Ilde Rizzo

Economic Perspectives on Cultural Heritage

Preface - Notes on Contributors - PART 1: INTRODUCTION - Economic Perspectives on Cultural Heritage: An Introduction M.Hutter - PART 2: THE CONSTRUCTION OF HERITAGE: THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS - Seven Questions in the Economics of Cultural Heritage D.Throsby - The Evaluation of Cultural Heritage: Some Critical Issues B.S.Frey - Optimizing the Use of Cultural Heritage C.Koboldt - The Value of Cultural Heritage A.Klamer - PART 3: HERITAGE REGULATION: REGIMES, CASES AND EFFECTS - The Political Economy of Rehabilitation: the Case of the Benedettini Monastery G.Pignataro & I.Rizzo - Cultural Heritage and Preservation Policies: Notes on the History of the Italian Case G.Guerzoni - The Development of British Policy on Built Heritage Preservation S.Creigh-Tyte - Features and Recent Developments of Cultural Heritage Policy in Japan Y.Kurabayashi - Tax Policies and Cultural Heritage D.Netzer - PART 4: HERITAGE POLICY: EXPERIMENTS AND PROPOSALS - Privatization Policies in Venice G.Mossetto - Conserving Historic Monuments in France: a Critique of Official Policies F.Benhamou - Towards a European Market for Arts and Culture Goods: Some Proposals F.Forte - Towards a Workable Heritage Policy A.Peacock - Conference Participants - Index

Chapter 28 Cultural Heritage: Economic Analysis and Public Policy ⁎

This chapter shows how economic theory and public policy analysis can illuminate decision-making relating to cultural heritage. We argue that from an economic viewpoint the appropriate conceptualisation of heritage is as a capital asset. Regarding heritage as cultural capital invites consideration of sustainability aspects, in parallel with the treatment of natural capital in economic theory, allowing us to derive a sustainability rule for cultural capital accumulation. The application of cost-benefit analysis to heritage investment appraisal is discussed, with particular reference to the assessment of non-market benefits. Turning to policy issues, we examine ways in which governments intervene in heritage markets, with particular attention to listing and other forms of regulation. Questions of institutional design, financing and policy delivery in a multi-jurisdictional framework are discussed, and finally the role of the private sector is considered, with emphasis on the possibility of crowding out and the incentive effects of public policy on private behaviour in the heritage field.

Determinants of adaptation costs in procurement: an empirical estimation on Italian public works contracts

It is widely agreed that rules governing public procurement should be designed to achieve value for money. However, in the public works sector, ‘… the good being procured is usually complex and hard to be exactly specified ex ante, … [and] alterations to the original project might be needed after the contract is awarded. This may result in considerable discrepancies between the lowest winning bid and the actual costs that are incurred by the buyer’ (Bajari et al., 2006). There is now a wide body of literature focusing on cost escalation during the execution of contracts and their estimates reveal that it can be often quite large. This article is aimed at offering an empirical test of the determinants of adaptation costs in the public works procurement. Using a detailed data set on Italian public works contracts, we run an empirical analysis, grounded on the main conclusions reached in the literature, to test for the main drivers of adaptation costs.

The "hidden" debt

1. Introduction.- 2. Notes on a Definition of the Concept of Public Debt.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Analogies between borrowing and unfunded obligations.- 2.3 Differences between borrowing and unfunded obligations.- 2.4 The U.K. pension system case.- 2.5 Economic and policy implications.- Notes.- 3. The Public Debt Perception Issue.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Public debt illusion: a brief overview.- 3.3 Funded debt perception.- 3.4 Unfunded debt perception.- 3.5 Concluding remarks.- Notes.- 4. The Fulfilment of Unfunded Obligations and the Problem of Population Growth: An Application of Baumols Law.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The model.- 4.3 Concluding remarks.- Notes.- 5. Public Choice Implications of Unfunded Debt.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The median voter theorem and unfunded obligations.- 5.3 Unfunded obligations fulfilment within a median voter framework: a simple model.- 5.4 The effects of the population growth on the level of unfunded obligations fulfillment.- 5.5 The choice of the median voters optimum contribution rate.- 5.6 Concluding remarks.- Notes.- 6. The Interest Group Theory and Unfunded Obligations.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Interest groups and the political process.- 6.3 Interest groups and unfunded obligations.- 6.4 Concluding remarks.- Notes.- 7. An Attempt at Empirical Investigation.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 Some preliminary methodological questions.- 7.3 The pension equation: cross-section analysis.- 7.4 The pension equation: time-series analysis.- 7.5 OLS results.- 7.6 Concluding remarks.- Notes.- 8. Conclusions.

