Ian Ostrander

The Logic of Presidential Signing Statements

Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending traditional presidential authority. Using original data on approximately 8,500 public laws and 1,250 signing statements, the authors investigate when and why signing statements occur. They find presidents are likely to issue constitutional signing statements on bills traditionally falling under the president’s purview.

Oil Crises and Policy Continuity: A History of Failure to Change

In the summer of 2010, an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig killed eleven workers and produced a massive oil spill. Th e spill ultimately released more than 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, prompting characterizations of it as “the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.” 1 Th e event triggered strong public calls to reconsider existing energy policies and on June 15, President Obama stated that “the time to embrace a clean energy future is now.” 2 However, since then, very little has changed in terms of American energy policies. While the spill itself constituted a unique disaster, the muted long-term reaction follows a historical pattern of failure to dramatically change energy policies in the wake of oil crises. Th e 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, or the BP spill, followed many historic shocks, each of which has reshaped public opinion toward oil and created the possibility of reform. Th e fi rst signifi cant shock occurred with the OPEC embargo of 1973 and the subsequent gas shortages. Similar disturbances include the fi rst Gulf War (1989–91) as well as the war in Iraq during the early 2000s, both of which led to rapid rises in the price of gas. While not exclusive, these are perhaps the most prominent of the oil crises that had the potential to change U.S. energy policies for fossil fuels.

Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws passed from the 95th through the 108th Congresses in order to demonstrate the specific influence of presidential signing statements on future congressional amendment activity. The results of our analysis lend support to the theory that laws receiving presidential signing statements are in fact more likely to be revisited and revised by Congress. These findings add to the literature both on presidential signing statements as well as the evolution of laws.

Out of step and out of touch: The matter with Kansas in the 2014 midterm election

Abstract In recent years the politics of Kansas, with its strong historic ties to the Republican Party, have taken a hard right turn. This political environment mirrors many other states in which one political party effectively dominates the policymaking process. But while political dominance may aid incumbency it can also contribute to the kinds of political excess that tend to promote electoral backlashes. In this paper, we use a survey of likely Kansas voters during the 2014 midterm elections to examine opinions and voting preferences related to two state-wide races in which incumbent overreach played a prominent role. In particular, we examine the reelection campaigns of Governor Brownback, as his remarkably austere and highly unpopular budget left him ideologically out of step with most voters, and Senator Roberts, as his lack of residence in the state after years of serving in the Senate left him out of touch with a disgruntled electorate. Although both Republicans survived reelection, their actions ensured an unusually competitive midterm in an otherwise deep red state.

No vacancy: holdover capacity and the continued staffing of major commissions

Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a holdover official is important as it can determine whether a board is functional or inoperable. In this article, we examine how the presence of holdover provisions within such commissions alters confirmation dynamics and vacancy rates. Evidence suggests that holdover provisions lead to quicker confirmation on nominations as well as fewer complete vacancies. Such structures thus help mitigate the short-term problems stemming from staffing independent regulatory boards, especially given the tendency towards obstruction in the US Senate.

The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

ABSTRACT In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance of power between Congress and the presidency by allowing more unilateral and unrestricted appointments. Is Congress conceding confirmation for expediency? In this investigation, I explore recent reforms with respect to the speed and outcomes of the executive nominations process as well as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.

Keeping Appointments: The Politics of Confirming United States Attorneys

ABSTRACT As the gatekeepers of federal law, U.S. Attorneys have a strong influence on legal policy. While U.S. Attorneys are presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation, the rules governing their appointments differ significantly from those used for executive and judicial nominees. Specifically, U.S. District Courts may name interim appointees if prolonged stalemate occurs. When combined with other recent rules changes favoring presidents, U.S. Attorney nominations provide an opportunity to observe how variations in rules influence the confirmation process. Examining all U.S. Attorney nominations between 1987 and 2010, we find evidence that U.S. Attorneys are generally confirmed faster than other executive or judicial nominations even while familiar predictors of delay remain important. The findings have broad implications for the study of appointments and confirmation politics.

Jolts, Surges, Brownouts, and Blackouts: Shocks to Stable Energy Policies

Many analyses of policy change argue that substantial changes result when seemingly stable systems are shocked by unplanned issues or events. Yet, while many potentially important shocks may occur, only a handful have a dramatic effect. We build on several compelling arguments to differentiate between different kinds of potential shocks. We examine these differences by comparing shocks within different energy sectors inside the U.S. We use systematic analyses of media coverage, congressional hearings, and policy outputs to show a distinct differentiation of impact from shocks. This research relates to broad theories of policy change, discussions of energy policy, and comparisons of similar policies over time.