Matthias Heinz

Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men? Gender Differences in Real Effort Dictator Games

We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients’ performance, the size of the pot is either high or low. We compare this real-effort treatment to a baseline treatment where the pot is a windfall gain and where a lottery determines the pot size. In the baseline treatment, reciprocity cannot play a role. We find that female dictators show reciprocity and decrease their taking-rates significantly in the real-effort treatment. This treatment effect is larger when female dictators make a decision on recipients who successfully generated a large pot compared to the case where the recipients performed poorly. By contrast, there is no treatment effect with male dictators, who generally exhibit more selfish behavior.

Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3%. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates

Media Bias in Economic News: A Factor 20

3.80 in sales, and

Goodbye or Identify: Detrimental Effects of Downsizing on Identification and Survivor Performance

2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2% while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus, treatment and control shops’ performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.

Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

We reviewed all articles reporting on job creation and job destruction by companies in Germany between December 2000 and September 2008 in Die Welt, one of the leading German newspapers, using experiments to test our selection criteria. There is a large difference in coverage of job creation and job shedding. Despite the fact that the economic situation in Germany improved over the period (unemployment rate fell by 2.0%), more than ten times as many articles report on negative employment news compared to positive news. When we control for the number of jobs involved, we find an even stronger bias: on a per-job basis, the bias to downsizing increases to a factor greater than 20. Additional tests indicate that these effects are similar in other leading German newspapers.

Media Slant Against Foreign Owners: Downsizing

Research shows that after layoffs, employees often report decreased commitment and performance which has been coined the survivor syndrome. However, the mechanisms underlying this effect remain underexplored. The purpose of the paper is to show that reduced organizational identification can serve as an explanation for the survivor syndrome. We conducted a laboratory experiment, in which participants work as a group of employees for another participant who acts as employer. In the course of the experiment, the employer decides whether one of his or her employees should be laid off or not. Mediation analysis supports a social identity-based explanation for the emergence of the survivor syndrome: downsizing causes lower identification with the employer which in turn relates to lower performance of employees.

Downsizing and firm performance: evidence from German firm data

It is well-established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the role of external forces. Investigating the role of market competition on the effectiveness of PfP, we theorize that there are two counteracting effects – business stealing and competitor response – that jointly generate an inverted U-shape relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little extra market to gain, while strong competition creates low incentives because competitors are more likely to respond. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory, allow us to empirically separate the business stealing and competitor response effects, and refute alternative explanations.