The Political Economy of Rehabilitation: The case of the Benedettini Monastery

This chapter is aimed at exploring some aspects related to the issue of conservation, using as a case study the conservation of the Benedettini Monastery in Catania. Starting from this case, we will try to draw attention to general issues of political economy, such as the identification of the actors involved in decisions about conservation, the ways in which conservation can be carried out and the role of the consumers/users. Four questions will be addressed: (i) What should be conserved? (ii) Why do we conserve? (iii) Who should conserve? (iv) How should conservation be carried out?

The effects of reimbursement mechanisms on medical technology diffusion in the hospital sector in the Italian NHS

OBJECTIVES The aim of this study was to investigate how the differences across the regional reimbursement mechanisms and in particular the use of the DRGs impact on the level in the high technology equipment diffusion. METHODS Based on hospital sector data at a regional level we build up indicators to measure the regional diffusion of high technological medical equipment in the period 1997-2007. These indicators are regressed on regional healthcare characteristics to investigate the relationship between the different reimbursement systems offered by Italian regions and the level of high technological medical equipment. RESULTS Our results suggest that the per-case payment system is generally associated with a lower level of regional technology endowment per million of inhabitants, especially for the complex and expensive medical equipment. CONCLUSIONS Our findings cast some doubts that an effective regulation of reimbursement mechanisms cannot limit the excessive diffusion of medical equipment that is a relevant driver of the increase in expenditure.

Regulation in the Cultural Sector

Government activity takes place in three different forms: public expenditure, taxation and regulation. Different mixes of these policy instruments can be adopted according to prevailing economic and institutional settings. In this paper attention will be concentrated on regulation: public expenditure and taxation will be recalled only to stress differences and/or analogies with regulation.

UNESCO sites and performance trend of Italian regional tourism destinations: A two-stage DEA window analysis with spatial interaction

This article analyzes the role of United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sites on the enhancement of tourism destinations (TDs) performance, taking the Italian regions over the period 1995–2010 as a case study. Specifically, we aim at studying the effect of the inscription in the World Heritage List (WHL) upon the dynamics of the efficiency of the Italian regions as TDs. We use a two-stage data envelopment analysis window analysis, to detect efficiency trends and resort to both semiparametric pooled-truncated and panel data estimators to evaluate the determinants of the efficiency changes in TDs over time. Moreover, we test for the presence of spatial dependence in the efficiency of TDs. The results reveal that the WHL does not play a significant role in enhancing technical efficiency of TDs. These empirical findings are robust to alternative estimators and model specifications. Furthermore, the spatial analysis does not reveal significant spillover effects in the efficiency of TDs.

Measuring the efficient management of public works contracts: A non-parametric approach

The efficiency of execution of public works contracts is usually defined in terms of the capacity to complete works within the costs and the time agreed on in the contract. Therefore, it has been traditionally measured considering either costs overruns or delays. Our purpose is to consider both measures simultaneously, so as to develop a measure of overall efficiency of public works contracts execution. We compute this measure, through a benchmark procedure, using a non-parametric approach (DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis). The analysis is carried out employing a detailed data set of Italian public contracts for roads and highways, in the period 2000- 2005.

Selezione dei fornitori e incentivi alla rinegoziazione in contratti incompleti: rilevanza empirica nel settore dei lavori pubblici

The literature on public procurement pays great attention to the rules underlying tendering procedures as well as on the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector because it offers room for the contract renegotiation and, therefore, for the increase of the final price. This paper offers empirical evidence of the potential effects of different tendering procedures (i.e. negotiation vs auction) on the contract renegotiation in the public work sector. The results show that, in presence of incomplete contracts, an excessive emphasis on the tendering rules, in absence of an efficient system of sanctions and incentives, can induce firms to behave strategically: they will offer very low bids to be awarded the contract, looking for renegotiating during the contract implementation.