Howell E. Jackson

Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence

Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators’ resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently-available evidence.

Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999 ? Part I

This article presents the second installment of an empirical investigation into regulatory competition in international securities markets. It contributes to the current debate about competitiveness of U.S. capital markets by offering an account of transatlantic capital raising practices at the height of technology boom of the 1990s and before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the corporate scandals that precipitated the Act. This article provides evidence that European issuers in the late 1990s were already turning away from U.S. public capital markets. While regulatory considerations appear to have played a role in that trend, even more important were the growing importance of private means of access of U.S. capital, the increased off-shore presence of U.S. institutional investors, and the relatively unsatisfactory trading performance of many foreign issuers that had gone to the trouble of obtaining U.S. public listings early in the 1990s. The picture of transatlantic capital raising presented in our survey suggests that the recent decline in competitiveness of U.S. capital markets may well be more a product of long-standing trends in global financial markets than a response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or other requirements of federal securities laws. We have supplemented our original analysis with a post-script from the vantage point of 2008 to draw connections between our findings and those of recent academic literature.

The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies

The recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver consumer financial services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. In response, the Obama administration proposed a new agency to oversee consumer financial services, and the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act embraced the Administrations proposal by creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Other regulatory reforms have been advanced, and in some cases adopted, in recent years, at both the federal and state level. In this paper, we provide an overview of consumer financial markets, detailing the purposes they serve, the extent to which they suffer from market failures or other deficiencies, and the structure of our current system of regulation. To illustrate our analytical framework, we present case studies on retirement savings, residential mortgages, payday lending, and mutual funds. We conclude with a series of observations on the limits of government intervention, suggestions about how to measure whether government intervention is successful, and potentially fruitful lines of future research and data collection.

Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation

This essay reviews recent debates over the allocation of regulatory authority in three separate fields of financial regulation: corporate governance, securities regulation, and the regulation of financial institutions. In each field, the essay argues, reform proposals can be organized into three basic groups: those that advocate centralization of regulatory authority; those that favor competition among governmental bodies; and those that recommend the privatization of regulatory standards. While this debate is most familiar in the field of corporate governance, highly analogous policy discussions are currently taking place in securities regulation and the regulation of financial institutions. This essay traces the development of arguments over the proper allocation of regulatory authority in various sectors of the financial services industry, noting differences both in the contexts in which the issue has arisen in various sectors of the industry and also in the ways regulatory authority is currently allocated in each sector. The essay concludes with several tentative thoughts about normative grounds on which debates over the proper allocation of regulatory authority might ultimately be resolved.

THE EXPANDING OBLIGATIONS OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES

Focuses on the expanding obligations of financial holding companies in the U.S. Emergence of enhanced obligations; Ways in which government officials have justified the trend toward enhanced obligations; Efficacy of enhanced obligations as a mechanism of regulatory control.

An American Perspective on the U.K. Financial Services Authority: Politics, Goals & Regulatory Intensity

Although similarities between the British and American systems of financial regulation are often remarked upon in academic commentary, the organizational structure of financial supervision in the two countries has diverged substantially in the past decade, as the United Kingdom has now largely consolidated its financial regulatory agencies in the Financial Services Authority whereas the United States has maintained the world’s most decentralized and fragmented collection of financial supervisory agencies. In this essay, Professor Howell Jackson explores various reasons why financial regulation in these two countries differs so dramatica lly in organizational structure. Focusing first on the differences in political economy that surrounded the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 in the United Kingdom and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in the United States, Professor Jackson discusses deeper differences in the regulatory philosophies of the two countries and also presents data on the relative intensity of financial regulation in both jurisdiction. He speculates that the comparatively more ambitious regulatory agenda of the U.S. system pushes the country towards a more elaborate system of financial oversight that is inherently more difficult to consolidate. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the goals of the financial regulators are more modest and, to the extent that cost efficiency is one of the country’s regulatory objectives in the field of financial regulation, that policy tends to foster a less cumbersome system of financial regulation that more easily accommodates consolidation of regulatory functions. The paper concludes with some broader comparative data suggesting that while British financial regulation may be less intensive than financial regulation in the United States, it is substantially more intensive than financial regulation in many other jurisdictions, particularly civil law jurisdictions on the Continent.

