Holger Andreas Rau

Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men? Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator Games

We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients’ performance, the size of the pot is either high or low. We compare this real-effort treatment to a baseline treatment where the pot is a windfall gain and where a lottery determines the pot size. In the baseline treatment, reciprocity cannot play a role. We find that female dictators show reciprocity and decrease their taking-rates significantly in the real-effort treatment. This treatment effect is larger when female dictators make a decision on recipients who successfully generated a large pot compared to the case where the recipients performed poorly. By contrast, there is no treatment effect with male dictators, who generally exhibit more selfish behavior.

Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-Level Public Goods: One vs. Two Provision Levels

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (si- multaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) aects public-good provision in a two-player game. WeWe analyze the provision of a step-level public good in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how the order of moves and the introduction of a second step-level affects public-good provision. We find that the sequential-move game improves public-good provision and payoffs. An additional step-level does lead to higher contributions but the effect on public-good provision is ambiguous and insignificant. Based on an existing data set, we calibrate Fehr and Schmidts (1999) model of inequality aversion and find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with these predictions in a quantitative sense, but there are also two contradictions to the models predictions.

Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and payoffs, even though second movers often punish first movers who give less than half of the threshold contribution. The additional second step level—which is not feasible in standard Nash equilibrium—leads to higher contributions but does not improve public-good provision and lowers payoffs. We calibrate the parameters of Fehr and Schmidt’s model of inequality aversion to make quantitative predictions. We find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with several predictions in a quantitative sense.

Gender differences in motivational crowding out of work perfomance

This paper studies motivational crowding-out effects after financial incentives are lowered. In a real-effort setting, workers receive a piece rate before financial incentives are substituted by a one-time payment. Under the fixed payment, effort is significantly lower only when preceded by piece-rate incentives. The decrease is driven by a fraction of men who reduce their effort by 12%, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding-out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard all alternative explanations besides from motivational crowding out.

How Worker Participation Affects Reciprocity Under Minimum Remuneration Policies: Experimental Evidence

We analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the employer on the enforcement of the policy. In the control treatment the policy is exogenously introduced. We find a pronounced effort increase after the policy was enforced. An exogenous introduction has detrimental effects, i.e., employers frequently pay a premium to maintain performance. Thus, worker participation may be an effective means for maintaining reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies.

Cartel Coordination and the Role of Payoff Asymmetries: Experimental Evidence on Partial Cartels

This paper experimentally tests the coordination of partial cartels when payoffs are asymmetric. In a two-stage mechanism with communication we analyze the formation of all-inclusive and partial cartels. Firms reject partial cartels if outside firms profit excessively from cartel formation. Communication increases the number of all-inclusive cartels, but partial cartels remain scarce.

Gender Differences in Competitive Positions: Experimental Evidence on Job Promotion

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly recruits. Discriminatory behavior by the employer is isolated in a treatment where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply for promotion and employers recruit. Strikingly, the gender composition in competitive position is balanced in the absence of a signaling institution. When signaling is possible, we observe that female workers who do not request a promotion are discriminated against.

How Gender and Risk Preferences Influence Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence

In a within-subjects experiment we test the relation of risk preferences and charitable giving. Women not only give substantially more than men, but also show an economically significant positive correlation between risk tolerance and donation levels. We find no such correlation for men. Men and relative risk-averse women do not differ in donations. Thus, common findings of gender differences in charitable giving may be explained by risk-tolerant women donating more.This paper experimentally investigates the determinants of charitable giving. It focuses on the joint analysis of two prominent gender differences, i.e., disparities in dictator giving and risk taking. In a within-subjects experiment, we test the impact of risk preferences on donations. The data find that women donate more and behave more risk-averse than men. Crucially, women show an economically significant positive correlation between risk tolerance and donations. By contrast, no such correlation is found for men. Men and relative risk-averse women give the same. Our findings suggest that risk preferences may help explaining common gender differences in charitable giving.

Decisions Under Uncertainty in Social Contexts

This paper theoretically and experimentally studies decision-making in risky and social environments. We explore the interdependence of individual risk attitudes and social preferences in form of inequality aversion as two decisive behavioral determinants in such contexts. Our model and the data demonstrate that individual risk aversion is attenuated when lagging behind peers, whereas it is amplified under favorable income inequality. People’s choices are not only context-dependent, but are sensitive to their degree of inequality aversion. The findings contribute to the understanding of decision-making in environments like trading at stock markets, the saving patterns of households or charitable giving under uncertainty.

Fairness and Learning in Multi-Employee Gift-Exchange Games: An Experimental Analysis

We study the role of norm violations and learning behavior in multi- and single-worker gift-exchange games and find that working with co-workers leads to a twofold effect. First, flexible wages yield moderately higher efforts than in the single-employee treatment. The data suggests that this is caused by learning behavior of workers who realize that higher effort pays off and exert more effort than in the single worker case. Second, when wage discrimination is not possible, effort is crowded-out and is substantially smaller than in the single-employee treatment.