William R. Lowry

Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in Congress

The question of whether parties converge or diverge over time has attracted a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention. In this article we make two contributions to this literature. First, rather than looking at general measures of ideology, we examine a specific policy area-environmental policy to see whether the parties have diverged or converged. We utilize ratings produced by the League of Conservation Voters to obtain measures of congressional voting. Unlike other issue-specific studies of divergence, we adjust these scores, using a methodology recently developed by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999), to make them comparable across time. Our results show that Republicans and Democrats in Congress have diverged over time on environmental issues. Second, once we determine that the parties have diverged, we analyze the underlying causes of this divergence. We provide three explanations for divergence between the two parties, based on the fact that parties are not monolithic but rather are made up of regional, factional, and individual components. If regions behave differently on an issue, then shifting representation of regions within parties will lead to shifts in overall party behavior. When internal factions with stronger views than the general party are more supported by interest groups and less constrained by issue salience or economic conditions, then the parties are more likely to diverge. And when party members are replaced by individuals with different views on an issue, overall party behavior shifts accordingly.

Party Differentiation in Congress

At times, the American political parties are so close in terms of policy positions that critics denounce the lack of a “dimes worth of difference” between them. At other times, the gap between them on a left-right dimension is huge. How can we explain this variation? We argue that parties can behave rationally as collective units, and that shifts in divergence and convergence can be explained as rational responses to changes within governmental institutions and to shifts in conditions outside. We analyze this argument using adjusted ADA scores (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999) to compare voting score differences between the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress from 1952 to 1996. We pose specific hypotheses for potentially important factors shaping party behavior and test them with a multivariate model. Our results support the argument that the variation in the behavioral gap between the two parties in Congress can be explained as rational party responses to internal and external stimuli.

Unbuilt Dams: Seminal Events and Policy Change in China, Australia, and the United States

Specific events can occasionally be described as turning points in the evolution of a par ticular public policy. Classic examples include the 1964 Civil Rights Act in American civil rights policy and the 1989 decision by Hungarian authorities to allow East Germans safe transit through Hungary into Austria, which culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall. Why do such seminal events occur? How comparable are explanations in very different political settings? This article draws on the logic of expansion of the sphere of conflict to explain semi nal events. The causal explanation of such events can be remarkably, almost eerily, simi lar, across political systems. To support the argument, Dujiangyan, China, where a large dam/hydropower complex already under construction was suddenly and dramatically aborted, will be compared to established seminal events in American and Australian environmental politics, the refusal to build dams in the Grand Canyon in the 1960s and the rejection of the Franklin Dam in Tasmania in 1983.

Oil Crises and Policy Continuity: A History of Failure to Change

In the summer of 2010, an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig killed eleven workers and produced a massive oil spill. Th e spill ultimately released more than 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, prompting characterizations of it as “the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.” 1 Th e event triggered strong public calls to reconsider existing energy policies and on June 15, President Obama stated that “the time to embrace a clean energy future is now.” 2 However, since then, very little has changed in terms of American energy policies. While the spill itself constituted a unique disaster, the muted long-term reaction follows a historical pattern of failure to dramatically change energy policies in the wake of oil crises. Th e 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, or the BP spill, followed many historic shocks, each of which has reshaped public opinion toward oil and created the possibility of reform. Th e fi rst signifi cant shock occurred with the OPEC embargo of 1973 and the subsequent gas shortages. Similar disturbances include the fi rst Gulf War (1989–91) as well as the war in Iraq during the early 2000s, both of which led to rapid rises in the price of gas. While not exclusive, these are perhaps the most prominent of the oil crises that had the potential to change U.S. energy policies for fossil fuels.

Land of the Fee: Entrance Fees and the National Park Service

What are the implications of increasing a public agencys ability to generate its own revenue for political control of the bureaucracy? This article uses historical cases of public land user fees to argue that, under certain conditions, such a change, rather than increasing agency autonomy, actually facilitates congressional intervention and control. Specifically, if the revenue increase carries no guarantees of increased appropriations and maintained levels of discretion, then old funds are supplanted by new funds with new strings attached. I illustrate the argument by examining the impacts of increased entrance fees on the National Park Service in recent years.

How Preferences Change Institutions: The 1978 Energy Act

In this article, we advance a generic theory of institutional change and illustrate it through a study of the Gas Deregulation Act of 1977–78. The passage of the Act provides an informative case study about institutional change as an innovative postcloture filibuster was implemented, and then defeated, in the course of the debate. Contrary to Shepsle’s argument that institutions determine outcomes, we argue that the legislative majority shaped the institution to get the policy outcome it wanted. We find evidence that negotiations among competing coalitions constrained outcomes to be inside the uncovered set. When the filibuster-related rules threatened to lead to an outcome outside of the uncovered set, the rules were changed to avoid this outcome. Our analysis calls into question both the view of majority rule as generically leading to chaos and the view that institutions are the essential tool to overcome such instability.

Creating Conditions for Policy Change in National Parks: Contrasting Cases in Yellowstone and Yosemite

Abstract Public agencies face significant political obstacles when they try to change long-standing policies. This paper examines efforts by the U.S. National Park Service to change long-term policies in Yellowstone and Yosemite national parks. We argue that, to be successful, the agency and pro-change allies must expand the sphere of conflict to engage the support of the broader American public through positive framing, supportive science, compelling economic arguments, consistent goals, and the commitment of other institutional actors. We show that the agency is capable of creating these conditions, as in the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone, but we argue that this is not always the outcome, as in reducing automobile congestion in Yosemite Valley.

Jolts, Surges, Brownouts, and Blackouts: Shocks to Stable Energy Policies

Many analyses of policy change argue that substantial changes result when seemingly stable systems are shocked by unplanned issues or events. Yet, while many potentially important shocks may occur, only a handful have a dramatic effect. We build on several compelling arguments to differentiate between different kinds of potential shocks. We examine these differences by comparing shocks within different energy sectors inside the U.S. We use systematic analyses of media coverage, congressional hearings, and policy outputs to show a distinct differentiation of impact from shocks. This research relates to broad theories of policy change, discussions of energy policy, and comparisons of similar policies over time.