THE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SUBSTANTIAL HOLDING COMPANIES

OVER the past several decades, holding companies have emerged as the dominant organizational structure in the American financial services industry. Today, many of the countrys largest financial firms operate through holding companies with a network of regulated subsidiaries, including depository institutions (such as banks and thrifts), securities firms, insurance units, and a host of other specialized affiliates. Citicorp, for example, controls the nations largest commercial bank, as well as a securities firm in New York, an insurance company in Delaware, and a thrift institution in California. Similarly, Household Finance has subsidiaries in the consumer lending, banking, thrift, and insurance businesses. As financial holding companies have become increasingly important, the legal rules governing these entities have gradually evolved, particularly in the area of safety and soundness. Traditionally, state and federal authorities have regarded holding companies as something of a threat to

Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue

The EU Financial Markets Dialogue led by the SEC and the European Commission has achieved some notable successes, particularly with respect to the consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates and the development of a plan to achieve convergence in corporate financial reporting. On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a clear ongoing commitment to the dialogue as a key mechanism for the development of efficient and credible regulatory solutions that guarantee effective investor protection and a high level of business efficiency. This paper reports on a two-day roundtable discussion that took place at Cambridge University in September 2005 to explore ways in which the academic community can contribute to this transatlantic debate. Lively discussion between the policy-makers, regulators, market participants and academics who attended the roundtable yielded a number of thematic concerns, which, the paper suggests, could form the basis of a programme for further work. Finally, the paper announces the establishment of a seminar series, to be based in the United Kingdom, on the Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue and invites contributions.

The Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates

One of the most elegant legal innovations to emerge from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is the FDIC’s single-point-of-entry (SPOE) initiative, whereby regulatory authorities will be in a position to resolve the failure of large financial conglomerates (corporate groups with regulated financial entities as subsidiaries) by seizing a top-tier holding company, downstreaming holding-company resources to distressed subsidiaries, wiping out holding-company shareholders while simultaneously imposing additional losses on holding-company creditors, and allowing the government to resolve the entire group without disrupting the business operations of operating subsidiaries (even those operating overseas) or risking systemic consequences for the broader economy. Although there is much to admire in the creativity underlying SPOE, the approach’s design also raises a host of novel and challenging questions of implementation. This chapter explores a number of these questions and elaborates upon the following points. First, in contrast to traditional approaches to resolving financial conglomerates, SPOE is premised on the continued support of all material operating subsidiaries, thereby potentially extending the scope of government support and thus posing the possibility of mission creep and expanded moral hazard. Second, SPOE contemplates the automatic downstreaming of resources to operating subsidiaries in distress, but effecting that support is likely to be more difficult than commonly understood. If too much support is positioned in advance, there may be inadequate reserves at the top level to support a single subsidiary that gets into an unexpectedly large amount of trouble. Alternatively, if too many reserves are retained at the holding-company level, commitments of subsidiary support may not be credible (especially to foreign authorities) and it may become difficult legally and practically to deploy those resources in times of distress. SPOE is most easy to envision operating in conjunction with the FDIC’s expanded authority under its Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the act’s preferred regime for resolving failed financial conglomerates is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (where Lehman was resolved) and not OLA. Several complexities could arise were a bankruptcy court today called upon to implement an SPOE resolution plan. While many legal experts are working on legislative proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate SPOE resolutions, there are a number of legal levers that federal authorities could deploy under current law to increase the likelihood that the SPOE strategy could be effected through traditional bankruptcy procedures. The task would be challenging and would require considerable advanced planning. But there are substantial benefits to be had from taking steps now to increase the likelihood that the bankruptcy option represents a viable and credible alternative for effecting SPOE transactions without resort to OLA and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.