Hikaru Ogawa

Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency

In general, the introduction of competition into the public sector seems to lead to higher cost-efficiency in service production. However, there are examples of substantial cost increases in some areas. In this paper, using a mixed oligopoly model, we investigate the effects of deregulation on the cost-reducing incentives of a public firm. Our results show that a firm that is a public monopoly has greater incentive to conduct cost-reducing investment than a public firm within mixed oligopoly market.

Economic Integration and Strategic Privatization in an International Mixed Oligopoly

This paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly model of two countries, each with public and private firms competing in an international market. The two-country model is compared with the conventional mixed oligopoly model with a single country to examine how the extent of privatization differs. By this comparison, we obtain a deeper appreciation of whether market integration encourages or limits privatization. The analysis shows that the extent of privatization in the international mixed market with two countries is smaller than that in the mixed market with a single domestic country. We further compare the extent of privatization in the noncooperative equilibrium with that in the cooperative equilibrium to show that further privatization leads to higher welfare.

Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly

This article examines the optimal environmental regulation in a mixed duopolistic market wherein environmental damage is associated with production. Specifically, the effects of partial privatization on optimal policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare are examined under three regimes: no regulation, direct regulation on emission, and the indirect regulation via Pigouvian tax. The common result under the different regimes of regulation is that the optimal level of environmental regulation critically depends on the degree of privatization, and its relationship is not monotonous. Furthermore, results show that while privatization results in different impacts on policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare under the three different regimes, it is mostly compatible with an improvement in environmental quality.

Location of Public Firm in the Presence of Multinational Firm: A Mixed Duopoly Approach

By incorporating a multinational private firm into the mixed duopoly model with Hotelling-type spatial competition, we show that the private firms nationality is a matter of the public firms location. As the share of foreign capital increases in the private (multinational) firm, the public firm moves to a central place. The effects of price regulation and sequential location choice are also discussed.

Market‐Demand Boosting and Privatization in a Mixed Duopoly

This study incorporates demand‐boosting strategies into a mixed duopoly model in order to consider the endogenous determination of market demand. The results indicate equilibrium characteristics that differ from those found under an exogenous demand setting. As consumers become more sensitive to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms, the government must choose a lower level of privatization. This suggests that the responsiveness of consumer demand to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms constitutes a limiting factor for privatization.

Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition

This paper analyzes how a fiscal transfer scheme affects tax cooperation in a repeated-interaction model of tax competition. In particular, the paper studies whether a fiscal transfer scheme promotes or blocks voluntary tax cooperation. It is shown that the larger the scale of fiscal transfer is, the easier voluntary tax cooperation is, implying that interregional transfers for correcting fiscal gaps are consistent with voluntary tax cooperation.

Equalization Transfers, Fiscal Decentralization, and Economic Growth

This paper analyzes the fiscal decentralization and equalization transfers in a two-region model of endogenous growth. In our model, two levels of government with different objectives are considered: the local governments maximize the utility of the residents of the region, and the central government makes the equalization transfers to close the gaps in fiscal capacity among the regions and pays attention to the economic growth rate. Our first result demonstrates that the preferred tax rate chosen by the local government is positively affected by the magnitude of fiscal decentralization. The second result shows that the fiscal equalization policies of the central government have no influence on the speed of interregional growth convergence. Furthermore, the normative implication is obtained from our final results that there exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralization to reach the central government´s goal of growth maximization, but the magnitude of fiscal decentralization chosen by the central government is excessive to entail the highest regional welfare.

A Model for the Convergence of Accounting Standards

The globalization of capital markets has greatly impacted the harmonization of accounting standards. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has contributed to the harmonization of accounting standards by issuing the International Accounting Standards (IAS). In 2001, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), which succeeded the IASC, made a commitment to achieve full convergence to a single set of high-quality global accounting standards. While the IASB established IAS of high-quality, both understandable and enforceable, the international harmonization of accounting or the convergence of accounting standards is still a much debated issue in accounting research. Using a simple game theoretic model, this paper examines the mechanism by which various countries in the global economy may come to adopt a single accounting standard. This standard would dominate the domestic standard of each country and would be called Global Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GGAAP).

Who gains from capital market integration? Tax competition between unionized and non-unionized countries

The welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries. The asymmetry is expressed through the labour market: one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other countrys labour market is unionized. Our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital. In the absence of active governments, capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country. Capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes/subsidies.

Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition

This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens select a policy-maker to set a tax rate for the country. In particular, under certain conditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the countrys capital is higher than the decisive voters own share.