it seeks to bring about and direct requires the comprehension of its historical necessity and of the validity of its own nature.

La fin de l'utopie

Cette fin de l’utopie, c’est-à-dire cette récusation des idées et des théories qui, dans l’histoire, se sont servies de l’utopie pour dénoncer certaines possibilités historico-sociales, peut être comprise encore comme « fin de l’histoire », en ce sens très précis que les nouvelles possibilités d’une société humaine et de son milieu ne peuvent plus être conçues comme le prolongement des anciennes, comme leur suite au sein de la même continuité historique : ces nouvelles possibilités supposent au contraire une rupture de la continuité historique, à savoir une différence qualitative entre la société libre et les sociétés asservies, différence qui permet, d’après Marx, de considérer toute l’histoire advenue à ce jour comme la préhistoire de l’humanité.

On the Problem of the Dialectic

In the framework of this journal, the full-length acknowledgement and review of a book with pure philosophical intentions is justified by the central position that the dialectic occupies within Marxism, and through the insights which could be obtained if one considers contemporary philosophy from a dialectical perspective relating philosophy to contemporary society, and to the entire socio-historical situation. Moreover, it is not a question of analyzing Marcks examinations of individual systems of modern philosophy, and his reactions to them. Instead, it ought to be asked whether and to what extent the basic problem of the dialectic is developed in these works, and whether a “cross-section of current philosophy, from the viewpoint of the problem of the dialectic,” is at all possible.

Re-Examination of the Concept of Revolution:

The concept of revolution in Marxian theory telescopes an entire historical period: the final stage of capitalism; the transitional period of proletarian dictatorship, and the initial stage of socialism. It is in a strict sense a historical concept, projecting actual tendencies in the society; and it is a dialectical concept, projecting the counter-tendencies within the respective historical period, in

Herbert Marcuse and Martin Heidegger: An Exchange of Letters

Lieber Herr Heidegger, I have thought for a long time about what you told me during my visit to Todtnauberg, and I would like to write to you about it quite openly. You told me that you fully dissociated yourself from the Nazi regime as of 1934, that in your lectures you made extremely critical remarks, and that you were observed by the Gestapo. I will not doubt your word. But the fact remains that in 1933 you identified yourself so strongly with the regime that today in the eyes of many you are considered as one of its strongest intellectual proponents. Your own speeches, writings, and treatises from this period are proof thereof. You have never publicly retracted them not even after 1945. You have never publicly explained that you have arrived at judgments other than those which you expressed in 1933-34 and articulated in your writings. You remained in Germany after 1934, although you could have found a position abroad practically anywhere. You never publicly denounced any of the actions or ideologies of the regime. Because of these circumstances you are still today identified with the Nazi regime. Many of us have long awaited a