Hiroshi Mukunoki

Multilateralism and Hub-and-Spoke Bilateralism

This paper studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free-trade agreements in an oligopoly model. The expansion of trading blocs through overlapping trade agreements allows the option of hub-and-spoke systems and achieves multilateral free trade as the equilibrium path, even if the expansion of trading blocs through the acceptance of new members is not feasible. The results suggest that free-trade areas (FTAs) tend to expand more than customs unions (CUs). Lobbying by a producer can either promote or undermine the achievement of multilateral free trade through overlapping FTAs.

Economic Integration and Rules of Origin Under International Oligopoly

Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent tariff circumvention by firms of nonmember countries. This article points out that in imperfectly competitive markets, ROOs have another role overlooked in the existing literature. Instead of focusing on the impacts of ROOs in the intermediate-good markets, we draw our attention to the final-good markets to examine the effects of ROOs. We find that under some conditions, ROOs benefit both firms at the expense of consumers. Under some other conditions, ROOs benefit the firm producing outside the FTA and hurt the firm producing inside the FTA.

FDI in Post-Production Services and Product Market Competition

Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element of business activity. A foreign firm faces a higher cost to perform such services than its domestic rival because of the lack of proximity to customers. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign firm can reduce its cost for post-production services by foreign direct investment (FDI), or alternatively can outsource such services to its domestic rival. Trade liberalization, if not accompanied by liberalization of service FDI, can hurt domestic consumers and decrease world welfare, but the negative welfare impacts can be mitigated and eventually turned into positive ones as service FDI is also liberalized. This finding yields important policy implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is limited compared to the substantial progress already made in trade liberalization.

Spillover Effects of Economic Integration in a Three-Country Model*

Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three-country model contrast with those found in a two-country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non-member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.

Individual Characteristics, Behavioral Biases, and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individuals various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.

Trade Liberalization and Aftermarket Services for Imports

We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm’s products. This weakens the firms’ competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.

Preferential Trade Agreements, Technology Adoption and the Speed of Attaining Free Trade

For developing countries, a technological catch-up is sometimes a prerequisite for endorsement of trade agreements. This paper compares sequential trade liberalization through a preferential trade agreement (PTA) and one-shot multilateral trade liberalization with respect to the speed with which countries attain multilateral free trade. We build a three-country oligopoly model, including one developing country whose domestic firm initially uses old technology. Firm-level adoption of new technology and country-level conclusions of trade agreements are endogenously determined. When a PTA is feasible whereas multilateral free trade is infeasible prior to technology adoption, a free trade area (FTA) that includes a developing country speeds up technology adoption and the realization of multilateral free trade, whereas a customs union (CU) delays them. The opposite case is obtained if PTAs are infeasible prior to technology adoption, or they are formed between developing countries. Even if faster realization of free trade via an FTA improves world welfare, a developed country may prefer liberalization via a CU.